The news that Pegasus, yet another spyware this time of Israeli origin, would be used to spy on journalists, politicians and NGO activists has caused scandal in the media and in social network users. The ghosts of global surveillance, of the “violation of privacy” and even of a “global humanitarian crisis” have been evoked from many quarters.
In reality, there is little to be surprised or scandalized because even just by recalling the recent Hacking Team case it would be understood that that of Pegasus it is non-news. As I wrote in Strategikon in unsuspecting times, there is nothing strange in the fact that states collect information on anyone, including heads of state, in any way and by any means, even by violating the law. It can be an unpleasant and disturbing prospect, but that doesn’t change the fact that such actions are perfectly consistent with the need to protect national security. As the character of an iconic Altan cartoon says, “the spies spy” and the interlocutor raises: “crazy stuff”.
The problem, therefore, is not the use of this or that technological tool to gain a strategic advantage, but the way in which each State decides to limit (or extend) its range of action when “security” is at stake. national”. Again, the tail wags the dog. Even technological espionage has always been practiced using the tools that were gradually available in the specific historical period, and with the cooperation of companies belonging to the security sector and not.
Politicians, journalists and activists have always been the target of the attention of institutional structures more or less formally legitimized to conduct such operations. And to be honest, politicians, activists and journalists were also, often, “confidential sources” of the aforementioned “information structures” which recruits them (goes) no exploiting greed, desire for revenge or more or less rooted ideological convictions.
The history of the part of the Cold War fought on the Italian territory that begins to emerge in particular due to the declassification of English archives is the best proof of the validity of this finding. Most likely there is still so much to discover and much more that will never be brought to the knowledge of historians. But what is available is already sufficient to carry out some considerations (however, not particularly original for those who deal professionally with these topics).
In the first place, whoever invokes the intervention of the judiciary or the various guarantors to put an end to this “scandal” should know that the former is in fact excluded and then by law from interfering with these activities through the affixing of the secrecy of State; while the latter do not have and cannot have any role in the field of national security which the EU Treaty removes from their competence. Yet, it is unthinkable that in a Western democracy there can be more or less institutional apparatuses – and companies – that operate beyond any control. Or not?
Secondly, however it is faced, from the theoretical point of view the problem admits of no solutions. If the rule of law – the primacy of the law – the state cannot exceed certain limits, whatever the cost. At the same time, in the face of the protection of the “superior interest of the State”, the law (the result of political compromises) cannot represent a limit. It is the paradox of wondering what happens when an unstoppable bullet hits an indestructible wall.
In practice, however, the synthesis between the two needs is achieved by renouncing to apply absolute categories. What matters is achieving the “tactical goal” – that is, the immediate goal – by postponing the management of consequences to the future, should they ever occur.
Thus, the rules are written in a confused way, so much so that they can be violated by denying having done so using the technique of plausible deniability. Where it is not possible to arrive with regulatory engineering, we arrive with the creation of a separate reality. And when the “illegal” action becomes public, the demon is exorcised by investigative commissions, journalistic investigations and historical analyzes, and then starts over to celebrate the rite by evoking a new one. An example above all is the final report of the Church Committee published in 1976 established by the American Parliament to investigate the clandestine activities of the US secret services. It contains many inconvenient truths and great statements of principle. But his revelations have not changed the way the intelligence apparatuses work.
Israel’s position is more pragmatic, as it has not yet approved a law to regulate Mossad activities, including electronic surveillance. There are no definitive official positions on this point and no one knows what the future holds. Certainly, however, the present ofInstitute it is characterized by enormous operational freedom reporting directly to the chief executive.
This last consideration allows us to return to the point and conclude the reasoning. National security, as has always been clear, has little to do with the protection of individuals and much to do with the survival of the state. However, with all the limitations and complexities of finding a balance between opposing and irreducible needs, it is not true that all states operate in the same way. Despite its recent history, Italy does not (anymore) derive from hypercontrol and the balance between the powers of the state makes it less easy to propose schemes such as those we have experienced in the past. The nascent Cybersecurity Agency, in other words, will not be the defunct Reserved Affairs Office of the Ministry of the Interior.
In the background, however, three huge themes remain.
The first is how Big Tech have created a diseased technological ecosystem, overrun by vulnerabilities and programming flaws that facilitate electronic espionage. The second is the role of progressive replacement of states in the governance of national security. The third, and most terrifying, is that of the weaponization of knowledge. Never before has knowledge been a weapon which, however, is not only in the hands of the States. To prevent activists, independent researchers and organized groups from building tools to defend themselves from the invasiveness (right or wrong) of the states, will we go back to an era in which knowledge will be allowed only to a select few?
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