Chen Min’er appointed secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Party Committee
According to news from the CCP’s official media Xinhua News Agency on December 8, Chen Min’er concurrently served as a member, standing committee member, and secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China, and Li Hongzhong no longer held these positions concurrently.
Chen Miner is a native of Zhuji, Zhejiang Province. He is 62 years old this year. From 1999 to 2001, he served as the president and party secretary of Zhejiang Daily, the official newspaper of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee of the Communist Party of China. Later, when Xi Jinping was the Secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee of the Communist Party of China from 2002 to 2007, he was in charge of the Propaganda Department of the Provincial Party Committee. Chen Miner is a loyal supporter of Xi Jinping and one of the key members of the “New Zhijiang Army” led by Xi Jinping.
Before the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Chen Min’er was one of the most popular candidates for “joining the permanent seat”, and was even considered by the outside world to be one of Xi Jinping’s possible successors, but he was eventually defeated as a member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee.
Yuan Jiajun, the former secretary of the Zhejiang Provincial Party Committee of the Communist Party of China, replaced Chen Miner as the secretary of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee.
Yuan Jiajun, 60 years old, is a native of Tonghua, Jilin Province. He is one of the representatives of the “Aerospace Department” officials who have emerged in the CCP’s political arena in recent years.
The British media BBC Chinese noticed that Xi Jinping pays great attention to the proportion of technocrats in the CCP’s decision-making level. Among the 24 members of the Politburo selected for the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, five technocrats were born in the field of science and technology.
The Wall Street Journal reported on November 21 that under the background of Sino-US technological competition, Xi Jinping promoted a large number of scientific and technological professionals to the leadership of the Communist Party of China. And Xi Jinping said at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, “We must insist that technology is the primary productive force, talents are the primary resource, and innovation is the primary driving force.”
The new Central Committee of the Communist Party of China has 81 officials with technical expertise, accounting for nearly 40 percent, according to data compiled by the Brookings Institution, a Washington-based think tank.
Although Xi Jinping is often compared to Mao Zedong in terms of ideology, Xi has repeatedly believed in the importance of science and technology to enhance China‘s economic and military strength, the report said.
Cheng Li, director of the China Center at the Brookings Institution, which compiles and analyzes the data, said these were not just empty words or empty goals, but that Xi was intent on promoting the tech elite into the CCP leadership.
The “top leaders” of the three provinces were adjusted on the same day
On December 7, Yi Lianhong, Secretary of the CPC Jiangxi Provincial Committee, was transferred to be Secretary of the CPC Zhejiang Provincial Committee, Yin Hong, Secretary of the CPC Gansu Provincial Committee, was transferred to be Secretary of the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, and Hu Chang, Governor of Heilongjiang, was promoted to Secretary of the CPC Gansu Provincial Committee.
So far, all local top leaders who are members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China have been determined.
According to a report by China News Weekly on December 8, before this adjustment, both Yi Lianhong and Yin Hong were the provincial party secretary in charge of one province, and Hu Changsheng served as provincial party secretary across provinces as the governor. All three are members of the 20th CPC Central Committee. In terms of age, Yi Lianhong was born in 1959, and Yin Hong and Hu Changsheng were both born in 1963 after the 60s.
The Hong Kong media Ming Pao wrote a review article signed by “Sun Jiaye” on November 3, saying that it was surprising that Chen Min’er failed to join the Standing Committee.
The most notable thing is that among the Politburo and the Secretariat of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, none of the new members belong to the “Zhijiang New Army”. Among the members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC, only Li Qiang and Cai Qi people.
The article believes that this shows that after more than 10 years of operation and layout, the scope of Xi Jinping’s employment is no longer limited to the narrow scope of the “Zhijiang New Army”. The characteristics of the new entrants to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China are “from all corners of the country”, and their sources include Tsinghua University departments, military and aerospace systems, Shaanxi-Gansu cadres, and the old Ministry of Fujian. Today, when the “two establishments” are established, Xi Jinping already has enough available candidates.
As a loyal supporter of Xi Jinping, Chen Min’er was transferred to Tianjin as the “top leader”, which was in line with previous experts’ expectations. His official career is still optimistic, and it is very likely that the Communist Party of China will enter the 21st session of the Communist Party of China five years later.
Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post reported that Wu Muluan, an associate professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore, analyzed that although Chen Min’er was not a permanent member this term, he has been a member of the Politburo since the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. Next, he may serve as the secretary of the Tianjin Municipal Committee of the Communist Party of China. Although being transferred from Chongqing to Tianjin is not a “promotion”, his rich experience in local governance will allow him to prepare for the next leadership reshuffle. “Xi Jinping may enter a fourth term, or even a longer one, and he will need loyalists by his side.”
Wu Muluan mentioned that Xi Jinping relies heavily on the “former colleagues” who worked with him in the past, especially those who established relationships when he worked in Fujian and Zhejiang in the past.
Xi’s army almost achieved a “complete victory” at the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, but the uneven distribution of power within it inevitably laid the hidden danger of division and even power struggle later.
Niu Ben, an analyst for China and Northeast Asia at the Eurasia Group, analyzed in an interview with the British media BBC that after the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, the only important faction remaining in the CCP’s politics is the “Xi faction.” But as Xi stays longer, his allies will start to compete for the position of successor. The relationship with Xi forms the power base. In the future, I will see the “Xi faction” sub-groups competing with each other.
Wu Guoguang, who once served as Zhao Ziyang’s think tank and is currently a senior researcher at the China Center for Economics and Institutions Research at Stanford University, pointed out in his speech on November 22 that the Xi family army is a team composed of various people related to Xi Jinping in life, including the second generation of red Xi’s family ties, Shaanxi going to the countryside, Fujian, Zhejiang, Shanghai and other old departments, the team of Xi’s family army is very strong, but a strong team will divide, “this is the development trend.”
He predicts that in the next five years, the top cadres of the CCP will accelerate their rejuvenation, each family of Xi’s army will scramble to recruit their own troops, and new factions under Xi will rise rapidly. With a possible 4th, 5th, and 6th term in Xi’s term, various factions will compete with each other for the redistribution of power after Xi.