If the armed left knows how to do something, it is to elevate its great criminals to the category of myth; Without a doubt, the most emblematic example is Ernesto “Che” Guevara. The spokesmen for that fiction rightly support those who define them as textbook idiots (read Vargas Llosa, Montaner and Mendoza). Today, some questions and other answers.
Who captured Guevara? The then cavalry captain Gary Prado Salmon, who died on May 6 at the age of 83, without military honors and after suffering several terrorist attacks against him. In the midst of the almost silent news of his death, stating the simple fact can be pointed out by friends of the armed struggle, at least, as a fascist or counterinsurgent expression.
What was the captured guerrilla like? The Guevara who arrived in Bolivia was neither the military hero nor the great intellectual that the armed left wanted to sell. He is a man rejected by the Cuban nomenclature, a wandering guerrilla who, as a useful idiot, serves the egotistical interests of the dictator from Havana. More than a current of thought, Guevara is a simple pawn of Caribbean communism.
What was the Bolivia of the moment? That of the National Revolution of 1952 that was going through a series of changes; among them, the Agrarian Reform. This scenario contradicts the supposed strategic nature of sending Guevara to Bolivia and highlights the decontextualization of the operation. René Barrientos Ortuño was the president and the army was going through a transformation that, begun in the Chaco War (1932-1935) and thanks to the different US missions, was updated in the counterinsurgency fight.
Why Bolivia? Fidel sent Guevara so that from the South American hinterland, and in light of the theory of the insurrectionary focus, he would promote the armed struggle throughout the region waving the slogan “create one, two, three Vietnams”. Simple as that.
How was Guevara captured? Tactically speaking, the subversives who located themselves in Ñancahuazú were more a group of nomads than a properly articulated guerrilla. Once the theater of operations was defined, Captain Prado’s troops proceeded to encircle and isolate the terrain in order to deploy the special forces unit that had just been under instruction from US troops.
Days after the operation against Tamara Bunke, near the Churo and Tusca ravines, Guevara’s gang was detected; At the intersection of both ravines the combat took place. And once numerical superiority decided fate, he expressed: “Don’t kill me, I’m worth more alive than dead”, forgotten was the cry “Homeland and death.” For greater detail, the reader will be able to consult two capital works “A guerrilla immolated” and “How I captured Che”.
Unfortunately, as General Prado explained, with the death of Guevara the focus theory died; but the armed struggle mutated into the modality of urban terrorism.
Guevara dead what followed? In addition to immortalizing the romantic image of the guerrilla (with a beard, uniform and rifle on his shoulder), the myth of the strategic superiority of the insurgency will be created. From this moment on, the erroneous belief that the guerrillas are invincible is perpetuated and, therefore, any military defeat is impossible.
This produced a psychological effect of advantage over the regular troops and the possibility of always having open spaces to strategically maneuver the negotiation tactic.
How did the guerrilla die? Barrientos made the decision to do so in the same way that Guevara proceeded against all the opponents of the brand new Revolution under the pretext of administering “revolutionary justice.” Once the insurgent was shot, a show like that of Régis Debray would be avoided.
If the information is true, three years ago at the UN the guerrilla defended revolutionary justice like this: “Executions, yes. We have executed, are executing and will continue executing as long as it is necessary. Our fight is a fight to the death (…) but yes, we do not commit murders”.
Any similarities between the death of Cienfuegos and Guevara? Based on the method of elimination used against both guerrillas, it can be inferred that Castro was behind all of this. The only difference is that Camilo had ancestry on La Isla, “El Che” was strongly resisted. Machiavellically, Fidel ordered two public buildings in the Plaza de la Revolución to carry a small tribute to the subversives.
Soldier vs guerrilla, who won? The little news coverage that caused the death of General Prado Salmon contrasts openly with the mythical image of the guerrilla. Operation orchestrated to a great extent by many mass media and revolutionary sub-intellectuals, thus evidencing the fertile ground that subversive warfare has.
And since it is easier to repeat commonplaces and not force yourself to think about continental facts on your own, Latin American myths do their thing.
Regrettable conclusion. Fascinated by a mediocre legacy, on all fronts, sanctuaries are raised and preserved to preserve in the memory of millions of naive people who, without reading or analyzing, serve as a sign of reproduction of both the guerrilla myth and the revolutionary sub-intellectual.
Addendum. On May 12, we commemorate, with deep sadness, the 25th anniversary of the assassination of General Fernando Landazábal Reyes at the hands of the FARC guerrillas. The current senator, by grace of Juan Manuel Santos, Julián Gallo Cubillos recognized with total arrogance the authority of the crime before his Special Jurisdiction for Peace. In “Revolutionary Strategy” and “Revolutionary Tactics” we evoke his intellectual legacy.