Like the Soviets, the United States leaves Afghanistan empty-handed – Leonid Bershidsky

The story of the invasions of Afghanistan by two superpowers is full of similarities.

In 1988, as it prepared to leave Afghanistan, the Soviet Union increased economic and military aid to the government of Mohammad Najibullah, despite the fact that Moscow was aware that requests for new weapons were illegitimate and based on inflated numbers. Mikhail Gorbačëv and his Politburo felt guilty and wanted to reward their “Afghan friends” (an expression that in the official documents of the time indicated Najibullah and his supporters) for having abandoned them to the fury of the opposition, trained, armed and financed by the states United.

Gorbachev was also aware of a question related to dignity. “He often said we couldn’t pull up our pants and run away, as the Americans did in Vietnam,” his foreign policy adviser Anatoly Chernyev recalled in 2009.

It took the Soviets over three years to leave Afghanistan after making the final decision. When they delivered the bases and military equipment, the procedures were quite elaborate. The new local owners received immaculate barracks and newly tested weapons. General Boris Gromov, head of the retreat, recalled in his memoirs (The limited contingent) the way the Jalalabad garrison and its barracks were left: “The beds were in perfect order. The bedside mats were also in the proper position. There were slippers under the lockers. The barracks contained all the necessary equipment. Running water arrived without the slightest interruption ”.

Today the United States leaves Afghanistan and would like to complete the withdrawal a few months after the final decision made by President Joe Biden. Washington seems more concerned than the Soviets about the possibility that its weapons will end up in the hands of the likely new masters of the country. The soldiers, in fact, are destroying a lot of equipment, and some of what the Americans are leaving behind in Afghanistan is unusable, by choice or by chance. For example, cars and trucks are abandoned without their keys. Furthermore, the United States does not seem particularly attached to the idea of ​​an elaborate farewell, at least judging by the unexpected nocturnal departure from the Bagram air base, where the Americans limited themselves to cutting the electricity (and consequently the water supply) before. to leave.

But the more things seem different, the more they stay the same. The spotless Soviet garrison of Jalalabad was sacked a few hours after the Russians left. “All items of any value – televisions, sound equipment, air conditioners, furniture, even the beds – were sold in the city market,” writes Gromov. The same scene was repeated in Bagram a few minutes after the Americans left: the looters broke in and took away all the valuables they could find.

The Soviets had gone to Afghanistan to foster a Communist coup as part of the expansionist strategy of the Cold War. The United States, on the other hand, invaded the country in an attempt to eliminate Al Qaeda after the attacks of September 11, 2001, a theoretically more honorable justification. The Soviet Union lost 15,000 men in less than ten years. Americans (adding Pentagon employees and private military company employees) have lost less than half in twice as long. The Soviets achieved nothing with their Afghan war, and the use of a large amount of resources in an endless conflict only hastened the end of Communist power. The Americans, after spending the appalling sum of 2.26 trillion dollars in the war, do not risk collapse and have at least managed to break Al Qaeda’s back and kill Osama bin Laden, even if not in Afghanistan.

Yet it is difficult to focus on these differences when the similarities are much stronger. At the beginning of 1989, according to Gromov, “the opposition” – a generic term for various Islamist groups composed of warlords who aimed exclusively at their own interests – controlled “207 districts out of 290”. The number of districts is quite fluid in Afghanistan, and according to current estimates, the Taliban control one third of the “421 districts and district centers”. The number continues to grow. This means that both superpowers have knowingly left behind besieged governments and a feeling of impending tragedy looming over the territories controlled by these governments. When the Taliban emerged as a credible force capable of putting an end to the internal struggles between the warlords and conquered Kabul in 1996, they hanged Najibullah despite having long since relinquished power. Afghan leaders who have partnered with the United States could face the same fate if they don’t leave the country.

In both cases, Pakistan played a decisive role in thwarting the superpowers’ ambition to control Islamist radicalism. As former CIA agent Bruce Riedel ruthlessly wrote for the Brookings Institution in early 2021, “the war against the Taliban will be impossible to win as long as Pakistan offers them shelter, training, equipment and funds. We cannot defeat Pakistan, a state that has nuclear weapons and is the fifth most populous nation in the world ”.

In 1989 Pakistan violated the Afghan National Reconciliation Agreements, creating the basis for the Soviet withdrawal. Afghan rebels, including fighters who would join the Taliban ranks, maintained a base in Pakistan and recruited Afghans from local refugee camps. Arms and money also flowed from the neighboring country to war zones, with the help of the United States and Western allies. As with Americans today, the Soviet Union at the time proved unprepared to confront Pakistan militarily.

In other words, regardless of the values, the time dedicated, the number of lost soldiers and the winning and / or losing position within the geopolitical battles, those who abandon Afghanistan do so leaving behind scenes of looting, a weak and weak regime. too dependent on foreign support (and which is unlikely to last long), fierce local fighters who feel rewarded after years of suffering and finally smug Pakistani generals across the border. Another constant is the burgeoning opiate industry, which neither the Soviets nor the Americans have been able to defeat.

These enduring circumstances are not so much related to the legendary indomitable character of the Afghans, but to the fact that, subject to the differences between the Soviets of the 1980s and the Americans in the first two decades of this century, both armies arrived in Afghanistan without the necessary preparation and with too much arrogance and confidence, only to quickly discover that they couldn’t stay in the country. Americans and Soviets were certain of the superiority of their army and of their values. They both noticed that some locals appreciated what they brought – each their own version of secular progressivism – and were convinced that those values ​​would take hold. But neither one nor the other have been able to maintain their presence indefinitely. In our age there is no room for colonization, an approach that Gorbachev was reluctant to follow when Biden is today. Eventually, for both the Americans and the Soviets, the human and financial cost outweighed the desire to control Afghanistan.

For the Taliban, as for the assorted Afghan rebels of the 1980s, the whole reason for existence is to stay in Afghanistan forever. In 2010, as in 1989, local fighters feel they can fight for the country and its lifestyle. The Taliban can be particularly convincing in this regard. On the other hand, if you intend not to leave, whatever happens, you can hold out longer than any superpower. Attachment to a place and its lifestyle are a very strong constant which, as the example of Afghanistan demonstrates, can create other constants.

(Translation by Andrea Sparacino)