The democratic challenges of Europe after the pandemic – Cas Mudde

We are not even in the middle of 2022 and I can already say that this year is neither what I thought nor what I would have hoped for. Of course, covid-19 was not the “great disruptor” that was feared. Indeed, most governments have put an end to almost all measures against the virus, and most of us are now happily convinced that we have entered a post-pandemic era. We probably would have done it even without the Russian (re) invasion of Ukraine, but this has certainly contributed to changing the mentality and priorities of most Europeans. And if it is true that illiberalism has replaced Brexit as the main target of the EU, this target is more outside than inside the Union – Vladimir Putin’s Russia rather than Viktor Orbán’s Hungary, for not to mention Jarosław Kaczyński’s Poland.

The Russian (re) invasion of Ukraine is the fifth political crisis of the 21st century after 9/11, the great recession, the so-called refugee crisis and the covid-19 pandemic. That is to say a crisis almost every five years! The war in Ukraine has at least postponed a political assessment of the pandemic. It will probably be the most significant political crisis of all, perhaps matched only by that of 9/11.

He has already influenced some of the most important national elections in Europe, helping – ironically – both Viktor Orbán in Hungary and Emmanuel Macron in France. But if the former has achieved a large victory at home – in free but incorrect elections – he will be the latter to emerge as the main winner at the European level.

The split illiberal front
Orbán surprised friends and foes with his big election victory. By making the most of his monopoly on the state media – on which the opposition had only five minutes of broadcasts – he turned the war in Ukraine into an asset rather than a disadvantage, presenting himself as the reliable and stable leader. which would have kept Hungary out of the war and low energy prices.

His “neutral” stance has worked well at home, where both private and public media controlled by his Fidesz party continue to have strong pro-Russian coverage. But he is isolating him more and more abroad. After losing Czech leader Andrej Babiš in the 2021 elections, and Austrian Chancellor Sebastian Kurz in a political scandal, Orbán will soon lose another ally: Prime Minister Janez Janša, who was defeated in Slovenian elections in April.

More importantly, the war in Ukraine created a serious rift in the Budapest-Warsaw alliance, the core of the illiberal front within the EU. While many analysts like to point out the far right’s support for Putin – which is not as strong as that of the far left – the war is not marked by a split between “generalists” and “populists”. Within the European Council, in fact, both the strongest opponents and the strongest supporters of Putin are populists (of the radical right), respectively the Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland and Fidesz in Hungary. Orbán has been absent from various regional events in support of Ukraine in recent months, and the Visegrád 4 (V4) group is rapidly transforming into Visegrád 3, after the Czech Republic, Poland and Slovakia refused to attend a meeting of ministers defense of V4, in protest against the pro-Russian position of Hungary.

Macron took advantage of the war in Ukraine to present himself as a world leader, having more meetings with Putin than his colleagues in the US, UK or Germany, but was forced to focus on domestic politics to defeat Marine Le Pen per second. round of presidential elections. As soon as he was re-elected, and in charge of the presidency of the European Council, he was expected to use Europe Day in Brussels to set out his ambitions for a liberal and democratic Europe. Ironically, the same day Putin used Victory Day to expose his vision of an illiberal Europe.

With the Germans returning from decades of economic dependence and political pacification of Russia, Europe is looking to France to take the initiative and Macron is happy to do so, if only because he will still face a fundamental political election in June, which could strengthen or weaken his presidency. The latter hypothesis will materialize if he is forced to cohabitate, that is, to govern together with a prime minister of another party: his second term will then be much less ambitious and could end in stalemate.

Family rhetoric
Whatever the outcome of the French parliamentary elections, the EU and its member states have important decisions to make. In the short term, defense and energy policy will be at the top of the agenda, and both will have to undergo fundamental changes after decades of complacency and neglect. At the same time, EU (and NATO) enlargement is once again on the agenda, especially for Ukraine and the Western Balkans. All of these issues will be promoted using the familiar rhetoric of liberal-democratic Europe’s protection against illiberal Russia. The big question is: how will this external struggle against illiberalism affect the internal one?

So far the camps have been anything but ideologically homogeneous. Just as the United States has included illiberal India in its “summit for democracy”, so the EU is increasingly celebrating illiberal Poland for its firmly anti-Russian and pro-Ukrainian stance, which includes its generous reception of more than three millions of Ukrainian refugees.

With a foreign policy taking on more weight than domestic policy concerns, there is a risk that the new litmus test for Europe is an anti-Russian position rather than respect for liberal democratic institutions and values. It could be bad news for Hungary, but also for the EU. Because, unlike NATO, the EU is not primarily a military alliance, but a “community of values”. More specifically, of liberal democratic values.

(Translation by Federico Ferrone)