The French failure in Mali is military, political and diplomatic – Pierre Haski

Mali, the main front on which the French army is engaged outside the national territory, is turning into a political-diplomatic puzzle. Now the risk for Paris is that of failure, and therefore of a retreat under conditions that would undermine French influence on the continent in the long run.

France has just suffered two very hard blows in Mali, almost nine years after the start of the intervention decided by the socialist president François Hollande. Both events are linked to decisions taken by the junta in power in Bamako, which challenged not only Paris but also the countries of the region and some of the Malians. At the center of the issue are the calendar for the return to civilian life and the deployment of the Russian military, with an ambiguous status.

The head of the junta, Colonel Assimi Goïta, announced the next steps in the transition to a civilian-led government, after disputing the goal of holding elections in February. In the new roadmap, which surprised everyone, the presidential elections are postponed to January 2026. Therefore Mali should experience another four years of military rule.

In what sense can this be considered a failure for France? Paris would like to maintain the appearance of a military presence requested by the official authorities of Bamako, also to respond to the anti-French campaign that has become increasingly evident in recent weeks.

France certainly did not like the “coup in the coup” which in May had led Colonel Goïta to overthrow the people he himself had placed in power a few months earlier. French President Emmanuel Macron declared that he would not remain “on the side of a country where democratic legitimacy and transition no longer exist”. Since then, however, the situation has not been resolved, and Macron had to cancel his visit to Mali just before Christmas, an event that was recklessly announced before he was certain the conditions were acceptable.

The second issue is that of Wagner’s mercenaries, the Russian private military company close to the Kremlin, whose arrival in Mali has been denounced by France and 17 other Western countries. Bamako denied and claims that these are only Russian military consultants, but the misunderstanding about the presence of these individuals, already reported by the dozen in Bamako and in central Mali, cannot last long.

Paris initially reacted categorically: “Either Wagner or us”. Now the French position is less clear-cut, even if in Paris they are still convinced that the cohabitation between two contradictory forces can become unmanageable.

For the moment the impact is primarily political. France has lost the opportunity to make itself heard in Bamako: its warnings remain a dead letter or even feed the idea that the French government wants to dictate the law to the brave Colonel Goïta for fear of Russian “competition”. And this despite the fact that the African countries of the region share French objectives and have imposed a series of sanctions on the Malian junta.

After nine years of presence in Mali, France finds itself without a clear horizon, neither military nor political, and without an honorable way out. Between jihadists, mafia networks, putschists and Russian mercenaries, in Mali there may no longer be room for the army and for the influence of the old colonial power.

This is the problem Macron faces, determined to re-establish Franco-African relations but trapped in a conflict without solution.

(Translation by Andrea Sparacino)