Wu Renhua believes that the most important truth of the June 4 incident is the truth of the massacre, and the core issue is the use of the military to massacre civilians. (Image credit: Getty image)
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Taught at China University of Political Science and Law in 1989Wu Renhua，June Fourth IncidentWhen the outbreak “inTiananmen SquareSpend the bloodiest night”. This bloody experience prompted him to write “The Inside Story of Tiananmen’s Bloody Clearance”, which was published insix fourOn the eve of the 20th anniversary of the incident, Wu Renhua published “The Martial Law Troops in the June 4th Incident”, why he wrote this book, Wu Renhua said, in order to find out what happenedthe truth.He believes that the most important truth about the June 4 incident is thatmassacrethe truth, its core problem is to usearmyMassacre civilians.Wu Renhua, as an eyewitness and a scholar of historical documents, finally found out after years of investigation.martial lawCase. He introduced in detail the number of the martial law troops, the route to Beijing, and what tasks they performed after entering Beijing, especially on the night of the massacre. There is no firing order, the way the firing order was given, the death of the military and police, and so on.
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What is the so-called truth of the June 4 incident? Wu Renhua believes that the most important truth is the truth of the massacre. Its core problem is the use of the military to kill civilians. “The Martial Law Troops in the June 4 Incident” details the situation of the martial law troops that entered Beijing during the bloody crackdown on June 4 in 1989. The whole book is about 350,000 words, and each martial law army that entered Beijing at that time is described in detail in a special chapter: including the route of the martial law troops entering Beijing, what did they do after entering Beijing? The circumstances of their mission on the night of the carnage.
The number of martial law troops
Regarding the situation of the martial law troops involved in the bloody repression of June 4th, the CCP official did not only keep the troop numbers secret in the so-called public information on the so-called suppression of violence after the event, but also did not have the troop code names that could be announced to the public.
After years of collecting information and using his professional knowledge in textual research, Wu Renhua deciphered the numbers and codes of the martial law troops one by one, and determined the location of the martial law troops and the number of troops entering Beijing.
According to Wu Renhua’s investigation, a total of 14 army groups were carrying out the martial law mission in Beijing. Including the 24th Group Army, 27th, 28th, 38th, 63rd and 65th Group Army of the Beijing Military Region; three group armies of the Shenyang Military Region: the 39th, 40th and 64th Group Army; Jinan Military Region’s 20th, 26th, 54th and 67th Group Army; Nanjing Military Region’s 12th Group Army . A total of 14 armies. It also includes the 15th Airborne Corps directly under the Central Military Commission, which was the only airborne corps of the CCP at that time and the most elite troops of the CCP at that time; including the 14th Artillery Division of the Beijing Military Region; the 1st Tank Division of the Tianjin Garrison Area; Beijing The 1st Guard Division and the 3rd Guard Division in the garrison area; and the Beijing Corps of the Armed Police Force. Not all of the soldiers of the 14 group armies entered Beijing. The number of officers and soldiers entering Beijing was between 200,000 and 250,000.
The main people who shot and killed were the 38th Army and the 15th Airborne Corps
From the evening of June 3rd to the early morning of June 4th, there were a lot of troops performing the Tiananmen clearance mission. The officials made careful arrangements for this because they were worried that there would be problems with the troops. The open task of the martial law troops is of course to suppress the student movement and occupy Tiananmen Square, and at the same time to prevent a possible coup d’etat within the party and a mutiny in the army.
One of the troops who fired was the 38th Army of the Army, which entered from West Chang’an Avenue, and the 15th Army of the Airborne Forces, which entered Beijing from Zhushikou, Tianqiao, and Qianmen to the south of Tiananmen. Other units also fired, but it was these two units that killed the most.
Who gave the order to shoot
Many people are very concerned about whether there was an order to shoot on the night of June 4th? How was the firing order given? Wu Renhua ruled out the possibility of each army group firing without authorization, but there was a clear firing order. Wu Renhua had eleven specific materials on hand to corroborate it: including those written by Major General Wu Jiamin, the commander of the 40th Army Group Army, all of which mentioned the firing order and how the firing order was received.
Regarding the level at which the firing order was given, this order was not issued from the army group corps level, nor from the front-line command of the large military region that followed the army. After investigation, Wu Renhua determined that the order to shoot must have been given with the consent of Deng Xiaoping. One is that Liu Huaqing, who was in charge of the work of the Central Military Commission at the time and served as the commander-in-chief of the martial law force, was a member of the Central Military Commission and deputy secretary-general of the Central Military Commission. The other two deputy commanders were Chi Haotian, then chief of the general staff, and Zhou Yibing, commander of the Beijing Military Region. They are entirely under the direct leadership of Yang Shangkun, vice chairman and secretary general of the Central Military Commission. Yang Shangkun has always been a cautious person. He actually managed the army as Deng Xiaoping’s agent. Moreover, in the early and middle stages of the 1989 student movement, Yang Shangkun had always been sympathetic to the student movement, and agreed with Zhao Ziyang’s idea of solving problems on the track of democracy and the rule of law. Later, because of Deng Xiaoping’s determination to suppress, Yang Shangkun, of course, listened to Deng Xiaoping, and went all out to enforce martial law and clear the scene. Therefore, Wu Renhua believed that the order to shoot was given by the supreme ruler at that time. That is, with the consent of Deng Xiaoping. After Deng Xiaoping agreed, it passed through the Central Military Commission, then through the headquarters of the martial law troops, and then communicated to the army level of each group army.
Military and police deaths
The official account of the number of military and police deaths has changed three times. At the meeting of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China in early June 1989, Li Ximing, then secretary of the Beijing Municipal Party Committee, made a report. He mentioned that the death toll of the military and police was 23, including 10 armed police and 13 soldiers. This is a very specific number. But it was very strange. A few days later, Chen Xitong, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China at that time and the mayor of Beijing, was entrusted by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China to make a report on the handling of the unrest and riots in Beijing at the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The circumstances of the police’s death have become murky. He said dozens of military and police were killed. Immediately afterwards, Yuan Mu, the then Secretary-General of the State Council, did not even mention the vague death toll of the military and police at a press conference on June 6. He said a total of 216 people were killed by the military, police and the masses. That is to say, the number of military and police deaths has changed from specific to vague, and finally it is simply mixed with the dead masses.
Wu Renhua said, why did he study the death of the military and police? This is because the CCP government has always said after June 4 that the army had to shoot down because of the counter-revolutionary riots in Beijing. Wu Renhua’s research on the death figures of the military and police concluded that: a total of fifteen people were killed by the military and police, including two armed policemen. Wu Renhua listed their rank, time of death and place of death respectively.
Several situations of military police death
The circumstances of the deaths of 15 soldiers and policemen are not the same. The first case: six soldiers from the Artillery Brigade of the 38th Group Army received an emergency order on the night of June 3 to go to Tiananmen Square to deliver anti-riot equipment. The car overturned at the intersection of Cuiwei Road, and the fuel tank exploded, unable to break free and died.
The second situation: Wang Jingsheng, a second lieutenant of the 24th Army, suddenly fell ill and died on July 4, 1989, one month after the June 4th crackdown. His death notice clearly stated that heart failure was a major cause of death. His death had nothing to do with the mob either.
The third situation: Major of the Political Department of the 39th Army, Yu Jinglu, a propaganda officer, was killed by the martial law troops himself. On the night of June 3, 1989, when he followed the martial law troops to Tiananmen Square, the troops were blocked by the masses. As a propaganda officer, Yu Jinglu was eager to take pictures of the clearing in Tiananmen Square and make a record of the clearing process. Due to his dedication to meritorious service, he did not listen to the dissuasion of others. He changed into civilian clothes and marched towards Tiananmen Square alone. As a result, he was shot and injured on the way. He was sent to the hospital by the masses and died of medical treatment.
The deaths of the above eight people have nothing to do with the so-called “thugs” at all. Only seven other people were associated with the so-called “thugs”.
There is no ‘counter-revolutionary riot’ in Beijing
Wu Renhua’s research on the deaths of the military and police explained: First, there was no counter-revolutionary riot in Beijing at that time. If there were counter-revolutionary riots, the number of military and police deaths would be far more than that. Because at that time Beijing was in a state of “intercepting” soldiers, that is, countless civilians took to the streets to intercept the army. From the night of June 3rd to the early morning of June 4th, at least one million people intercepted the troops advancing towards Tiananmen Square in various places in Beijing. With so many “thugs” intercepting the troops, how many people died in the troops? Hard to imagine. Wu Renhua gave an example: On the evening of June 3rd, around the early morning of June 4th, 880 officers and soldiers of the 173rd Infantry Regiment of the 20th Army of the Army were stopped at the east gate of the Temple of Heaven Park, of which about 300 officers and soldiers were stopped at this park. Under a wall at the east gate. At that time, Zhu Shuangxi, a party of the group army, wrote in a signed article: At that time, there were more than 60,000 people who surrounded 300 officers and soldiers under the fence. Just imagine, if more than 60,000 people were rioting, the outcome of 300 officers and soldiers would be unimaginable. And at the request of Colonel Chen Rongfu, the head of the 173rd regiment, the people sent 11 officers and soldiers who were injured during the march to the hospital for emergency treatment. Wu Renhua believes that this example reflects the basic situation in Beijing at that time: as long as the army stops advancing, the people will not only not be violent to them, but will be treated very kindly.
Shooting and repressing some people in the front with violence and violence in the back
Then, the second conclusion is drawn from this: the army shot and suppressed it first, and some people followed by violence. Wu Renhua said that he has never denied that during the June 4th crackdown, some people used violence to change violence, using bricks, stones, and wooden sticks to deal with the killing soldiers. But we must recognize the relationship between causality and time. First of all, because the army shot and massacred the people, the scene of heavy casualties angered some people, because people are bloody after all. One thing to remind everyone to pay attention to is that none of the fifteen soldiers and police died earlier than 11:00 pm on June 3, 1989. The vast majority were around the early hours of June 4, 1989. This clearly shows that these military police died after the martial law troops shot and massacred them.
Wu Renhua pointed out that the martial law troops fired at ten o’clock in the evening on June 3, 1989. The first person who died was Song Xiaoming, a technical worker at the Third Research Institute of the Chinese Ministry of Space. He was shot near Wukesong at ten o’clock in the evening on June 3, 1989.
Responsible editor: Chen Jun
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