[Epoch Times, July 25, 2021]Hello, viewers, my name is Yokogawa. Welcome to the Yokogawa Viewpoint Channel. Today is July 24, Saturday.
Today’s focus: What is the meaning of Xi Jinping’s visit to Lhasa during the Zhengzhou floods? Compared with Xi and Deng’s evasion of floods, why did the United States prosecute the CCP’s fox hunters?
Why did Xi Jinping visit Lhasa during the floods? Most of the welcome crowd were not Tibetans; compare Deng Xiaoping’s Banqiao dam failure in 1975 and Xi Jinping’s flood avoidance in 2021; the US cracked down on the CCP’s illegal fox hunting operations in the United States, plus one defendant, overseas Chinese We should avoid breaking the law by helping the CCP.
Xi Jinping’s inspection of Lhasa is very strange
Xi Jinping’s inspection of Lhasa was very strange. Compared with the floods, Tibet currently has no emergencies, and there is no need for leaders to pay for the inspection. Speaking of laboring the people and hurting the wealth, after watching the front and shouting, so many extras are still sending two people on both sides of the road to throw Hadas in the car. Who are these people?
Lhasa: In 1951, with a population of approximately 25,000 + 15,000 monks, Tibetans in Lhasa experienced two great escapes. In 1959 and 1989, the CCP repressed twice. A large number of Tibetans and monks left, and most of them were Han Chinese.
In this census, there are 600,000 Tibetans in Lhasa and 230,000 Hans, but the army is not included in the census. According to estimates by the Tibetan government in exile and human rights organizations, Tibetans are a minority in Lhasa. The resident of Lhasa is dominated by party and government agencies. Even Tibetans are related to the party and government of the CCP. Therefore, most of the people who donate Hada are party and government agencies. Tibetans are not excluded.
Xi Jinping’s visit to Lhasa has two functions: 1) to avoid the embarrassment of inspecting the disaster area; 2) to draw attention to man-made disasters by visiting news spots. Just look at the first page of the “Henan Daily” on the 24th.
Deng Xiaoping could not have done anything back then
This is different from Deng Xiaoping’s situation back then. Deng couldn’t do anything at that time (of course, even if he did, he might not do it). The situation at that time was that the country was in chaos. Zhou Enlai was unable to cope with his physical condition and had to use Deng Xiaoping; Mao was in charge of revolution and did not control production and construction. The troubles responsible for production have been the case since the Mao era, and it is still the case now).
Deng Xiaoping needed to balance Mao’s revolution with his being used to save the economy, and also to deal with Mao’s thugs Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao. Jiang Zhang was looking forward to Deng’s negligence or loopholes and troubles. Don’t forget that year, 1975. Re-use Deng (Vice Chairman of the Military Commission, Chief of Staff, First Deputy Prime Minister) in November to re-use Deng Xiaoping in November (Criticizing Deng’s counterattack against the right-turning case).
Even if there is a saying of playing bridge, that would be helpless. Deng Xiaoping later strengthened his power to really play bridge. This is not an excuse for Deng. The nature and responsibilities of Deng’s subsequent 89 Tiananmen massacre and the dam failure of the Banqiao Reservoir in 1975 are different. What I am talking about is how the high-level CCP politics works.
What’s the difference between Xi Deng who both avoided floods?
In the Zhengzhou disaster, Xi Jinping held the highest power, and it is not an exaggeration to say nothing. Although there is a high-level power struggle, it will never affect the decision-making and implementation of disaster relief, that is, it is impossible to shirk responsibility. A visit to Lhasa will not add points to his struggle within the party and the layout of the 20th major.
In the two major disasters in Henan in 1975 and 2021, Deng and Xi Jinping’s avoidance, shirk responsibility, and even escape are incomparable. As for whether someone digs a hole for him, he has to jump down to dig the hole. This is like saying that the Gang of Four deceived Mao Zedong. Whoever wants to believe will believe it.
The number of victims and vehicles in the Jingguang North Road Tunnel
The official report is that there are more than 200 cars, Caixin.com reported that 2 people were killed, and the paper reported that 4 people and more than 200 cars were hard to confirm. But everyone who drives knows that there is no way to go in a traffic jam. Before the flood, the tunnel was in a state of traffic jams. It is impossible for the Jingguang North Road Tunnel to have less than 300 vehicles.
Someone photographed a lot of suspected corpses wrapped in white cloth pulled out of the tunnel by extended trailers. The actual death toll may be difficult to know.
The death toll from the two major incidents is still a mystery
We know that the death toll from two major events is still a mystery. The 89 Tiananmen Square and the Wenchuan Earthquake, the former was wiped out by the army, and the latter had civilian volunteers who collected a partial list. With the intervention of the army or armed police this time, it is difficult for the outside world to get a closer figure. Anyway, the official figures are by no means credible.
Dozens of villages flooded in Xinxiang disaster
Another issue worthy of attention is the Xinxiang disaster. The “Communist Canal” broke its dyke, flooded the Weihe River, and Weihe broke its dyke. The cause may be that the four reservoirs in the upper reaches of the river were broken or flooded, causing dozens of villages downstream to be flooded, only one It is said that there are 10,000 people trapped. The water outside the village is 8 meters deep, and the water is 1.8 meters inside the village. The water is still rising. The local truck driver used a car to enter the breach and fill it in invalid.
The armed police all went to Zhengzhou to block news and show off. Sacrificing the countryside to protect the city is also a major feature of the CCP’s rule. “Ode to Long River” talks about this. It is called losing the pawn and protecting the car. The key is not whether to protect the city or not, but that the sacrificed countryside should be rescued and compensated in time.
The CCP’s armed police have sufficient resources. If they cannot do it, there are only two situations: they are unwilling to do it, or they are unable to do it. The latter shows that the CCP’s military is actually incapable of combat. Testing the strength of the military means major disasters and actual combat. Exercises are not counted as exercises by the CCP’s military.
Major disasters can test the ability of intelligence collection, analysis, decision-making, army mobilization, deployment, and communications to reach the destination under harsh conditions.
U.S. cracks down on CCP fox hunters
The U.S. Department of Justice has updated the indictment, prosecuting 9 people who participated in the “Fox Hunt”. I talked about this case when I first started working on the YouTube channel in October last year. This time a new defendant was added.
Let me briefly talk about the case first.
From 2016 to 2019, the defendant threatened, harassed, monitored, and intimidated someone who had lived in New Jersey since 2010 (Xu Jin, the former director of the Wuhan Development and Reform Commission and his wife Liu Fang, a hundred Hongtong staff) and a daughter of a woman2, Live in California. This is part of the CCP’s “Fox Hunting Operation” and “Skynet Operation”. Participants were sent from mainland China, there were also Chinese living in the United States, and even hired in the United States.
In 2017, three mainland officials brought Xu’s father to the United States and forced Xu to return to China for trial along with the suspect. Participants included an hired American private detective, some were responsible for collecting Xu’s personal information, some were receiving mainland officials, some were operational logistics, some were tracking and monitoring Xu’s daughter and using photos for cyber threats; some went directly to Xu’s home and knocked them out. Door and leave a threatening note.
In October last year, 8 people were prosecuted. This time, a Tu Lan (Tu Lan) was added, an official of the former Hanyang District Procuratorate.
In this way, at least three people were sent directly from China: Hanyang District Procuratorate (picture blue), Hanyang District Public Security Bureau, and a retired physician from Xiangyang Central Hospital (taking care of Xu’s father along the way). Find the rest directly in the United States.
Here are a few issues worthy of attention.
1. Does Fox Hunt violate the sovereignty of the host country?
The U.S. prosecution was made under the pretext of acting as an agent of a foreign government that did not notify the U.S. Department of Justice, acted and conspired as an illegal agent of the People’s Republic of China without notifying the Attorney General in advance, and was involved and conspired to be involved in cross-state and transnational kidnapping. . Tulan and Zhu Feng also charged with obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice (20 years).
There is an article in the country saying that this is nothing at all, but just contacting the wanted person and telling him the domestic policy towards him. In fact, it cannot be tolerated by any sovereign country, but some small countries can’t do anything about it.
This is a routine operation of the CCP, and it is indeed done in many countries. It is also in Hanyang District. In 2018, another Hongtong officer was arrested in Kenya and returned to China, and the Fox Hunting Working Group of the Ministry of Public Security led the Hubei police to catch it. , Claiming to have the cooperation of the Kenyan police.
Why didn’t the Ministry of Public Security be sent to the United States, but the Hanyang District came to the United States and then asked for help? I knew that it was against the laws of the United States, so I didn’t dare to do that.
2. Why doesn’t the United States cooperate?
As I said, countries are not required to cooperate with the red circular. The conditions for cooperation are generally that the same criminal facts are also similar crimes in this country, and there must be sufficient evidence.
This has nothing to do with whether this person committed a crime, but whether the Chinese police can provide evidence acceptable to the US Department of Justice. The CCP knew that it could not provide it, so it could only kidnap it sneakily.
This is not the United States protecting criminals, because the CCP refused to provide criminal evidence. In fact, it did not refuse, but did not communicate with the U.S. Department of Justice.
3. Overseas Chinese cannot accept CCP orders
Another point is that overseas Chinese need to pay attention to the fact that official personnel from the mainland ask for help. Many of them violate US laws and cannot be accepted casually. Strictly speaking, they should be rejected at all.
This time the main person in the United States is Zhu Feng, a resident of Queens, and a permanent resident. Zhu Feng confessed to the US government that he is only a close relative of another person who was returned to China by the fox hunting operation. He was required to cooperate with the police because of that relative’s case. . The others seemed to be found by his relationship.
In this mode of operation, the CCP sent a small number of people to temporarily form an action team in the United States to perform its tasks. This situation should be common. Once it was cracked and prosecuted as a foreign spy, no one could help.
“Yokogawa View” Production Team
Editor in charge: Li Hao#
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