(DW Chinese website) Russian President Vladimir Putin announced on Wednesday a partial mobilization to provide follow-up armed forces support for its invasion of Ukraine. DW spoke with security expert Gustav Gressel to discuss the strength of the Russian military and the odds of success that come with a partial mobilization.
Deutsche WelleDW: What is the current state of the Russian army?
Glazer: Well, they’re basically in disarray. Russia started the war in peacetime, so they sent highly-ready battalion-level combat teams—that is, a battalion with the support of professional soldiers—to the front in February. During the course of the war, they called almost all of their advanced combat readiness battalions.
The troops were sufficiently hit; some formations were physically non-existent. Their casualties were numerous, dead and wounded. So these troops are exhausted by now. It cannot be regenerated by volunteers.
Now, the problem with mobilization is, you have to have a training unit. And the current round of troops can’t train because no one is doing it.
After the mobilization order was announced, there was a long queue of Russian vehicles trying to flee at the Russian-Finnish border
Deutsche WelleDW: What impact do you think Putin’s partial mobilization will have?
I’m thinking now, what are they going to do? Will they deploy this 40% remnant of the troops they have and send it to Ukraine. Russia hopes that basically with the mobilization, with the increased military presence, they will break the Ukrainian resistance, erode the Ukrainian army, and bring home victory?
This may be Putin’s mind — it’s a one-time opportunity. If he expands and deploys these people, the Russian army will be left with nothing. It’s very risky.
Deutsche WelleDW: Given the apparent superiority of the Russian army in terms of numbers of personnel and equipment, how did it not succeed in this invasion of Ukraine?
Many reasons. They entered the war with completely wrong political assumptions, underestimated Ukraine’s resilience, and completely failed to understand Ukraine’s political system and how it works. Sloppy planning, lack of logistical readiness, lack of air force.
First, they launched this as a “special military operation,” using only their high-readiness contract troops and no conscription. They completely underestimated the task of commanding and controlling a force so heterogeneous and assembled in such a short period of time.
Their officer training is poor. There is a very inflexible command and control structure. They have a very cumbersome line of command and control for combat support, especially for artillery and air-to-ground coordination. It’s pretty bad, and it’s still bad. They are currently trying to overcome this. But in practice, nothing happens.
Deutsche WelleDW: Previous studies on the state of the Russian military have shown that it is strong. Is this claim nonsense?
I’m partly the initiator of this, because I’ve written and published these kinds of articles as well. So there are two questions. The first is that after 2014, the Russian military has become increasingly opaque. It’s kind of like a bigger and bigger mystery, a black box. A lot of what they talk about is untrue.
The second thing is, of course, we looked at their performance in Syria. But the operation in Syria is much easier than what they are trying to do in Ukraine.
Deutsche WelleDW: What you describe is,a) Russian troops were not in good shape before the invasion of Ukraine. and,b) Their performance largely fell short of Putin’s expectations. So, what does this mean now in terms of advancing this part of the mobilization?
My gut feeling is that Putin doesn’t really care about the inferior quality of the “new troops that are being assembled”. So my guess is that the overall purpose of this is to run Ukraine out of bullets before Russia runs out of soldiers.
They are recruiting in the countryside, among the minorities there, forcibly recruiting them, trying to spare Moscow, St. Petersburg and the larger urban centers – not only because these are the elite and their own children, but also because under Putin In their minds, they are more valuable than others. So the instinctive idea that they will all be treated as cannon fodder here may be correct.
Deutsche WelleDW: This aspect is incredibly depressing.
Incredible Stalin’s way! I’ve been wondering if Putin really thinks that today’s Russian society is the one that Stalin directed…and for now, the difference doesn’t seem to be very big.
Deutsche WelleDW: Will these reluctant soldiers desert en masse in the army?
This is easier said than done. The thing is, if you’re in an organization like this where you don’t know what your neighbors are going to do, and it’s a life-or-death situation, it’s not that easy to drop the gun and run, even if you don’t really support the regime.
Deutsche WelleDW: You described this partial mobilization as basically the final blow to break through the Ukrainian resistance. Do you think this will work?
No conclusion yet. I don’t think victory is inevitable. But the Ukrainians will have a hard time fending off such an offensive.
Deutsche WelleDW: In your opinion, what will the victory of Ukraine depend on?
Much will depend on the West’s willingness to supply Ukraine with heavy weapons, equipment, and ammunition to stop this trend. Now, we really need to tune every car and every piece of gear we have in the West, and I haven’t seen that willingness in the West.
Gustaf Gressel is a Senior Policy Fellow in the Berlin office of the European Council on Foreign Relations, specializing in military, security and defense, particularly issues involving Russia.
Deutsche WelleDW: Germany is cautious about supplying heavy weaponry. Do you think Germany’s concerns are understandable?
No, I don’t think they have any reason. If you provide cannons, you can also provide tanks. They just need to overcome this problem.
I think what they need is a big American boot that kicks them in the back at great speed. That’s all that’s needed right now.
The interview has been condensed and edited for clarity.
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