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On October 7, 2017, Kim Jong-un held the Second Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee to establish the strategic line of “strengthening economic construction and nuclear force construction simultaneously”. On April 20, 2018, the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee was held to establish a new strategic line of “concentrating all forces for socialist economic construction”, and essentially canceling the “Nuclear Economic Development” strategy, which is the June 12th U.S.-North Korea Singapore Summit. Take a sharp turn”.
After the collapse of the Hanoi summit with Trump, from December 28 to 31, 2019, Kim Jong-un held the Fifth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee and resumed the strategy of “simultaneous development of nuclear and economic development”, which determined the historical status of the Third Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Workers’ Party. Not as good as the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, let alone a profound impact on the world. From January 5 to 7, 2021, he made a summary report at the Eighth National Congress for three consecutive days and formulated an ambitious five-year economic and military plan, which can be regarded as an upgrade of the “Nuclear Economic Development” strategy to version 2.0.
After the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party, the book “Kim Jong Un’s Dilemma: “Nuclear Great Leap Forward” and “Economic Great Leap Forward” (FT中文网, February 20, 2021) have been analyzed and commented. The “Leap Forward” and the “Great Economic Leap Forward” go hand in hand, but North Korea’s domestic environment (weak overall national strength and a lot of people’s livelihood debt) and international environment (sanctions by the Security Council and the United States, the new crown epidemic, and the sharp drop in international aid) are difficult to support. Kim Jong-un is carrying out a more arduous “trouble march” and is constantly adjusting. Unfortunately, the effect has not been good. The frequent major operations on the Politburo this year are only a superficial phenomenon, and there are deeper contradictions.
Crisis: North Korean senior officials and official media reverse verification
North Korea’s current domestic and foreign difficulties have been confirmed by Kim Jong-un in many public speeches. On July 24, at the opening speech of the first seminar for commanders and political cadres of the People’s Army, he said that “the severe difficulties facing our revolution”; on July 27, he delivered a speech at the Seventh National Congress of Veterans in the War It was said at the time that “the difficulties and obstacles caused by the unprecedented world public health crisis and the long-term sanctions and blockades are no less than a test of war”; The young people sent a congratulatory letter stating, “At present, we are facing the most severe situation since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.”
What are the specific difficulties in North Korea? How severe is it? Senior officials and state media have always reported good news but not bad news, and will not disclose it to the public. A search of the column “News on the Revolutionary Activities of Comrade Kim Jong-un, General Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Korea” and the “Main News” column on the top of the KCNA official website, found that the political activities of Kim Jong-un and Kim Deok-hun for more than three months were by no means running accounts, and used reverse thinking to conduct open source empirical analysis. , Revealing a lot of clues, there are many new gains.
1. According to the relevant draft issued by the Korean Central News Agency on September 3, the four topics of the third enlarged Politburo meeting are: land and environmental management, prevention and control of the new crown epidemic, increasing production of consumer goods, and doing a good job in this year’s harvest. The counter evidence corresponds to the four major dilemmas, in order: 1. The severe natural disasters such as typhoons, floods and heavy rains; 2. The long-term border blockade caused by the new crown epidemic; 3. The severe shortage of consumer goods urgently needed for people’s livelihood; 4. The severe shortage of food.
2. In response to heavy rains and floods in some areas of South Hamgyong Road, on August 5, Kim Jong-un instructed the engineering troops to repair the destroyed roads in the disaster area as soon as possible, urgently call the national reserve materials to guarantee the main materials needed for disaster relief and reconstruction, and ordered the central government to obtain financial assistance. Materially strongly support disaster relief and reconstruction. To prove that the disaster was severe and the disaster relief lacked manpower, material resources, and financial resources, Kim Jong-un must personally intervene and clearly instruct the use of the army and the reserves and financial resources of the central government to overcome the difficulties.
3. On September 3, a telegram from the Korean Central News Agency was entitled “Some departments of the national economy successfully completed the August national economic plan”, naming and praising four departments: the electric power industry, the machinery industry, the province of railways, and the sericulture and silk industry. Since September 1st, other departments have not praised the completion of the August plan. After Kim Jong-un vetoed the 2021 plan approved by the cabinet, the high targets proposed by the four sub-committees of the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee on February 10 were not satisfactory. In contrast to the Korean Central News Agency’s February 11 draft, most departments named in the metallurgical industry, chemical industry, coal industry, mining industry, light industry, and construction and building materials industry failed to complete their production tasks on schedule. The industry inspected by Jin Dexun for more than three months proved that he frequently went to the front line to supervise and solve the problems of insufficient supply of raw materials. Obviously, the relevant provinces of the cabinet are very difficult to solve, and the prime minister must come forward to coordinate and promote.
4. Kim Jong-un particularly emphasized in the Eighth National Congress that the metallurgical industry and the chemical industry sector are the “dual pillars of the self-sustaining economy”, and the central tasks for the next five years are to “significantly increase the output of iron and steel products” and “significantly increase the output of chemical products”. It proves that the current production in the metallurgical and chemical industries is far from ideal. Otherwise, the North Korean state media would have lauded publicity and advertised to the “wise leaders” and the “national fathers”.
5. Jin Dexun’s inspection activities for more than three months, especially in July, mainly centered on agricultural production and light industrial consumer goods, which proves that there is a serious shortage of food and consumer goods in North Korea, especially the most tormented July-August before the autumn grain harvest, which is usually superimposed by typhoon rains and floods. disaster. The information implied by the KCNA on July 11, 18, 20, and 24 of Jin Dexun’s activities (press: Kim Jong-un did not report on government activities in the first half of July, and two activities related to the army in the second half of July), which contradicted the infant’s rations There is a general shortage of milk products than adult food. Otherwise, the Prime Minister will never have to inspect nurseries and kindergartens wherever he goes, and specifically discuss “measures to improve the supply of infant milk.”
Relief: Kim Jong-un releases “four major tricks”
1. Establish the work of land management as “the central task of the highest priority in the implementation of the party’s economic policy.” At the third enlarged meeting of the Politburo, Kim Jong-un put forward high standards and strict requirements, “Actively formulate a plan to basically complete river governance, soil and water conservation works, repair dams, and coastal tidal dikes during at least the five-year plan period, and enter Normal management stage.”
North Korea’s national strength is fragile, financial resources are exhausted, and people’s livelihood owes too much. Whether it can invest heavily in infrastructure as it wishes, and whether it can significantly improve its disaster reduction and relief capabilities in five years is another big question mark.
2. Assign the task of increasing the production of consumer goods and the task of increasing the production of grain. At the third enlarged Politburo meeting, Kim Jong-un emphasized that “the light industry sector’s task of increasing the production of mass consumer goods is to completely complete the first year of the five-year plan”; “to do a good job in this year’s autumn harvest, we must complete the planned task of food production goals. “, “Achieve a major breakthrough in solving the people’s food problem.”
According to the Korea Central News Agency, September 5, in the first half of the year, North Korea vigorously carried out the “search for new land campaign” and “actively promoted agricultural production.” Practices and achievements.
3. Carry out the Korean-style “going to the mountains to the countryside” to reduce burdens and decompression. On August 28th, Kim Jong-un sent a congratulatory letter to the youths who had volunteered to sign up for the heavy and difficult front of socialist construction, praising “in response to our party’s call for young people to go to the mountains, the sea and the reclamation area” and “replace the capital citizen’s ID card with a dispatch card.” . The author’s first reaction was to think of the movement of educated youth to go to the countryside to the countryside launched in December 1968 in China.
According to the telecommunications of the Korean Central News Agency on August 27 to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Youth Day, “there are 10,000 youths and model youth league cadres who have voluntarily rushed to the struggling departments following the party’s eighth resolutions.” Based on the herd effect, North Korea signed up and delegated. There will be more and more young people in China, and the employment pressure and food supply pressure in cities, especially the capital, can be reduced accordingly.
4. Prevent military instability and ensure absolute loyalty. From July 24 to 27, Kim Jong Un planned and organized the first seminar for commanders and political cadres of the People’s Army. The Korean Central News Agency announced on the 30th that “the first time in the history of the founding of the army” was held, and the main target participants were “military commanders and political commissars of various services, armies, divisions, brigades, and regiments.” When I saw this sentence, the author’s first reaction was to think of the background and intention of the CCP’s “7,000-member meeting” held in January-February 1962. The former participants were all army regiment leaders and regiment political commissars, while the latter participants were all county party secretaries across the country, and the two were equal.
On July 24, Kim Jong-un’s report on the opening of the class “analyzed in detail the main shortcomings of the troops and military and political cadres at all levels in the implementation of the party’s military line and policies and their causes”, and indirectly explained the issue on June 29. The legitimacy and urgency of the purging of the Politburo and senior military generals. Member of the Politburo and Deputy Chief Political Officer Quan Young-jin in his subsequent report called for “comrade Kim Jong-un, the great leader of our party, the country and the people,” he called on “Heartly support another steel commander who is victorious in all battles, and the great leader of our party, country and people”. The intention of the meeting is to strengthen allegiance to the supreme leader. To put it bluntly, the “Jin Family” must closely follow the “Jin Family”.
On July 27, Kim Jong-un demanded in his closing speech that “the entire army has become an invincible fighting team that is infinitely loyal and absolutely obedience to the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea.” The so-called “infinite loyalty and absolute obedience” to the leadership of the party is plain. In the past it was “infinite loyalty and absolute obedience” to the leadership of his grandfather and father. Now it is “infinite loyalty and absolute obedience” to his leadership. The future is “infinite loyalty and absolute obedience” to the leadership of his son.
The three generations of Jin’s emotional intelligence and power skills are very good, and they have a thorough study and application of human weaknesses. They have both carrots and sticks, both “spiritual atomic bombs” and “material atomic bombs”. They have always been good at winning people’s hearts and feelings. The biggest problem is that too much is too late, too shrewd and snobbish. Some people can see through it at a glance, and some people can see through it coherently. E.g:
On July 25th, Kim Jong-un made a “programmatic conclusion” at the seminar, specifically specifying the “solutions to provide soldiers with further improvements in their living conditions.” On the evening of the 28th, a banquet was held for the seminar. Three Politburo Standing Committee members Cui Longhai , Zhao Yongyuan, and Jin Dexun attended, and the senior officials praised Kim Jong-un for “not only strengthening the programmatic guidelines for the troops, but also pouring them the unforgettable care and kindness, and once again showing kindness to prepare a feast for them”; on the evening of the 29th, for the seminar. A special performance by the State Council Recital Group was held at the Miikeyeon Theater. He needs to continue to reward his allegiance, the closer he follows, the more opportunities he has to gain power, position, fame, and profit.
Conclusion: Kim Jong-un may have suspended the strategy of “simultaneous nuclear and economic development”
More than eight months after the conclusion of the Eighth National Congress of the Workers’ Party, North Korea’s economy and people’s livelihood failed to improve. Instead, it became more severe. Kim Jong-un frequently replaced senior officials and frequently performed major operations on the Politburo, but that didn’t help. In addition to the constraints of objective conditions, the primary subjective factor is still in Kim Jong-un himself, who overestimates his own ability and subjective initiative, and makes “Great Leap Forward” greed and advances. Practice has proved that the cabinet’s original plan for 2021, which was rejected by Kim Jong-un, was pragmatic. It is unnecessary to convene the Second Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee. It is very difficult to complete the economic indicators after the Second Plenary Session is greatly elevated.
Fortunately, he didn’t hold on for three years, and when he was hungry, he made up his mind to “policy make a sharp turn.” Marked by the second enlarged meeting of the Politburo on June 29, which performed major operations on the Politburo, especially military members, he wisely suspended the “Nuclear Economic Development” strategy and the “Nuclear Weapon Great Leap Forward” plan formulated by the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China in just six months. , First “economics” to slow down the “nuclear” and focus on solving people’s livelihood issues. Only due to the need to “deify” himself and consolidate his rule, he could not “sincere himself”, so he had to constantly replace senior officials as “scapegoats”, eager to get out of danger. If it is not due to age and health, the Politburo members who were removed this year will still have the opportunity to be promoted again in the future. Park Zhengtian is an example.
Yonhap News Agency and other Korean media have repeatedly reported that Li Bingzhe’s dismissal and Park Jung-cheon’s resignation were due to “Sinuiju’s ineffective epidemic prevention”. I disagree. This matter is far from enough to perform such a major operation on the high level of the army. The Secretary of the Ping An North Party Committee of Sinuiju, Wen Jingde, and the health care minister Cui Jingzhe, who is the counterpart of the epidemic prevention, have not been dismissed, but why have they promoted the two marshals who have just been promoted for eight months (Li Bingzhe) , Park Zhengtian), a second marshal (Kim Jongguan) who had just been promoted for four months was abolished and expelled from the army?
Kim Jong-un just used the topic to show that he wanted the army to endure for 2-3 years to make way for the economy and people’s livelihood. If the army can’t keep up with his “policy turn”, Yongjin, the last second commander of the “four marshals”, will be very dangerous and will be dismissed and expelled from the army. Kim Jong-un needs marshals and second marshals to worship the flag and stand up for power, regardless of their right or wrong and loyalty.
North Korea held a National Day military parade for civilian and security forces at 0:00 on September 9. There was no regular army, no intercontinental missiles, and no submarine-launched missiles. The responsible secretaries of the Pyongyang Special City and all nine party committees in the country each led a team to accept the review. Send three strategic adjustment messages to the country: 1. Reduce the heat of “Sungun politics”; 2. Strengthen loyalty and unity to tide over the difficulties; 3. Use the militia to contain the army.
The international strategy is adjusted more wisely, pretending to attack and then retreating. On September 11th and 12th, the newly developed long-range cruise missile was tested for the first time, and on the 15th, the railway mobile launching medium-range ballistic missile was tested for the first time. The former is the project and capital investment two years ago, and the latter is the newly formed railway mobile launch group after the Eighth National Congress. Both test launches violated multiple UN Security Council sanctions and resolutions. The essence is still the continuation of the “nuclear and missile edge strategy” in an attempt to make concessions. , Relax sanctions.
North Korea has shallow land and slow train speeds. The deterrence of mobile railway launches is far inferior to that of Russia and China. A locomotive is equipped with two missile launch boxes and four ballistic missiles. Because the tail has a high-temperature flame above 3000 degrees, it is impossible to salvo. The first one can be easily locked and destroyed by American satellites and radars. The remaining three Unable to fight, the combat power is limited. The true benchmark for measuring the strength of the second nuclear counterattack is submarine-launched intercontinental missiles, but North Korea has not yet submarine-launched Polaris-4 and Polaris-5. Taking the hardship and progress of China’s development of the “Julang” series as a reference, North Korea will not be able to independently break through technical difficulties in the next five years. Submarine-launched intercontinental missiles are just samples of the parade.
From October 2017 to June 2021, North Korea’s “simultaneous nuclear and economic development” strategy has gone through four stages of “establishment-cancellation-resumption-suspension”. Seeking survival first, then development, first enhancing national strength and then modernizing national defense. This is the only correct answer. Nuclear weapons can be used for defensive and frightening purposes. They cannot be eaten as food. An optimal price-performance ratio is not necessarily needed too much or too good.
On August 27, the International Atomic Energy Agency issued a report on the North Korean nuclear issue, stating that the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at the Yongbyon nuclear facility in North Korea has shown signs of restarting since July this year, such as the discharge of cooling water. Recently, the South Korean government and the media are enthusiastic about this topic, either with short-sightedness or ulterior motives. On September 7, a senior official of the Blue House responded to the first official (Deputy Minister) Cui Zhongjian of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and stated that “North Korea’s restart of the Yongbyon nuclear facility does not violate the agreement between South Korea and North Korea”, saying that the Blue House also held the same position.
Moon Jae-in has strong idealism and appeasementism. He puts national interests above national interests. He is willing to co-star with Kim Jong-un’s brothers and sisters in “Bitterness”. He will step down in less than eight months. Public opinion in the ruling party, the Common Democratic Party, is sluggish and the next presidential election is pessimistic.
China and the United States share common core interests and major powers in nuclear non-proliferation, so they can ignore North Korea and South Korea’s small actions and double rebellion, and are currently focusing on solving their respective domestic anti-epidemic and economic recovery. On June 16, 2020, North Korea violently bombed the North Korea-South Korea Liaison Office Building in the Kaesong Industrial Park. The United States, China, Russia, South Korea, Japan and other countries treated each other coldly. Exploding back to the starting point, no new way has been exploded.
In the next eight months, the North Korean nuclear issue will maintain the status quo. The Security Council and the United States will maintain severe sanctions. It does not matter if all contacts are frozen. No matter how North Korea and South Korea make moves, the United States and China hardly accept the move. They slow down and change quickly. When the global epidemic is significantly eased in the second half of 2022, the new South Korean president will formulate a new policy toward North Korea (definitely not as friendly as the Moon Jae-in government) after taking office, and then discuss how to promote the denuclearization of the peninsula, and there is no need to rush to reach a consensus. Without breaking, talking and slowly.
(Note: The author is a researcher of Chahar Society, WeChat public number: SSWYPL. This article only represents the author’s personal views. The editor’s email is [email protected])