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The war between Russia and Ukraine is the largest war in Europe in the new millennium. In practice, the war involves two major military powers, the United States and Russia, and its political and military mobilization covers the world.
Since Putin came to power, Russia has basically continued the long-standing “confrontation” between the Soviet Union and the United States. Russia has inherited Tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union’s greed for land, obsession with geopolitical strategy, and infinite yearning for sea ports. The Putin government tried to use war to realize the revival of the Soviet imperial dream, but it was blocked by Ukraine and NATO brought together by the United States, and the war increasingly showed the color of confrontation between military groups.
At present, Russia has occupied one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory, and the war has entered a tug-of-war, with a situation of mutual offense and defense. The following phenomena deserve attention:
First, Russia’s geostrategy has the inertia of expanding its sea power—seeking to control the Black Sea outlet and key geo-nodes. In this war, Russia also concentrated its efforts to seek control over the Black Sea.
Second, Putin has consolidated his political power with military exploits (fighting Chechen militants), and he also hopes to use military exploits to restore leadership and domestic authority, which has spurred him to take risky military actions.
Third, Putin believes that a quick solution can be achieved by relying on powerful force. Through economic relations such as natural gas and oil, European countries can be divided and disintegrated, making it difficult to reach an agreement on opposing Russian military actions. Due to the strategic deception of the United States, Russia initially It was mistakenly believed that the United States would not interfere directly, but the United States promoted the NATO summit to form a European collective consensus on “resisting Russia and helping Ukraine”, which made Russia into a strategic passive.
Fourth, the essence of Russia’s attack on Ukraine is to challenge US hegemony by force. The war has the meaning of a continuation of the Cold War. Although Russia has undergone “democratic” reforms, it is not considered a “democratic country”. Western political elites still regard Russia as a power monopoly and corrupt “authoritarian” country. Russia’s encroachment on Ukraine invites U.S. sanctions, while an all-out war on Ukraine poses a potential threat to the security and unity of NATO nations, and the U.S. must lead the fight back.
Fifth, the war contributed to the differentiation of global power. The United States is still showing its strong leadership in the world, Russia’s influence on neighboring countries has been severely weakened, and the phenomenon of “Russian exclusion” has appeared around the world. Because China has a “special relationship” with Russia, it not only hopes that Russia will be weakened by the United States and restrained by the war in Ukraine, but also worried that Russia’s excessive weakening will lead to itself becoming a separate target of the United States. The attitude of “just away”. The main direction of China’s diplomacy is still to improve relations with the United States. Countries that are far away from the battlefield but not affected by the war basically choose to be “neutral” (such as African and South American countries), or choose a “stance on the wall” that prioritizes economic and trade, such as Pakistan and India.
The Russian-Ukrainian conflict is an epoch-making war. If we look at this event from a long-term historical perspective, it is expected that Western historians will position it as the decisive battle between “democracy” and “dictatorship” in the 21st century. Because an important slogan of US aid to Ukraine is to defend “democracy”. The reality reflects that in the era of weak globalization, traditional international factors, such as geo-strategy, security, alliances, and military force, are still important. Even strong economic dependence cannot completely prevent countries from going against each other. replaceable. The United States and its allies support Ukraine almost overwhelmingly, but do not forget to maintain the necessary energy trade with Russia. The ultimate goal of the United States is to “weak Russia” and eventually marginalize Russia. The United States believes that Russia has launched a “war of aggression” and that Russia must be defeated. The United States supports Ukraine through leadership, promotes the reorganization of geopolitical power, promotes NATO to absorb new members and achieve growth, and achieve global political and military mobilization in the war. Some kind of deterrent to China.
Because the war is still going on, and driven by a shared “enemy”, Europe will remain united for the time being, but will face the pressure of how the current order will continue and the question of how to rebuild the European order in the future. Russia may face defeat, and its European part will likely become a defense front. China can stay out of the way for now, but China’s perceived war stimulus is particularly strong. In the future, the Russian-Ukrainian war may subvert the post-World War II order and the existing international balance of power. The U.S.’s global leadership will be further escalated by the war, and China will be ostracized by the U.S., making it difficult to find a breakthrough in the short term. After a large-scale war is over, it is often accompanied by a new distribution of rights. The division of leadership in the new world order may exclude Russia and “cold” China, and depending on the role and weight of the fight against Russia, there may be a new reorganization of Europe’s political and geopolitical structure.
The impact of the war on China was generally negative. First, it exposed the “weakness” of Russia, the largest country around China. The lack of political trust between China and Russia in strategic cooperation is also exposed, that is, Russia failed to communicate with China in the war, causing China to respond passively. China must avoid suspicion and prevent being tied to Russia, but also must not rush away from its long-term strategic dependence with Russia. Second, it has exacerbated the risks of China’s “Belt and Road” land route, increased the price of bulk commodities, especially food, and the price of gold has skyrocketed again, and China’s economic diplomacy is facing adjustments. In addition, the war has pushed up global energy prices, and during this period, the new crown epidemic broke out in major Chinese cities, and the increase in energy prices has undoubtedly added new uncertainty to the economic revival of specific cities. Third, the grand strategy of American operations research aims to defeat Russia militarily or at least keep Russia in a passive “defensive state” for a long time. The United States seeks to strengthen military-industrial cooperation with Europe, while for China, it seeks to restart the Cold War-style containment and use “normative” weapons to “marginalize” China. The United States regards China as a “cultural other” and a “system other”. After the TPP stagnated, the United States further transplanted the TPP’s rules to the Indo-Pacific in terms of regional economic and trade norms, forming the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” (IPEF), and expanding the “institutional distance” between China and the United States in regional economic and trade agreements. and the investment environment has become stressful.
The Russian-Ukrainian war led the United States to accelerate its attack on Russia and the exclusion of China. Russia often appears “poor skills” on the battlefield, and its national strength is weakened. After recognizing Russia’s weakness, the U.S. government firmly believes that China is the only country with the strength to conduct military, economic and diplomatic confrontation with the United States, but China’s shortcoming lies in its lack of dominance over the formulation of international economic and trade norms. The United States currently has two initiatives. The first is in the Western Hemisphere. It may use the sanctions against Russia to redefine allies and determine closeness and distance. It may use the results of the war against Russia as a new way to delineate the regional international order and state status. standard. The second is that at the Indo-Pacific level, the alliance brokered by the United States has temporarily gained a certain advantage, posing a greater challenge to China. The IPEF currently advocated by the United States is essentially a composite policy of industry and security. The goal is to achieve market exclusion and institutional (normative) isolation of China, and strive to promote China’s behavior and path changes with international pressure.
In this regard, China must pay close attention to the changes in the balance of power brought about by the war, and learn and gain insight into the dynamics of the strengths and weaknesses of all parties in the context of war and conflict. Sino-US relations are still the core of foreign relations and play an overall role. China should still focus on doing a good job in its work with the United States, firmly safeguard the post-World War II order, and oppose the West seeking to subvert the post-World War II order with war. Because the current international political and economic order centered on the United Nations is generally beneficial to China, and China must also unite more third world countries, accumulate consensus, seek windows of opportunity, and enhance international influence. Professor Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University wrote an article 12 years ago that “the diplomatic efforts of China and the United States should focus on expanding objective and mutually beneficial interests, rather than focusing on creating pleasing new concepts.” Under the reality that China and the United States have more conflicts than cooperation, how to Seeking consensus as much as possible, rather than indulging in hypocritical diplomatic rhetoric, will test not only the wisdom of politicians, but also the corporate autonomy of Chinese multinationals. to the interests of Chinese multinational corporations.
War is still the most direct and fastest way to promote the reform of the international system. The “encirclement and suppression” caused by the war launched by Russia may interrupt Russia’s dream of rejuvenation or promote the transformation of Russia’s domestic politics. How can China, which is on the road of peace, face the complicated situation? Achieving a peaceful rise? After the Russian-Ukrainian war, this problem will be more prominent.
(Note: Wang Yingliang, who studies transnational investment and national security, this article is an excerpt from the author’s consulting report to Chinese multinational companies, the author’s WeChat ID: porsche910114. This article only represents the author’s personal opinion. The editor-in-charge email [email protected])