In the past few hours, there has been no louder voice in the world than the tripartite statement issued by Saudi Arabia, Iran and China on Friday, March 10, announcing a reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. According to the manifesto statement, Saudi Arabia The Saudi and Iranian delegations led by the Minister of State, Cabinet members, National Security Adviser Musaid bin Mohammad Alban and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran Ali Shamkhani respectively in Beijing from March 6 to 10, 2023 Intensive talks were held during which Riyadh and Tehran agreed to restore diplomatic relations and reopen their embassies and representative offices within a maximum of two months.
Until that moment, the details of the settlement remained unclear, making it closer to a statement of intent than a full agreement, which included an affirmation by the two countries of “respect for national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries” and an agreement between the two countries’ foreign ministers to meet , arranged to send ambassadors to each other, and discussed the way to start the agreement. The statement also mentioned that Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to launch the security cooperation agreement signed in 2001, and the agreement signed in 1998 involving economy, trade, investment, technology, science, culture, sports and General agreement on bilateral cooperation in many areas, including youth.
There’s a lot to like in the deal, although no clear details have yet been made, with Riyadh and Tehran severing ties in 2016 against the backdrop of Iranian protesters attacking the Kingdom’s embassy in Tehran and its consulate in Mashhad. relations, the seven-year rift in particular makes us question what drives both sides to seek a rapprochement at this moment, and what they hope to gain, however, the overriding question remains the nature of China’s role in making that agreement Concerned, this is an unprecedented diplomatic achievement for Beijing, whose presence in the Middle East has always been centered on economics and trade, and in fact, the United States‘ view of China’s new role is far from its public statement that it welcomes the agreement and commit themselves to confirming that they knew this in advance.
riyadh vision
Let’s start on the Saudi side, the agreement expresses a belief that has become entrenched among policymakers in Saudi Arabia that geographic constraints must be recognized, and that Riyadh and Tehran have been rivals and contenders for regional leadership since 1979 The Islamic Revolution in Tehran in 1998 strengthened their rivalry, but did not cause it. However, the most important effect of the agreement was to make Tehran more “bold” and “interventional” in exercising influence.
The alliance with the United States is Saudi Arabia’s choice in response to threats from “Iran’s neighbors”. For decades, this alliance has effectively and successfully carried out its mission, proving the mutual benefits of both parties. However, recently new waters have flowed into the river of bilateral relations, The United States has gradually stepped in and changed its strategic focus in the Middle East, ditching its traditional commitment to Arab allies and bringing them face to face with Iran.
More specifically, the September 2019 attacks on Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities at Boukaq and Qureis, and Washington’s lukewarm response to them, were a turning point in Saudi security perceptions, when Riyadh realized Relying solely on alliances with the United States is futile, and has stepped up efforts to diversify its security and military partners, including strengthening security cooperation with China and Russia.
In essence, the rapprochement with Iran is a manifestation of a relative shift in Saudi security doctrine. By restoring relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia hopes that diplomacy will help reduce its vulnerability to direct Iranian attack, as well as the deterioration of US-Iran relations and the The collateral damage of mutual military escalation between Iran and Israel, meanwhile, China’s mediation is a loud signal from Riyadh to the United States that Riyadh is determined to continue its efforts to diversify its partners, even if it requires opposition from the United States The latter cooperate on issues that have always been the domain of U.S. diplomacy.
The presence of China in the agreement thus shows that Saudi decision is clearly independent of US intervention, which is the same message sent by Riyadh in October last year, when Saudi Arabia led the OPEC + oil group to cut production by 2 million tons per day in defiance of US objections. At this time, the White House strongly accused Saudi Arabia of helping Russia launch a war against Ukraine and vowed to bear the consequences for this decision, but Saudi Arabia insisted on moving forward, and the United States eventually had to soften its position.
The deal with Iran also makes sense from a commercial standpoint, with Riyadh viewing its security as critical to ensuring uninterrupted oil exploration, transportation or sales, while Saudi Arabia seeks to reduce its reliance on oil exports and Efforts to diversify its economy are creating new models of regional partnerships and competition, prompting it to reconsider tensions with Iran today.
Tehran Perspective
On the Iranian side, on the other hand, the deal reflects Tehran’s leaders’ belief that the best way to reduce U.S. influence and deter Israeli meddling – which Tehran considers its arch-enemy – is aimed at detente with relations, including with Saudi Arabia. Tensions within the Arab neighbors.
From Iran’s point of view, the normalization of relations between the Arab states and Israel represents the most dangerous shift in the regional security environment in recent years, and the greatest danger that must be addressed by reducing the pretext to stimulate rapprochement between the Hebrew states and their Arab neighbors, Foremost among these is “Iranian interference” in the region, while a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia would also benefit Iran’s policy toward the United States by concluding a deal with Saudi Arabia, its chief regional rival and America’s most important ally in the region. Reconciliation, Tehran claims that Washington is a country that undermines regional and global security, thereby depriving Washington of its most important weapon, and moreover, it is in Iran’s interest to include Beijing as a mediator in the regional security system, reducing the US monopoly.
The Saudi-Iran settlement comes amid an unprecedented wave of internal protests in Tehran in the last quarter of last year, amid escalating calls for regime change against the backdrop of the killing of a young woman, Masha Amini, which Tehran argues is underrepresented in the West. Opponents, especially the United States, are seeking to fuel and exploit the protests in order to undermine the Iranian regime, which is what has prompted Iran to resolve its regional divisions to provide an opportunity to address its internal challenges.
As with Saudi Arabia, the economy is central to Iran’s thinking, and draconian international sanctions prevent Iran from exerting influence outside its borders, let alone doing any meaningful harm to its enemies in Washington and Tel Aviv, given Tehran’s monthly budget deficit of about At $1 billion, economic difficulties have increased Iran’s motivation for reconciliation with Saudi Arabia.
Cooperation between Riyadh and Tehran will allow them to better control oil prices, as the two countries together account for 35.5% of OPEC’s oil reserves, so price stability is a major economic event for both countries and an important driver of cooperation between the two countries, however , it is worth noting that, for Iran in particular, to fully benefit from such a settlement would require the easing of Western sanctions, which means working to revive the Iran nuclear deal.
China’s involvement in Gulf affairs
Well, now let’s look at China, Beijing has been working to increase its presence in the Middle East, but that presence has always been centered around economic cooperation, so if the Saudi-Iran settlement is the biggest breakthrough in the history of China’s Middle East diplomacy , it is not an exaggeration that Beijing’s gains from the agreement outweigh the motivations of the two main parties involved. On the one hand, China has demonstrated that it is capable of achieving diplomatic success on issues that the Americans have long avoided because China has good relations with both parties, unlike Washington, which only has good relations with Saudi Arabia, and on the other hand, this provides evidence of the possibility of Beijing playing a constructive role in the international system, thus making it possible for China to resolve global conflicts Diplomatic initiatives are more dynamic, serious and credible, especially in the Ukraine conflict, where China has hinted that it will play a diplomatic role in the Russia-Ukraine war, although its tasks will be more difficult and complex.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, through this diplomatic breakthrough, Beijing has demonstrated its willingness and ability to support a stable Middle East that can reliably meet its energy needs and paved the way for greater Chinese engagement in the region, Especially on issues and challenges that the United States has proven unwilling or likely unable to address, as in the case of Syria and Yemen.
However, it is important not to overestimate China’s role in the Saudi-Iran rapprochement, as all Beijing has done is hammer out a deal that has been at least two years in the making, and both sides have their own incentives to give credit to Beijing, In the case of Saudi Arabia, this is a sure sign from Saudi Arabia that it is willing to deal with a global power that competes with the United States, not only in the economic field, but also on the security and diplomatic levels. In the case of Tehran, to be sure, China mediates The agreement reached under the Trump administration served its narrative that the United States has been interfering in the Middle East.
More specifically, at that moment, we should not lose sight of the forces that have played the biggest role in Saudi Arabia’s rapprochement with Iran, foremost among them Iraq, which, due to a delicate sectarian balance between Sunnis and Shiites, There is an immediate and clear interest in quelling direct tensions between the two most prominent Islamic powers, in addition to the Sultanate of Oman, which has played a role on more than one occasion in containing regional tensions and preventing escalation, all of which It is an effort that has led to the current moment, with Beijing taking the lead for understandable political reasons, perhaps explaining the keenness of the Saudis and Iranians to thank Baghdad and Muscat for hosting the many meetings between the two sides during 2021 and 2022. The reason for the round of dialogue.
However, this does not prevent China from leaving its own mark on the agreement. It is worth noting that the commitments in the statement between Saudi Arabia and Iran are basically consistent with the Sino-Arab policy document released in early 2016, which identified five key points for getting along with regional countries. The main principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and ultimately peaceful coexistence were a clear message from Beijing that a settlement was brokered by China and not centered around security conditions and commitments, commitments to democracy and human rights, and the subsequent mutual control of the parties to the agreement by the United States, including the US program of military presence, does not mean that China will not play any security role under the agreement, but the potential role of the The scope remains unclear, for example, in one scenario we can assume that Beijing promises to cooperate more effectively with Riyadh on its nuclear and missile programs if Tehran breaks the nuclear threshold, if it violates Saudi Arabia’s security interests , may threaten to reduce security cooperation with Tehran.
However, after making these commitments, China is unlikely to directly intervene in the security affairs of the region in the short term, which is equivalent to military intervention in the short term. China’s interests in the region are still mainly economic interests, and it hopes to de-escalate the tension, This will help its ambitious economic plans under the Belt and Road Initiative.
At the same time, Beijing realizes that the United States is the main provider of arms and security services to countries in the region, has the largest military presence there, and is the main guarantor of the security of global trade, including oil, which China cannot play role, and it did not seek to play that role in the first place, but that did not stop policymakers in Washington from being uncomfortable with the way China was gradually building its influence, initially promising that its interests in the region were merely economic and not wanting to be a major political player, today, China is actively involved in diplomatic efforts, and there is nothing stopping this from eventually leading to more intelligence and security cooperation, whether by promoting Chinese arms exports, which are popular with countries in the region due to their low cost, and Beijing does not object to technology transfers, either through increased security cooperation, or even an actual military presence, should the need arise in the future.
deceptive signal
It is clear that there is a lot of political momentum in the Saudi Arabia-Iran deal, whether in Riyadh and Tehran itself, or in Beijing, Washington and Tel Aviv, but that momentum should not lead us into the nature of the deal itself and our expectations for the future To draw the wrong conclusions, first of all, it is clear that the nature of the agreement is still limited and there are many outstanding issues to be resolved, the most important of which are those related to Tehran’s policy and “regional intervention”.
It is also important to point out that although the exchange of ambassadors is important, it does not mean that major differences have been overcome. This kind of “cold peace” has been the hallmark of the relationship between the two countries for decades, but this does not prevent the two countries The two countries compete in many fields, and the relationship between the two countries has not reached the stage of complete estrangement except for a temporary period. In 1987, the relationship between the two countries was broken due to the sabotage of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca. After that, the two countries in the Relations were resumed again in 1991, while the last interruption occurred in January 2016, when demonstrators in Tehran attacked the Saudi embassy after the execution of a prominent Shiite cleric in Saudi Arabia, lasting nearly seven years. After severing diplomatic ties in 2009, the two countries have only recently announced their intention to resume diplomatic ties.
What we mean here is that restoring diplomatic relations does not mean that the two countries decide to overcome tensions and move forward, or even abandon competition, but may mean changing the strategy for dealing with this competition, focusing on non-military tools, as As we mentioned, from the perspective of Saudi Arabia, vacillating U.S. commitment alone is no longer sufficient to secure the region, which requires communication with Iran to peacefully deter threats from its and its proxies to Saudi Arabian territory while avoiding the security and economic consequences of an open confrontation between Iran and Israel in Gulf waters.
This of course does not mean that Saudi Arabia will stop discussions with the United States on the “security threat” from Iran. It is worth noting that the agreement between Saudi Arabia and Iran came after Riyadh hosted a series of high-level US-Gulf meetings in February last year. The meeting discussed the “Iran threat”, the most important of which was the joint air and missile defense and maritime security working group meeting, in addition to the Iran working group meeting and the combating terrorism working group meeting.
Quite the contrary, we can expect the recent agreement, especially China’s role in it, to create more momentum for the United States – and President Biden’s administration in particular – to gain momentum in the region heading into the 2024 presidential election year. Diplomatic achievement creates more momentum, and the Iran nuclear deal would be the first choice to make it happen, especially with Saudi Arabia likely to back it and the possibility of Tehran showing more flexibility in addressing Riyadh’s concerns, despite its It may be tougher in responding to American demands and special conditions.
Together, these dynamics lead to the agreement’s biggest loser, the Israeli occupying power, which will have to confront a series of new realities, starting with the diminishing political incentives for countries in the region to normalize with them, which do not apply to the undecided countries that have normalized relations, because even countries that have normalized relations with Israel may slow down if Iran shows an inclination to take seriously the concerns of its neighbors, and perhaps most importantly, Tel Aviv will have to face The US government, which is more enthusiastic about the success of the Iran nuclear agreement, is indifferent to Israel’s opposition, especially as Washington’s aggressive policies and statements by Israeli right-wing government figures such as Ben Gevier and Smotridge become more and more serious. More and more fed up, and fed up with Netanyahu’s repeated disregard for U.S. pleas, both regarding relations with the Palestinians, and Netanyahu’s controversial judicial reform plans that have sparked a turmoil in the history of the occupying power from its inception to the present. largest wave of protests.