Home » Shen Zhou: Could there be a tank war in eastern Ukraine? | Missiles | Air Strikes | Tactics

Shen Zhou: Could there be a tank war in eastern Ukraine? | Missiles | Air Strikes | Tactics

by admin
Shen Zhou: Could there be a tank war in eastern Ukraine? | Missiles | Air Strikes | Tactics

[Epoch Times, April 14, 2022]It has been more than 10 days since the Russian troops have withdrawn from the surrounding capital of Ukraine, Kyiv, and more are gathering in eastern Ukraine, but so far there has been no large-scale war, nor the hand-to-hand combat predicted by the US Department of Defense. (Knife Fight). The Russian army may expect a decisive battle with the Ukrainian army, but Ukraine does not seem to have such plans, and the possibility of a tank battle does not seem to be high.

The Russian army may invest 60Battalion Tactical Unit

According to the assessment of the U.S. Department of Defense, the Russian army is gathering a large number of troops in eastern Ukraine, which may total more than 60 battalion-level tactical units, including the remnants of Belarusian troops withdrawn from northwest and northeast Kyiv, and the original plan to besiege the second largest city. Kharkov troops.

These forces, if assembled, should account for more than half of the invading Russian army, along with about 55 battalion-level tactical units spread across the southern Ukrainian battlefield, from Kherson to the fiercely fighting Malibo until the connection to eastern Ukraine swathes of the southern region.

U.S. Department of Defense officials believe that the current combat effectiveness of the Russian military is between 80% and 85% after continuous losses. It is difficult to determine how long it will take to reorganize the Russian army that has retreated into Belarus, because some tactical units have suffered serious losses. If they cannot quickly replenish their troops, they may only be reduced to fewer tactical units than before, so that they can be put into Ukraine as soon as possible. Eastern battlefield.

Nevertheless, the number of armored units of the Russian army is still considerable. If the Russian army can really assemble 60 reorganized battalion-level tactical units, there should be about 600 tanks, mainly T-90 and T-80, and the rest are upgraded versions of T-72; there may be 1,800 armored vehicles; artillery and many more Hundreds of rockets; armed helicopters should be able to mobilize hundreds of them.

Map of the strategy on the territory of Ukraine on April 13, 2022. After the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Kyiv region, they are trying to build up towards eastern Ukraine. (think tank ISW)

Ukraine will not change tactics easily

Even if the Ukrainian army can concentrate all the hundreds of T-80 and T-72 tanks, I am afraid that it is not the opponent of the Russian army; it is very likely that the Ukrainian tank army will be attacked by the Russian air and large-scale long-range artillery before the battle. defeat. The Ukrainian army has avoided similar battles from the beginning, preventing the Russian army from taking advantage of air strikes and long-range strikes, and it should not change easily now.

See also  Zelensky cuts diplomatic ties with Russia | Russia Beyond | Russia News

Although the Russian army expects a similar tank battle, the Russian generals should be very clear that Ukraine may continue to adopt small-scale movement attack tactics or irregular blocking tactics. The Russian army will probably be more careful not to rashly go deep alone, and try to advance along the open area as much as possible, protect the flanks and rear supply lines, and prevent it from being ambushed or surprise attack at any time.

Although the Russian army has begun to attack southward from the Izum area, it has not adopted a rapid assault method like the attack on Kyiv more than a month ago. The Russian army is more like waiting for the completion of the large-scale assembly. The current attack intensity is not large, and in the future, it may try to take every step as much as possible. However, Moscow executives may have ordered clear results by May 9, and front-line commanders may be under pressure to take risks.

Schematic diagram of the Eastern Ukraine strategy on April 13, 2022. Russian forces are building up and trying to push south from the Izyum area to form an encirclement, but have yet to launch a large-scale attack. (think tank ISW)

The withdrawal of the Russian army from Kyiv was quite rapid, and it should be very worried about the pursuit of the Ukrainian army; the Ukrainian army did not seem to organize a large-scale pursuit operation, and probably did not have the corresponding mobility and firepower.

The commander of the Ukrainian army is also clear that it is not possible to defeat the Russian army in a large-scale head-to-head confrontation, but to overwhelm the Russian army through a war of attrition, so that the Russian army cannot achieve its combat goals. In the first phase of the war, the Ukrainian army successfully did this; in the next phase of the war, the Ukrainian army should replicate similar tactics, first try to save itself, and then find opportunities to kill the enemy. The weapons provided by the US military also show this.

What weapons did the US provide

On April 12, the U.S. Department of Defense said that in the past year, the United States provided Ukraine with $2 billion in aid, of which $1.7 billion in weapons had been shipped into Ukraine. More than 30 countries are currently coordinating aid.

See also  The resistance of Bastanka's agronomist: "I had 400 Russians killed, but I'm safe because there was no internet"

On April 13, the U.S. Department of Defense convened a meeting of major arms contractors to accelerate production and develop new modernization capabilities for continued assistance to Ukraine; while replenishing U.S. arms stockpiles and ensuring long-term U.S. and allied/partner preparedness , to meet the challenges of current and future conflicts.

On April 7, the U.S. Department of Defense announced a list of weapons to assist Ukraine, including: more than 1,400 Stinger air defense systems; more than 5,000 Javelin anti-armor systems; more than 7,000 other anti-armor systems; Hundreds of Switchblade tactical UAS; over 7,000 small arms; over 50 million rounds of ammunition; 45,000 body armor and helmets; laser-guided rocket systems; Puma UAS; 4 counter-artillery guns and anti-UAV system tracking radar; 4 anti-mortar radar systems; high mobility multipurpose wheeled armoured vehicles; night vision equipment, thermal imaging systems and optics; tactical security communications systems; commercial satellite imagery services; explosives Handling protective equipment; medical supplies.

Most of these are individual weapons and cannot deal with large-scale armored wars. The list confirms that the U.S. military provided Ukraine with satellite services, communications systems, and Puma drones for reconnaissance, allowing Ukrainian forces to keep track of Russian movements.

On November 14, 2012, U.S. soldiers trained to launch a Puma (PUMA) reconnaissance drone at Camp Schofield. (US Army)

The Switchblade drone, which can carry explosives and is equipped with cameras and sensors, requires only about a day or two of training to operate; it can be used for brief reconnaissance and can be commanded to rush to a target at any time to carry out a precise attack. Switchblade drones may soon be the new thing to watch.

On June 21, 2016, the U.S. military announced that it was testing the portable Switchblade UAV, also known as the Micro Air Missile System, at the Edston, Alabama Arsenal. (US Army)

On April 13, the United States announced the latest batch of aid plans, including: 18 155mm howitzers and 40,000 rounds of artillery shells;10AN/TPQ-36 anti-gun radar;twoAN/MPQ-64 Sentinel air surveillance radar;300a Switchblade tactical unmanned aerial system;500Javelin missiles and thousands of other anti-armor systems;200M113 armored personnel carrier;100a high mobility multipurpose wheeled armoured vehicle;11Mi-17 helicopters;unmanned coastal defense ships;Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear protective equipment;medical equipment;30,000 sets of body armor and helmets;Exceed2,000 optical and laser rangefinders;for clearing obstaclesC-4 explosives and demolition equipment; M18A1 mines compliant with the Ottawa Convention.

The U.S. Department of Defense has assessed that Ukraine still has access to most of its air defense systems, but Ukraine wants to increase its inventory of air defense capabilities and also wants more aircraft. At present, Eastern European countries are preparing to provide Russian-made S-300 air defense systems, Russian-made tanks, and Mig-29 fighter jets, which are familiar weapons to Ukraine. Other countries may also provide artillery and light armored vehicles, etc., mainly to provide precision strikes and maneuverability, which is not enough to deal with a large-scale confrontation.

See also  Administrator's Day: Eight benefits of using ChatGPT and DALL-E | TECHNOLOGY
On April 6, 2010, soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division of the U.S. Army wore night vision devices during night operations in Afghanistan. (US Army)

hand-to-hand combat (Knife Fight) previews the melee mode

On April 8, the US Department of Defense issued a press release, “Defense Official Says Conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas Region Could Be ‘Knife Fight'” (Defense Official Says Conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas Region Could Be ‘Knife Fight’). “It can be very bloody and very ugly,” the article said.

Such a statement actually indicates that Ukraine will still seek close combat with the Russian army and avoid a possible armored war. A large number of weapons provided by the U.S. military are also melee weapons, and the U.S. military should also strongly recommend that the Ukrainian army engage in close combat with the Russian army in order to eliminate the Russian army’s advantage. U.S. intelligence can still play a key role, and U.S.-provided night-vision equipment may give Ukraine a partial night-time advantage.

The U.S. Department of Defense still believes that the Russian military has not addressed the low morale and logistical problems that exist not only in Ukraine, but also outside Ukraine. The U.S. military will obviously suggest that the Ukrainian army and the Russian army carry out a continuous war of attrition, and do not rush into a head-to-head confrontation; the May 9 deadline will put more pressure on the Russian army, waiting for the Russian army to make mistakes.

The Russian army continued to indiscriminately bombed the southeastern Ukrainian city of Malibo and claimed that 1,026 Ukrainian soldiers had surrendered, but it was suspected as false news by the outside world. The fierce fighting in Malibo continued, and the Ukrainian army continued to launch a limited counterattack in Kherson; in contrast, there was no large-scale fierce fighting in eastern Ukraine, which was a little calm before the war.

Sooner or later, the Russian army will launch a large-scale offensive to form a siege of eastern Ukraine; the Ukrainian army will seek opportunities to harass, block, and conditionally make surprise attacks. What happens next still depends on intelligence, mobility, supplies, and the responsiveness of field commanders; a tank or armored battle is unlikely.

The Epoch Times premieres

Responsible editor: Gao Yi#

You may also like

Leave a Comment

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.

This website uses cookies to improve your experience. We'll assume you're ok with this, but you can opt-out if you wish. Accept Read More

Privacy & Cookies Policy