It’s easy to say “today Ukraine, tomorrow Taiwan”. One year into the Russian-Ukrainian war, the odds that Beijing decides to invade the island beyond the Strait remain more or less the same as before. It is true, Xi Jinping says it wants to make the military “fully modern” by 2027. But that the date represents – as claimed by the Cia – a deadline foroccupation of Taiwan it’s all yet to be proven. “It is not our assessment that China wants to go to war,” the director of US national intelligence recently admitted, Avril Haines.
Beijing believes Taiwan inalienable part of its territory and has never ruled out a reunification military hand. Yet in recent times, after months of bellicose rhetoric and aerial maneuvers around the island, the official press releases from Beijing regurgitate messages of brotherhood and promises of “win-win” economic synergies. Far from persuaded, the rest of Asia has responded to Chinese reassurances with skepticism. In addition to welcoming an increasingly massive American presence (just think of the new bases in the Philippines), the Indo-Pacific is the backdrop for the emergence of horizontal partnerships between middle powers: South Korea e Japan they have even put an end to historical enmities by announcing a collaboration on security matters. Something unthinkable until a few months ago.
The trend towards the purchase of new ones is transversal throughout the region weapon systems. Asian countries strengthen their arsenal and do so by studying the war in Ukraine. Even in the Indo-Pacific, orders for Himars, the new most advanced missiles that Biden sent to Kiev, are increasing. According to the manufacturer Lockheed Martin Corp., at least three states in the region are considering a purchase. Singapore already has them. If regional neighbors arm themselves, China will in turn warn the “encirclement” takes action. In February the magazine Pacific of Renmin University, noted that “the crisis in Ukraine has further exacerbated tensions around China, creating a new set of security dilemmas”. According to the authors, the driving factor must be sought in the maneuvers of the United States to strengthen regional alliances in an anti-Chinese key. In other words, Beijing attributes the increase in military spending – this year by 7.2% – to self-defense needs. A motivation that, however, does not convince American intelligence. For the head of the CIA, William Burns, simply “our assessment to date is that the leader and army chiefs of Beijing are not sure of being able to complete the mission” of reunification. That’s why they stall. And they study.
The Chinese military analyzes satellite images and information from Ukraine “every day,” al South China Morning Post Zhou Chenmingresearcher at a think tank Beijing military. Not only does the Russo-Ukrainian war provide a first glimpse of the international reaction to a possible Chinese invasion of Taiwan. It also allows China to take a cue should it one day find itself having to fight in similar circumstances. That is, if she gets involved in a conflict with a small but tenacious rival. Analogies abound.
While Beijing has never openly criticized Moscow, the most recent scientific output demonstrates how the Chinese analysts are aware of Russian shortcomings on the battlefield. Shortcomings that deserve attention considering that a large part of the Chinese arsenal is of Soviet manufacture. For about a year, a concerted analytical work has been involving researchers affiliated with universities linked to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), state-run arms manufacturers, and think tanks linked to military intelligence. Some publications were written for central government entities, such as the State Administration of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense, which oversees the development of China’s arsenal.
According to Reuters – which has sifted through almost 100 articles that have appeared in over 20 specialized and publicly consultable magazines – particular attention prevails for the damage caused by Russian troops, hit by Ukrainian missiles Stinger e Javelin. What is also worrying is the role that Starlink, the satellite network developed by the American company SpaceX, played a role in the initial stages of the conflict by facilitating the use of the HIMARS system and allowing Ukraine to resist Russian sabotage of telecommunications networks. Just recently, a team of researchers from the Beijing PLA University of Space Engineering announced the imminent launch of “Project Gw”: a mission aimed at preventing a SpaceX monopoly in the sector through the construction of a similar satellite network, usable for Starlink’s “Long Range and Long Term Surveillance”.
Equally instrumental in the ongoing war, the employment of armed drones and from reconnaissance it has captured the interest of China: from the Turkish-made Bayraktars that have become a symbol of Ukrainian resistance, to the Iranian kamikaze drones used by the Russians to hit Ukrainian energy infrastructure. The world‘s leading exporter of unmanned combat aircraft, China demonstrated full awareness of the strategic role of drones during military operations in the Strait last August. In that case, it was mostly civilian vehicles raised to exert psychological pressure, but on February 23, the PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the Chinese military, observed how drones and commercial satellites have redefined modern warfare.
And then there is the so-called “cognitive warfare”. Last month, an article by the PLA Information Engineering University called on China to prepare proactively for a reputational backlash similar to that experienced by Russia. According to the study, it is necessary to “promote the construction of cognitive comparison platforms” and strengthen control of social media to prevent Western information from influencing the Chinese population during a hypothetical conflict. Taiwan explicitly appears in only a small number of reports analyzed by Reuters, but it is hard not to notice the frequent allusions to a possible armed confrontation on the island. Especially given the growing attention to urban warfare tactics: during the plenary session of the Chinese parliament, which ended on March 13, General Ma Yining raised the need to study how to carry out military operations in Taiwanese cities, where 90% of the population lives and in areas where strategic economic activities are concentrated. Such as semiconductor manufacturing. In Beijing they take notes. In case it should be needed before 2027, after, or when it will be. If it ever will.