The idea that Vladimir Putin exasperated by Ukrainian counteroffensive has decided to demonstrate how terrible his reaction can be, once he is cornered, is one urban myth circulated in the hours following the collapse of the diga di Nova Kakhovka and to the next flood in the oblast of Kherson on which many experts have spent. It makes no sense to talk about it because what we have before our eyes is not the angry outburst of a desperate and cruel dictator, but a situation more similar to the catastrophe of Chernobylat least by analyzing the causes: it was a mistake determined by a mix of inexperience, arrogance and stupidity.
To understand what happened we must, first of all, know the geography of the area crossed by the river Dnieper placed between the sixth and last artificial reservoir, built on the course of the gigantic river of the eastern steppes, and its delta which flows into the black sea at a distance of about 90 kilometers. The river has a floodplain, i.e. a gap between the course and the banks, of about 12 kilometres: especially on the eastern flank, in that part of the Kherson oblast still occupied by the Russians, the territory is subject to floods of the river and for this sparsely populated. This is where the avalanche of water from the dam of the power station hit Kakhovskaya HPP and it is here that villages and agricultural settlements have been submerged by four or five meters of water, mud and oil spilled from a refinery overwhelmed by the wave.
Looking closely at the map, we realize that right in front of the dam – 30 meters high and almost 3,300 wide – there is a system of river islands very dense, extending for 15 kilometers in length and reaching a maximum width of just under 3: to understand each other, it is as large as two thousand football fields. On these islands in the days and hours preceding the disaster of June 6 there was a fierce fighting between the Ukrainian troops and those of the Russian occupiers. In the middle of the vegetation and between easily traversable canals as in a Venezia antediluvian without buildings and roads, a confrontation was taking place, by winning which the Ukrainians could have set foot in the part of the oblast still controlled by the troops of the Kremlin without having to expose yourself by building a pontoon bridge more southern. The same thing was happening in the delta area, 350 square kilometers of islets and marshes, but there – near Nova Khakovka – there was the prospect of freeing inhabited centers of a certain importance, not only marshes and natural parks such as near the mouth. And here it is clear what happened: in the previous days the water level in the artificial basin had been raised, taking advantage of the traditional May flood. The temptation to cover those islets with a few meters of water must have been very strong, so much so that very little effort would have been enough.
But it is at this point that the error variable is triggered: just as in Chernobyl a test of the safety system triggered the reaction that caused the 1986 disaster, so in Nova Kakkovka the “controlled” water outflow (but not too much) by a hydroelectric plant undermined by the occupying troops was the trigger of one environmental and humanitarian disaster of enormous proportions. No missile could have brought it down: Anyone who has seen Ukrainian, Syrian or Yemeni buildings hit by missiles and rockets knows that they have not collapsed, but gutted at the point of contact. To demolish a building, as well as any reinforced concrete infrastructure, it is necessary mine it: The Internet is full of spectacular videos of controlled demolitions carried out by “undermining” the load-bearing parts of buildings. So if the dam collapsed it could only have been for the minethanks to an unfortunate opening.
But where did so many liters of water pour? Paradoxically, the bomb exploded on the side occupied by the Russians, engulfing not only villages and businesses, as well as Nova Kakhovka itself, but also the troops eh deposits from the Russian Armed Forces. On the eve of the disaster they had been told to prepare to withdraw in order by 8-9 June: all of a sudden, along the entire eastern flank of the Dnieper they were told to get away as soon as possible to save themselves. And in doing so they could not bring themselves along tanks, armored vehicles e ammunition, ended up under water. The Ukrainians have had less damage, since the western side of the river has the bank much closer to the course and the inhabited centers are built on a higher position.
Thus, with the prospect of two-three weeks for the withdrawal of the waters and with the Dnepr which in the coming months will see the flow become gradually smaller (the flood already occurred, as mentioned, in May), the Ukrainian counteroffensive he won’t even have to deal with a few kilometers of muddy roads, since the summer sun should dry him out.
In short, we have witnessed a new man-made ecological and humanitarian disaster, just like Chernobyl, but as a direct consequence of mistakes, arrogance and lack of criteria: not as a deliberate gesture to stop a counter-offensive nor even less as a showdown against towards the west. It is also true that the Ukrainians had already opened reservoirs in a controlled way to stop Russian offensives in Kiev and in the Donbass long enough to allow the defenses to be reorganized, certainly not to stop the aggression altogether. Now, it seems, far from reorganizing the defenses, the Russians will have to look between the Dnieper and the Crimea more defensible positions and find ammunition and vehicles to replace those lost.