There are at least two objectives of the Ukrainian attacks on Russian territory: to force the Kremlin to protect a wider area of the front line, thus diluting its defenses, and to make Russian citizens understand that their president, Vladimir Putin, has dragged them into a real war. The psychological factor: with the drones exploding over Moscow, the inhabitants of the capital – the political center where the decision to invade was made a year ago – realize that the war concerns them too. Something is changing, it is the Tass news agency itself that writes it. Citing a source in the “military-industrial complex”, Tass says Muscovites have started buying anti-drone weapons, evidently frightened by Wednesday’s attack. «Since May 30 there has been a surge in sales of anti-drone systems. They mostly bought weapons,” the source said. The source also explained that these weapons are certainly not cheap. Anti-drone rifles costing $15,000 and up. It could mean that it is mainly the elite who are making these purchases – an elite who perhaps fear that their homes may be the target of new attacks. But the forces of order could also buy more weapons. In any case, these are growing numbers confirmed by a manufacturer of anti-drone systems, Detector Systems, which told Tass this: «the demand for anti-drone weapons has really increased. Anti-drone guns are the most in demand.”
Kremlin officials have lashed out at Western leaders because they have not denounced the attacks on Moscow: their silence – they say – would be proof that the real conflict is not against Kiev, but against the West in alliance to destroy Russia.
It is interesting to note, however, that despite the propaganda portraying war in such existential and apocalyptic terms – a struggle in which the political, military, but also cultural survival of the Russian world is at stake – the Kremlin, after all, is not spending such exorbitant figures in the invasion. Of course, the Russian budget is very unclear, especially the military one. But there are some estimates, however imprecise, which give a rather indicative order of measurement. The Economist used the Russian government’s forecasts of how much it would spend on defense and security – forecasts made before launching the invasion – and compared them to how much it is actually spending. The result would amount to 5 billion rubles ($67 billion) a year, equal to 3% of GDP, which is less than what the United States spent on the Korean war.
The main reason is that limiting war spending has served the Kremlin to maintain a sense of normalcy in the country. In reality, sanctions are bad for the economy, so money (subsidies, aid, incentives) is needed to protect the population and companies. To increase the war effort would be to risk upsetting this kind of precarious balance. There are various options ahead, all with dangerous side effects: printing money would drive up inflation, eroding living standards; loading the banks with public debt would have the same effect; the government could ask for more taxes and implement a strong shift of public spending towards defense and the military sector, but this would affect incomes. Meanwhile, revenues from the energy sector (oil, above all) have collapsed due to the western price cap. And the deficit on GDP grows. Several analysts now expect a deficit of between 6 and 8 trillion rubles, between 4 and 5% of GDP, numbers that are still manageable but high by Russian standards.
These numbers make us understand the reason for Putin’s resistance to the hawks who are calling for total war. The tsar hesitates and hopes to hold out in a war of attrition. Meanwhile, Muscovites are buying anti-drone rifles.