The return of the term meritocracy to the public scene and the political arena is based on an evident misunderstanding, if not on a real manipulation of the original use of the term. Michael Young introduced the term “meritocracy” in a 1958 book (The Rise of Meritocracy, New York, Transaction Publisher United) which narrated the hypothetical story of a community where following a revolution a rigorous regime of egalitarian meritocracy which, after the initial enthusiasm, had caused profound social tensions which finally culminated in its demolition. In addition to the exercise of sociological imagination, Young’s text remained famous for the still most widespread definition of meritocracy: merit = natural talent + effort (or commitment). In reality, the meritocratic principle, unlike the aristocratic principle based on inheritance, is intertwined with one of the possible declinations of the idea of equality: equal opportunities. A declination that implies the elimination of social inequalities in the passage from one generation to another, a realignment of opportunities as an indispensable prerequisite for a competition that is played solely on merit and thanks to this ends with a fair production, rather than with a ‘unfair reproduction of inequalities. Hence the centrality of education, the true basis of meritocratic society, since only after school has canceled the impact of the socio-family background on the skills (and educational careers) of the new generations, they can enter the arena of meritocratic competitions – the job market first and foremost – making use of only personal resources, which are summarized by most in the combination of (natural) talent + commitment (or effort). There has been widespread consensus on this interpretation in the Western world, even in culturally and politically distant contexts.
But alongside this declination of “meritocracy” there is a very widespread one, more widespread than one might imagine and full of implications for equity and social justice. It is the most naive version of meritocracy, of an exclusively procedural type which brings it closer to what Rawls, in his typology of conceptions of justice, defines as “natural competition”. We might even label it a form of social Darwinism. In this case meritocracy does not mean equality of opportunities and social mobility, but rather the selection of the best and the pursuit of excellence in the various social spheres, from education to work, from economics to politics, thanks to competitive mechanisms, regardless of the initial correction invoked by supporters of equal starting points. This vision is based on an epistemic flaw: on the one hand the overestimation of the autonomy and responsibility of the individual and on the other the underestimation, or even misrecognition, of the conditioning deriving from the contexts within which the individual finds himself acting. Setting aside equality of opportunities and social mobility, we are limited, in fact, to pursuing the selection of the best and the pursuit of excellence in the different social sectors.
But if defining merit and therefore meritocracy is a problem, it is equally difficult to identify a univocal conception and definition of equity. Equity is in fact a polysemous term since in some uses it is clearly opposed to the term equality, in others it incorporates it, gives it a broader meaning and places it within a richer and more problematic conceptual framework. Two great theorists of justice have largely contributed to this conceptual framework: John Rawls and Amartya Sen.
The first conceives justice as fairness and proposes social equality of opportunities as one (not the only) of the principles on which to structure the “just” social order. The second is aware of the relativism implicit in the very concept of equality (‘equality of what?’), since the predicates of equality can conflict with each other: equalizing an object, for example income, can be in contradiction with equalizing another, for example the relationship between contributions and compensation. He concludes that equality is not always and automatically identifiable with justice and fairness, but that it is necessary to ask ourselves whether a certain equality or a certain inequality can be considered more or less just. To decide on the justice of a given social structure it is necessary to look not only at how a good, for example education, is distributed between different social categories (classes, genders, ethnic groups, etc.) in a given time, but also to consider the effects that at a later time that distribution generates in terms of advantages/disadvantages for specific categories of subjects (Rawls) and also consider the aggregate dynamics of that good (Sen). Hence the invitation not to separate, in the judgment on social choices, the distribution plan, considered statically and identified with equity, from the plan of effects and effectiveness. It is therefore essential to clarify and distinguish the relationships between merit, equity (understood as a principle of justice) and equality.
For these reasons, in the educational field the cruciality of equity is a key principle for justice but also for social cohesion and the development of individuals and society. Equity can be divided into at least three fundamental dimensions (to which others can be added). As previously mentioned, these essentially consist of the containment of disparities between individuals, the reduction of inter-categorical inequalities and the achievement of a minimum threshold of education and, even more importantly, of skills actually possessed. It is not possible to take merit as a guiding criterion if it is not associated with equity in the aforementioned forms, especially if scholastic results or results on standardized tests based on texts are taken as the yardstick for evaluating merit. The results, whether grades or test scores, are the result of a complex network of factors, primarily of an ascriptive nature but also due to contexts (social, scholastic, cultural, geographical/urban) and also to elements of pure chance.
International investigations show that the dependence of results, both in terms of learning (academic/educational achievement) how much qualification has been achieved (educational attainment), by factors linked to the force of inertia of family inheritance (Giancola and Salmieri, 2022), to differences between categories (biological sex, sexual orientation, migratory background; Lucas and Beresford, 2010), to the structure of educational systems (Benadusi and Giancola, 2014). Motivations, attitudes and individual effort (in terms ofeffort mentioned by Michael Young, later taken up by many others), but it must be considered that even these characteristics are not independent of ascriptive and contextual factors. For this reason, if the concept of “merit” is crushed over that of “result” it can only be a completely spurious measure. Furthermore, assuming and not granting, that the result can be purified from spurious effects, we still have to ask ourselves whether the school’s task is to reward the differences in the achievements of individuals but rather to raise the average levels of results, minimizing the share of students below -threshold (the so-called “low performers” or “underachievers”). The hypothesis of a trade-off between improvement in average results and competitive selectivity is largely disconfirmed by international data. The data produced within PISA, for example, show that educational systems with a lower share of below-threshold students are also those which have better average performances and even the highest share of excellent students (the “top performers”): they stand out in this sense national cases that combine equity, effectiveness and inclusion such as Canada, Finland, Denmark (OECD, 2018; Giancola, 2019).
In essence, the question of eliminating, or at least containing, the inequalities that strongly influence scholastic success, the possibilities of social mobility and individual life courses must necessarily be placed before the blurry notion of merit. In education, the focus should be primarily on equity policies (Benadusi and Giancola, 2021) such as care interventions for early childhood (since educational inequalities are generated in this phase and then grow over the course of life), the extension and enrichment of school time and also redistributive policies in favor of schools and disadvantaged areas. Alongside these, orientation, support and motivation actions for students are necessary (both with respect to learning and future prospects), public investment policies in accessible and usable cultural services (to compensate for the enormous heterogeneity between areas and territories ). Finally, an integration of educational policies and interventions with welfare policies is necessary. The question then remains what the main task of the school and the education system is. From the point of view of the growth of a democratic society, it is primarily – especially at basic and medium levels of education – to train active and aware citizens rather than to carry out a competitive selection. A crucial game is being played on this field for the future of the new generations and of society more generally.
(n.189 of 14 March of the magazine Il Menabò di Etica e Economia)