by Enrico la Forgia, deputy director of Lo Spiegone, and Viola Pacini, editor-in-chief of MENA
Elections took place in Iran on Friday 1 March valid for the Islamic Consultative Assembly, body with legislative functions, and the Assembly of Orientation Experts, with more religious and clerical functions.
Although the results are quite obvious, with the principlists (i.e. the conservatives) having a clear advantage over the reformists, these elections remain a valid political thermometer to interpret the political moods of the country, especially as regards young people. In fact, these were the first elections to take place after the wave of protests sparked by femicide of Jina “Mahsa” Amini, the 23-year-old Kurdish-Iranian killed by the morality police in September 2022 for “wearing the veil incorrectly”.
The Iranian electoral system for the two “democratic” bodies
Iranians were called to vote for the two representative bodies of the country: the Islamic Consultative Assemblyor the Parliament, e the Assembly of Orientation Experts. All citizens who have reached the age of majority and enjoy political rights could go to the polls.
In the case of Parliament, there are 290 seats, of which 5 are reserved for minorities of the country – that is, Jews, Chaldean Christians, Assyrian Christians, Zoroastrians and Armenians, who vote for their representatives in a distinct manner. The remaining 285 seats are divided between the 196 constituenciesdivided into two different collegiate types.
Single-member constituencies are characterized by a double-round majority system with limited voting (a single expressible preference), in which candidates must exceed at least 25% of the preferences in the first round to be elected. Multi-member constituencies provide instead a majoritarian system with unlimited voting. Each voter has as many votes as the number of seats available, which are then assigned to the candidates with the most preferences until exhaustion. Also in this case, it is necessary to exceed the threshold of 25% of the preferences to be elected.
If seats remain vacant due to failure to reach the minimum quorum, a second round of voting is organized with double the number of candidates compared to the number of positions to be filled. As a legislative body, the Islamic Consultative Assembly has the task of discussing, approving and rejecting laws.
The Assembly of Orientation Experts
The Assembly of Orientation Experts is a body made up of 88 mujtahidor figures with high religious and legislative competences authorized to interpret Islamic law without having to rely on previous rulings.
Given the current age and state of health ayatollah Ali Khamenei (born 1939), the assembly seems to receive more attention than the Parliament, as it is also the body that expresses its opinion on the succession to the office of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the head of the Iranian state. THE mujtahid they are appointed by direct election of the people (all those entitled to vote) for a term of office lasting 8 years.
It should be emphasized that candidates for the Assembly of Experts must be approved by the Guardian Council, who rejected most of those who applied this year, approving only 15,200 out of about 50,000. Furthermore, members of the Assembly of Experts who win the elections must receive consent from theayatollah before fully entering into their duties. A mechanism that leaves little doubt about the independence of mujtahid.
An important fact is that former president Hassan Rouhani, defined as the man of moderate liberals, was prevented from running, while only 30 reformists managed to win the approval of the Guardian Council, symptom of an organ now almost completely controlled by the clergy, byayatollah himself and, in general, by the most conservative Islamist fringes in the country.
Voter turnout as the most significant data
The most significant result is the very low voter turnout. If the state leaders feared being delegitimized with a turnout of less than 40% – as in the elections preceding the Islamic Revolution of 1979 -, the turnout still came very close to the fateful threshold of the monarchist era, stopping at around 41%.
However, it should be noted that turnout has been in free fall since the elections 2016, when turnout exceeded 60%. in the wake of the nuclear deal and economic concessions from the West. The withdrawal of the USA from the agreement itself and the economic crisis then caused turnout to collapse to 43-44% in 2020, and it is presumable that the wave of protests in 2022 and the worsening of the crisis have pushed popular participation even further down.
According to a collection of surveys cross-referenced and analyzed by Middle East Institutethere is a split in participation between Iranians over 60 and under 30 (who make up over 40% of the population). In fact, it turns out that only 24% of young people in this age group would have voted, versus 34% nationwide and over 50% of Iranians over 60.
The regime’s moves and the popular response
As per practice, the State announced to keep the polls open even after the deadline for voting had expired. Officially, this extension should have allow the supposedly long queues outside the polling stations to express themselvesbut in reality it served to shave a few percentage points off turnout and maintain a minimum semblance of legitimacy.
Another example of a maneuver aimed at legitimizing the candidates was the election to the Assembly of Experts of Ebrahim Raisithe current President of the country, who secured a seat for the third time with over 82% of the votes from Southern Khorasan province. Initially there were no other candidates for the same position, because the Council of Guardians had eliminated all possible opponents. However, a puppet contestant was introduced at the last minute, who has changed your district to which you belong to compete against Raisi.
The very low voter turnout and the tricks that the government had to adopt to instill a semblance of legitimacy in the elections are a symptom of something deeper: a general distrust towards the leaders of power.
The less conservative fringes of the population, especially the younger ones, perceived these elections as a cosmetic measure by a regime that has disappointed the expectations of its citizens, failing in the tasks of improving the economic and working conditions of the country and guaranteeing personal freedoms. The Reformist Front coalition itself did not present candidates, calling the election process senseless and ineffective. Former President Mohammad Khatami, of a reformist orientation, also boycotted the vote.
An insecure regime?
Abas Aslani, researcher at the Centre for Middle East Strategic Studies of Ankara, saw in these elections not only an example of citizens’ dissatisfaction, but also a symptom of insecurity on the part of the regime. Despite having Parliament, the executive and the judiciary in their grip, the conservatives must prepare for the presidential elections scheduled for next year, whose results, at this point, they cannot be taken for granted.
Furthermore, the lack of trust towards the Assembly of Experts and the clergy in general adds an additional question mark on the succession to the office of ayatollah, given the condition of Ali Khamenei. When the time comes, will the Assembly of Experts be able to read the mood of the country and opt for more popular and “progressive” figures or will it continue along the ultra-conservative line traced by the current Supreme Leader?