The reason why the Russians are attacking Bahmut may have less to do with military and more to do with political strategy.
As the second year of the conflict, which was predicted to last several days, begins, Vladimir Putin continues to throw his forces into the fighting around the city of Bakhmut, and Ukrainians continue to resist. The first sign that Bakhmut would become a disaster for the Russians in terms of losses appeared nine months ago, about 50 kilometers north of that city in eastern Ukraine.
A battle that lasts more than seven months
On May 11, 2022, parts of the Russian motorized brigade of hundreds of vehicles and thousands of soldiers tried to overrun the Seversky Donets River in order to expand Russian successes in the Donbas region of Ukraine, Forbes writes. Ukrainian drones and scouts intercepted the brigade in the middle of the crossing. The Ukrainians fired volley after volley of heavy artillery at the Russian forces massed on the open banks of the river. As the smoke cleared, dozens of Russian tanks and combat vehicles lay destroyed, and probably hundreds of Russians were killed. “The attempt to cross the river showed a stunning lack of tactical sense,” said the Institute for the Study of War in Washington.
This event was a prelude to the Russian attack on Bahmut. Around the same time as the massacre on the river, tens of thousands of Russians were steadily charging towards the well-prepared Ukrainian positions around Bakhmut, a pre-war town of 70,000 located 17 kilometers southwest of Severodonetsk, which is one of the larger cities of the Russian-occupied Donbass. .
Russian losses were so great. Estimates at that time amounted to as many as 50,000 killed and wounded that the Kremlin had organized an emergency mobilization, targeting mostly middle-aged men from regions far outside Moscow, to replenish its forces. The Kremlin would arm these men with surplus Cold War weapons and thrust them into battle after only a few days of training.
The Russian attack on Bahmut was probably the first and decisive battle of the second phase of the war. The surprise of the Russian unprovoked attack on February 24, 2022 is over. The starving and beaten Russian brigades that had unsuccessfully tried to encircle Kiev retreated, while the increasingly experienced Ukrainian brigades, armed with new Western-made weapons, chased after them.
What was supposed to be a lightning strike by Russia on Ukraine turned into a bloody showdown. The fast war was becoming a war of attrition, in which the side that kills the most has a better chance of victory.
Nowhere is this dire calculation more evident than in Bahmut. This was seen as early as last summer, when the extent of Russian losses around the city became apparent. This is even more obvious now, nine months later, while the battle for Bakhmut heats up, Russian President Vladimir Putin promises to keep fighting, and Ukraine, inspired by the leadership of its own president, Volodymyr Zelensky, shows no signs of backing down, writes the American media.
Some cities and towns bring obvious military value. They can be located on high ground or along strategic roads, railways or navigable rivers. Maybe they have a tank factory or some other vital industry. Bahmut does not meet any of these criteria. The closest thing to strategic quality is the proximity of several major roads connecting free Ukrainian cities in western Donbass. But Bahmut is no more important as a traffic hub than any other city in the northwest.
The reason why the Russians specifically attacked Bahmut may have less to do with military and more to do with political strategy. The first few months of the Bakhmut operation were the main task of the Wagner Group, a mysterious mercenary company allegedly financed by Yevgeny Prigozhin, a former sausage seller and Putin favorite.
Wagner’s group cooperates with the Russian military, but is not part of the Russian military. It is largely Moscow’s biggest military rival for resources. Analysts concluded that Wagner’s attacks on Bahmut were a way to create a narrative around the group that it was the only Russian force still capable of defeating the Ukrainians. The idea was apparently for Wagner to turn his reputation on the battlefield into political influence in Moscow.
But as a political gambit, Bahmut was unsuccessful. The Ukrainians will not only aim to regain the territory they recently lost, but may also move forward. As long as senior commanders understand that a one-day retreat is the price frontline brigades pay for the next day’s advance, mobile defense is a long-term winner against a short-sighted enemy, it said.
Ukrainian commanders take a long-term view. The contrast with the Russian commanders around Bahmut could not have been greater. Wagner’s officers repeatedly threw their best troops at Ukrainian positions. Losses were heavy. By last fall, Wagner was in dire need of fresh strength. The Russian army has just mustered 300,000 men in a desperate attempt to make up for its own losses. Equally desperate for new resources, Wagner turned to a surprising source – Russian prisons.
The representatives of the company offered pardon to the convicts in exchange for a few months of stay on the front line. At first it was a tempting offer. Wagner quickly mobilized 40,000 former prisoners and reinforced his 10,000 professional fighters around Bahmut.
These former prisoners were actually cannon fodder and came to the front almost without any preparation. They allowed Wagner to keep up the pace of his attacks, but they had little chance of breaking through and ending the battle on Russian terms.
Wagner’s forces managed to advance to the outskirts of Bahmut, but only briefly. Urban combat requires highly trained infantry with excellent base leadership. Ukrainian brigades have highly trained infantry, thanks in part to NATO instructors. They also have good junior leaders thanks to a military culture that allocates responsibility to junior officers and sergeants, not solely to old colonels and generals, as is the Russian custom.
By now, even Ukraine’s Territorial Troops – the equivalent of the US Army’s National Guard – have been trained and become effective in combat. One of the best territorial brigades, the 241st, defended Bahmut during a critical phase of the protracted battle late last year.
As the Bakhmut campaign entered its seventh month in December, the Ukrainians were in the lead. “It is unlikely that this type of fighting will favor the poorly trained Wagner fighters”, announced the Ministry of Defense of Great Britain. On December 21, Zelensky visited the front line in Bahmut: “The Russian army and mercenaries have been attacking Bahmut non-stop since May. They attack him day and night, but Bahmut holds on,” was the message at the time.
At least 4,000 of Wagner’s fighters died around Bahmut in 2022, writes the British Guardian. By early 2023, word had spread through Russian prisons. There were fewer and fewer volunteers until Prigozhin announced on February 9 that Wagner would no longer recruit convicts. In fact, the convicts turned their backs on him.
Deprived of his main source of fresh manpower, Wagner could no longer support the attack on Bahmut. Gradually, over a period of several weeks early this year, regular Russian troops, including well-trained paratroopers, replaced the mercenaries who had been fighting there. By gradual replacement, Russian troops retained the initiative around the town,” the ISV said. The biggest success for Russian forces around Bahmut in eight months of relentless and costly fighting came on January 12 when they captured Soledar, a small settlement above the labyrinth of salt mines north of Bahmut.
The capitulation of Soledar did not mean that Bahmut was also in imminent danger of falling. “Wagner’s capture of the center and most of Soledar is an undoubted tactical success. However, the enemy front has not been breached. The enemy command is definitely in control of the situation,” wrote Igor Girkin, a former Russian army officer who played a key role in Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.
Bakhmut itself was never worth that much to Kiev, especially since the civilians had almost abandoned it. Its main value was an opportunity – an opportunity to kill Russians. The Ukrainians took advantage of that opportunity, and the Russians took part in it, just as they did on the Northern Donets River last May. Week after week, month after month, the Russians stormed Bahmut with masses of poorly trained soldiers. The Ukrainians killed them by the hundreds, according to the American media.
At best, during the long campaign, Wagner’s troops advanced 100 meters a day, Prigozhin estimated.. In nine months, they advanced about 25 kilometers around Bahmut. Every kilometer is however, paid with several hundred dead Russians.
A year ago, the Kremlin hoped to seize Kiev and topple the Ukrainian government within days. Three hundred and sixty-five days later, after losing as many as 270,000 soldiers killed and wounded in Ukraine, the Kremlin is struggling to take the lifeless, non-strategic city. But he keeps trying. Bahmut is a symbol of bloody struggle – and a possible harbinger of the next year of heavy fighting.
(World)