Although the divergences and frictions between the United States and China began well before the debut of the Trump administration (2016-2020), those were the years that first cemented and then exacerbated the differences. Using questionable methods, Trump has exposed China and deprived it of the luxury of being able to leverage economic advantages obtained through non-market practices. The symbol of the Trump administration’s approach to China was in fact the Trade War that began in 2018 and, in fact, never ended. Through the Trade War, Trump aimed, among other things, to solve the problem of the trade deficit which saw the United States behind China. We could debate the validity of the objective: in fact, a trade deficit in deficit is not always a real problem, it depends on the composition of the deficit and on other elements, such as the importance of the destination market for the exporter. The Trade War and the following years have demonstrated how, whether there is a trade deficit or not, the US market and investments are vital for the Chinese economy.
The Trade War then evolved into an economic war that involved not only trade, but also investments and above all technological development, effectively starting the containment of the Chinese one. The Biden administration then continued on this path, albeit with different means and tones, but the change in economic relations between the two great powers was indelibly marked by Donald Trump’s move to the White House.
Not only have economic relations changed forever, but also diplomatic ones. To give an example, the Trump administration launched the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” initiative, which outlined a sort of strategy of implicit geopolitical containment of China, aimed at responding to China’s hegemonic aims Chinese. The effort to deepen and strengthen relations with Taiwan dates back to the Trump administration, which has included increasing arms sales to the island and US military activity in the area. Taiwan has become one of the central causes of tensions between the United States and China. The strengthening of relations between the USA and Taiwan and the decision taken by Beijing to remove the term “peaceful” in the new strategic documents addressing the issue of reunification between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan have meant that tensions and potential escalations in the Strait have been now among the most studied and followed scenarios in the analysis of a potential conflict between the USA and China.
Tensions between the US and China would have eventually emerged with or without Trump, perhaps with a few years’ delay. After all, not only had China already long since embarked on a path of eroding US hegemony in its own favor, but it also showed no intention of abandoning economic practices that created unfair disadvantages for competition (i.e., extensive use of state subsidies to advantage own businesses and practices of economic coercion). However, it is undeniable that Trump and his administration have acted as an accelerator and catalyst of the geopolitical dynamics of tension between the USA and China that have become part of our everyday life.
A potential Trump II administration is harder to delineate. Support for a strong policy of implicit containment of China has the support of both parties, Democrats and Republicans; therefore, it is difficult to question. Furthermore, “the Chinese threat”, especially economic, has provided the perfect hat for highly popular policies in the United States of incentives for the return of manufacturing industries and related jobs to the US territory, such as the Inflation Reduction Act ( Inflation Reduction Act), which encourages the production of technologies for the green transition in the USA. Therefore it is difficult to see a populist President like Trump was and will be undoing this pro-protectionist US approach. However, compared to the years between 2016 and 2020, a new variable has entered: the Russian variable. It is no secret that Trump is close to Russia and Putin, and Putin in turn is close to and needs the closeness of China and Xi Jinping. This places a question mark on the potential foreign policy of a possible Trump II towards China. One way for Trump to handle the situation would be to return to a more isolationist US policy. I propose here one potential scenario of many that could manifest itself1
In fact, Trump will continue with the policy of containment towards China and will even raise its tone, but his actions will focus on the benefits for the Americans. This will imply costs for allies, both European and Asian, but collaborating with allies has never been a Trump priority and will be even less so in a potential second administration. On the contrary, open trade disputes between allies and the US will increase. The result will be that the allies will be weakened, thus making Moscow happy, and will have to adopt an even more realistic and pragmatic policy than that adopted in past years. This policy will include not only a strengthening of relations with third countries, but a reconsideration of relations with Beijing, with some allies and partners moving closer to China.
Trump II therefore would not see a rapprochement between Washington and Beijing, at least not formally, but it would lead to a rupture of what remains of the liberal interactional order and above all a rupture of the traditional alliances of the USA, thus benefiting the objectives of Moscow and those of Beijing. In this scenario, Europe is particularly vulnerable and would do well to strengthen its relations with other countries to better deal the blow.