It is unlikely that 75 pages of strategic document can change 75 years of political tradition. Having said that, it is inevitable that the former National Security Strategy (Nationale Sicherheitstrategie, Nss) published by a German government is a break in the way Berlin approaches the world.
The document, mentioned as a priority target for the government in the coalition agreement between social democrats (SPD), greens and liberals (FDP), was proposed to give Germany a tool with which to deal holistically with the current global disorder. However, what began as an expression of the German ambition to do more on the world stage has become, as of 24 February 2022, an urgent political necessity. After the outbreak of war, every month of delay in developing the Strategy dented German credibility; not a few commentators were alarmed by the fact that a document so publicized by the government had fallen victim to disputes between the (green-led) Foreign Ministry, the Social Democratic Chancellery and the (liberal) Ministry of Finance.
The turning point towards integrated security
After a year of hesitation, the Strategy was finally published on Wednesday 14 June for parliamentary discussions. The NSS combines several aspects: it serves to communicate primarily interests and values pursued by Germany internationally, to explain how Berlin considers current global trends and, above all, to draw the sum from a jungle of already existing strategic documents, white papers and ministerial guidelines. This makes the Nss a hybrid product: on the one hand, the Strategy looks to the past and summarizes the state of the art by creating a 360-degree analysis of the strategic context in which Germany operates. On the other hand, the NSS officially introduces a concept of “integrated security” which conceptualises the protection of the country by also focusing on aspects of human security, the safety of German society and environmental threats. Hence also the ambition to develop a series of policies that would transform Germany, a federal state characterized by often cumbersome interinstitutional mechanisms, into a real country-systemalso involving the federated states and the population in the broadest sense.
The document is designed to lay the foundations a sectoral strategies (some of which already exist, such as the one on raw materials, while others are still to be written, as in the case of space or relations with China). This explains the lack of detail regarding practical initiatives, even if some fields of action are identified. Germany must become “capable of self-defense” (wehrhaft), resilient and sustainable. Relations with United States and France they are considered the two cornerstones of German foreign relations (the mutual aid clause in the Aachen treaty is even placed on the same level as article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and article 42 paragraph 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union); military spending will have to settle on a “multi-year average” of 2 percent of GDP. On the other hand, the formation of a National Security Council is excluded, supported above all by the liberals and the right-wing SPD but considered a weakening of the Foreign Ministry in favor of the chancellery.
Interests and values, but no priorities
While confirming the commitment to classic themes dear to German diplomacy, such as the disarmament and the riforma dell’Her, it is evident that Berlin has realized that it cannot be an earthenware vessel in a world of iron. L’European Union is considered the main one force multiplier on a number of topics, from space to defense industry consolidation. NATO is confirmed as the only organization capable of defending the continent, while a role of security provider and crisis prevention in the neighborhood. The environmental transition and the threats deriving from it climate crisis are seen as the main area in which robustness is still possible multilateral diplomacyeven with rivals like China.
The document lists numerous areas of action that are certainly useful and important, but what is often missing is a common thread that allows us to understand which of the problems identified takes precedence. Some sections of the document easily summarize the inherent contradictions in German foreign and defense policy: in the field of arms acquisition, for example, Berlin is aiming for a common European approach – but only if this does not involve sacrificing capacity or speed in the procurement processes. Squaring the circle is very difficult, and indeed the impression is that the NSS does not provide what a strategic document should provide: useful guidelines for addressing any political dilemmas. This is made even more problematic by a small inscription repeated even during the presentation press conference by Finance Minister Christian Lindner: the Strategy will not lead to an increase in public debt.
Since however that the Nss should therefore lead to a spending remodeling, it would have been necessary to specify which priorities will be financed and what will be cut. Perhaps it was inevitable for a coalition government that was anything but cohesive on economic issues, but the fact remains that the National Security Strategy remains a incomplete document and which can only be judged in the light of the segments still awaited (especially on China) and the political actions that will follow.
Cover photo EPA/CLEMENS BILAN