Kuwait enters a political-institutional phase with uncertain outcomes. Because this is not yet another of the crises that have so far paralyzed the Gulf oil emirate: the Emir has dissolved Parliament but there will be no new elections, because the institutional process will be revised and a new government has already taken office . However, Kuwait is the Gulf monarchy in which the National Assembly plays the most significant role in terms of history (since 1963), legislative power and dialectics with the government representing the royal family: the one introduced by the new Emir Shaykh Meshal Al-Ahmad Al -Sabah, in office for only six months, is a measure shock with very few precedents (1976, 1986).
The choice of institutional zeroing could convince international investors who await hitherto postponed economic-social reforms, in a country that is a strategic ally of the United States and of which China is the main trading partner. In fact, it will be up to the Emir directly to now speed up the implementation of the reforms, with the hope that Kuwait City will join the prosperous path of economic diversification of its neighbors. But the risk of an authoritarian involution exists, especially if the reform path were to run aground, thus encouraging new popular protests. In front of which – unlike in the past – the royal family would find themselves alone and without any more alibis.
Address to the nation
“Save the country” and “review the democratic process in its entirety”. With these words, pronounced last May 10th in a televised address to the nation, the Emir of Kuwait dissolved the National Assembly, also suspending some articles of the Constitution (unspecified so far) “for a period not exceeding four years” . Shaykh Meshal denounced the “unhealthy atmosphere” which favored the spread of corruption in Kuwait “even in the political, economic institutions and even in the judicial system”. And he went so far as to evoke interference in the choice of the crown prince, which is up to him alone, even though it must then be confirmed by Parliament.
Political stalemate
The dialectic between parliament and government has always distinguished Kuwait from neighboring monarchies, making it the most lively political system, despite the fact that here too political parties are banned and candidates run as independents despite belonging to political groups. Over time, however, this coexistence has blocked the country, due to growing internal quarrels, generating fragile governments: Kuwaitis have voted three times in the last three years.
The National Assembly (50 members elected out of 65) can have its say regarding the state budget, the designation of the crown prince and above all it can question the ministers, who are often accused of corruption and prefer to resign before going to the chamber. After the elections last April, the negotiations for the formation of the executive immediately went uphill, also because the vote had rewarded the candidates of the political groups in opposition to the outgoing government.
The problems that Kuwait has accumulated are many. The emirate (OPEC member) is the sixth largest country in the world in terms of oil reserves but its economy is too dependent on fluctuations in the price of crude oil. Despite the launch of Vision 2035 in 2017, hydrocarbons still represent 90% of revenues and foreign direct investments, although slightly growing, are very far from the numbers of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, representing only 0.2% of GDP (2023). However, public spending continues to grow: in 2024/2025, almost 80% of this will be used to pay salaries and subsidies. Corruption remains the protagonist of public debate as well as of many street protests despite government initiatives, such as the creation of the independent Nazaha Authority in 2016.
The new emir of Kuwait
The Emir, 83, assumed leadership of the country in December 2023, with the passing of his half-brother. And right from the start he made no secret of his desire to shake up the country. A direction apparently contrary to that of his predecessor Shaykh Nawaf Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah. In fact, the short reign of Shaykh Nawaf (2020-2023), who also intended to overcome political paralysis, was characterized by diplomacy and national unity as evidenced by the amnesty granted to dissidents and critical voices of power; relations between the government and the National Assembly had thus become more collaborative.
“I will not allow democracy to be exploited to destroy the State,” the Emir now said, referring to the ungovernability that the vetoes and parliamentary questions have exacerbated. Shaykh Meshal knows the state machine very well, but even more so the security and intelligence apparatus, which he has dealt with for decades. A career that began at the Ministry of the Interior in the 1960s and continued as head of State Security and then as deputy head of the National Guard, the elite corps with the status of gendarmerie which is entrusted with national defense and which the current emir helped modernize.
In foreign policy, multipolarity and continuity
If on the internal level Shaykh Meshal has chosen a muscular approach that evokes his own background security, in foreign policy the Emir continues in the wake of historical alliances (Saudi Arabia, United States, Great Britain) and recent but already tested partnerships (China). With one discontinuity: the appointment of a minister of foreign affairs not belonging to the royal family. Given the critical moment, Kuwait will even more need political support from its neighbors, as well as international investment. After the suspension of parliament, UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan was the first to phone the Emir to express support, and Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq Al Said arrives to visit on May 13. Shaykh Meshal’s first two foreign moves reaffirmed his desire for dialogue in the Middle East (his first non-Arab trip was to Turkey) and the close economic relations with China (the long-term cooperation agreement for trade, investments and economic zones).
The path that Kuwait is preparing to cross is narrow and still presents many question marks, even if the emirate has the resources and solidity to overcome it, containing the authoritarian risks. The real issue – which probably had a significant weight in the Emir’s choice to suspend parliament – however concerns the choice of the crown prince, given Shaykh Meshal’s elderly age. Whoever is appointed will have to manage the outcome, positive or negative, of this unusual phase of disruption.