A few hours afterIranian attack on Israel it is possible to make a first preliminary evaluation. How did this situation come about? What has Iran lost and what could it have gained? How do you get out of it?
The attack is the culmination of a months-long escalatory cycle
Iran’s attack is one retaliation in response to a series of operations conducted by Israel starting in December 2023 against senior Iranian officials in Syria, culminating in the attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, in which the highest-ranking general of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards operating in Syria was killed. These attacks, and especially the one in Damascus, have put Iran in an almost impossible position.
On the one hand he could have take the hit and continue to benefit indirectly from Israel’s growing isolation following the devastation inflicted on Gaza by Israel itself. This would have resulted in a serious weakening of Iran’s deterrence capacity and, in fact, would have represented an invitation to Israel to raise the stakes further. On the other hand, Iran had the option of respond militarilyin an attempt to recover some of the lost deterrencehowever risking being dragged into a war that it does not want and into which the Israeli government would have done everything to bring the United States.
A sort of middle ground was opted for, a massive direct attack from Iranian territory with drones (between 130 and 150) and ballistic and cruise missiles (about 150 in total). It was a attack with great political impact but little practical effect: There were no casualties or significant damage. After all, it was communicated well in advance to give Israel, the United States and their European and Arab allies (UK, France, Jordan in the lead) time to prepare. But did Iran really get what it was looking for?
Strategic defeat or victory for Iran?
On the one hand, Iran has certainly lost us in this whole story. Israel claims to have intercepted almost all of the gifts and missiles and this would have shown the limits of Iranian military power. Furthermore, the fact that the attack was deliberately limited and communicated well in advance clearly indicates that theIran is afraid of a war it cannot sustain.
The attack also saw the participation in the defense of the Israeli territory of Jordanwhich would have highlighted how the real dividing line in the Middle East it is not the one between Arabs and Israelis – as it was until the 1980s – but that between Israel and the Arab countries on one side (with the exception of Syria) and Iran on the other. But most importantly, the attack shifted international focus from Gaza, where Israel is on the defensive, to Iran, where Israel has easily regained American and European support.
Iran has therefore lost some of the advantages it had indirectly gained from the international criticism rained down on Israel for the destruction of Gaza. However, there are some elements that suggest that he may have earned something.
First, it has showed some military capability. It is entirely plausible that the interception rate is lower than the 99% claimed by the Israelis. An attack in the future conducted not for political but for military purposes would in all likelihood have a greater impact than the ‘telegraphed’ one on the night of 13-14 April.
Secondly, the Iran’s reputation in regional public opinion has probably strengthened because he had the audacity to attack Israel despite the risk of a very heavy counter-retaliation from the Israelis and Americans. Considering that the only other regional actors that have affected Israel during Israeli military operations in Gaza are allies of Iran (Hezbollah and Houthis), the credibility of the ‘axis of resistance’ – the network of Iranian allies in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Yemen – has increased in the region.
Third, the attack put in once more highlighting Western hypocrisy, which promptly condemned (rightly!) Iran, but never admonished Israel for triggering the escalatory spiral. In fact, before the retaliation, the United States and Europe urged Iran not to act, but without doing the same with Israel.
In the end the Iranian attack exposed Western cowardice in the eyes of the global South and of Russia and China: The United States, France and the United Kingdom did not hesitate to use their forces to defend Israel’s airspace and territory from a retaliation that the country itself actually provoked. Yet, they are careful not to take measures to close the airspace of Ukraine, an innocent country attacked by an imperialist power with intentions of conquest – and which also uses the same type of drone.
A way out?
Iran considers the matter over, as its representation at the United Nations said. The US also seems inclined to overcome the incident. President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu to “take the victory” of intercepting all or almost all missiles and drones (whether true or not). Above all, he communicated to him that the United States does not intend to participate in an Israeli counter-retaliation. It would not be surprising if the press tip that Biden complained that Netanyahu is doing everything he can to drag the United States into a war in the Middle East was a deliberate move.
The question now is what Israel will do. So far, the Netanyahu government has consistently ignored the requests and warnings of the Americans on Gaza, nor did it feel obliged to warn Washington before the attack on Damascus that triggered the spiral of escalation. Will he continue to attack Iran in such a way as to provoke a second retaliation? If he does so it will be because he will not have received any form of pressure from the Americans and Europeans. Therefore, if in the coming weeks and months we find ourselves in a generalized conflict in the Middle East, the responsibility will also fall on Washington and the Europeans.