That’s why Xi won’t dump Putin now or later
“Lhe relations between China and Russia will not be characterized by Russia pulling China into isolation or dragging it into war in Ukraine. Rather, China will help Russia create the conditions to return to the international community and seek a solution to the geopolitical stalemate caused by the war”. The synthesis of the current relational dynamic between Moscow and Beijing is traced by Hu Xijin, a Chinese journalist widely followed social media and former editor of the nationalist tabloid Global Times.
If the anti-US rhetoric and the strong vagueness of how much declared on the war in Ukraine were widely expected, perhaps the main element to be captured from the three-day state visit of Xi Jinping in Moscow it is his explicit support for Vladimir Putin. Not about the conflict, but about his leadership position. Position made clear by the support expressed in the 2024 presidential elections and then with the invitation to Beijing by the end of 2023.
In doing so, China has made it clear that it will never support a regime change in Russia and that negotiations must be conducted with Putin himself, who is now increasingly dependent on Beijing. The only real advantage obtained since the beginning of the war by China, which otherwise has seen its Asian neighbors essentially “enlisted” by the United States in their strategy to contain Beijing’s rise in the Pacific. That’s why China has no intention of dumping Putin, indeed, just as it supports its rhetoric on war, obviously being careful not to antagonize Ukraine.
Until a few years ago, Beijing belittled attempts to create an Asian NATO. He now knows that its containment is the Pentagon’s strategic priority. For this reason, you have the same vision as Russia on the war in Ukraine: it is the United States that is “throwing fuel on the fire”. As if to say: if in the future we are forced to take military actions on the eastern front, it will be your fault.
Xi describes himself as a mediator and in the meantime closes important agreements with Putin
But on the concrete front, what did Xi’s visit produce? There is something, and it seems to hang on the Chinese side. As stated in the joint statement signed by the two leaders, “the two sides will continue to strengthen mutually beneficial cooperation in the financial field, including by ensuring smooth settlement between the economic entities of the two countries and supporting the expansion of the use of Chinese currency in bilateral trade, investment, credit and other economic and commercial activities”. A fine goal for Beijing, which is betting on the internationalization of its currency also to shield itself from Western sanctions.
The Kremlin leader also said he was “ready to create a joint working body for the development of the Northern Sea Route”, one of the routes through the frozen waters of the Arctic, the joint document is also stingy with details. However, this is another area of traditional Russian influence that would open the doors to Chinese projectionas indeed has already happened with Central Asia.
On the energy front, “all the parameters” of the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline under construction have been agreed. “The total volume of gas supplies by 2030 it will be at least 98 billion cubic meters,” said Putin, who said he was ready to increase supplies of natural gas liquefied and petroleum. The goal of reaching 200 billion dollars of trade in 2023 has been reaffirmed: an expected increase in Russian exports of meat and cereals.
Last year, Chinese imports of Russian energy – that constitute more than 40% of the Kremlin’s budget revenues – they grew from 52.8 to 81.3 billion dollars. According to Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Russia is China’s second largest supplier of crude oil and coal. In January, Russia overtook Qatar, Turkmenistan and Australia to become China’s largest gas supplier, supplying 2.7 billion cubic meters.
And the imbalance seems destined to increase further. On the peace front, it is difficult to expect a truly “dirty” role for Beijing, che meanwhile aims at an image operation with the call between Xi and Zelensky. However, it will be necessary to see if Kiev will lend its flank or leave no space. The important thing for China is at least to show that they have tried.
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