Kolesnikov: the social pact with the regime is more fragile than it appears, it is difficult for the Kremlin to launch another mobilization
Andrei Kolesnikov, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Eurasia Center, is probably the most prominent dissident intellectual remaining living in Moscow today. His essays on Russian society, deeply critical of the regime, appear regularly in Foreign Affairs. And perhaps it was precisely the global resonance of Kolesnikov’s interventions in the most influential international political magazine in the world, published in the United States, that pushed the government a few months ago to declare him a “foreign agent”.
How has the atmosphere changed in Russia after Vladimir Putin’s re-election and the Crocus attack?
«There are paradoxes in today’s Russia – replies Andrei Kolesnikov from his apartment in Moscow -. One of these is the reality of daily life, especially in big cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg: you have the impression of a normal life, apart from some small but unpleasant changes.”
For example, what changes?
«For example, there is no lack of medicines. But some rare drugs for oncology or other serious diseases are disappearing. And there are no problems with food or the production of other goods. Yet Moscow has filled up with Chinese cars, not European ones. And we note various characteristics of an unhealthy society. Everyone prefers to communicate within their own community, trying not to do it with unknown people. For me it would be dangerous, because I would risk complaints. But everyone tries to concentrate only on their daily life.”
It seems like people try not to think too much about the war. Are people afraid?
«They understand that they have to behave according to the rules. They must be patriots in Putin’s sense. And if they are not, if they are against the war, they have to remain more or less silent and be very cautious. There are some secret supporters, so to speak, of people like me: they often see me as a host of several popular programs on YouTube that broadcast from abroad and sometimes even from Moscow. And some of my neighbors or even strangers express words of support to me when we meet in the elevator, for example, or on the street.”
Do you see a change in political line internally after the Crocus event?
«It was very shocking. Another shock, a very serious one. I don’t think it’s comparable to that at the beginning of the war or at the beginning of partial mobilization, but almost at those levels. We had not experienced anything like this for a long time, since the Beslan school massacre in 2004 or the Dubrovka theater crisis in 2002. For this reason, the first reaction of liberal communities was to think of the Reichstag fire of 1933 (the which Adolf Hitler followed up with a ferocious repression in Germany, ed.). Many expected Putin to close the borders, announce martial law and start a new mobilization.”
Was this a correct reading of Putin’s actions?
“I do not believe. I personally estimated that Putin would not dare to initiate such moves because they would impact all Russians, not just liberal minorities. For average Russians it is unpleasant to be mobilized, because it is a violation of an unwritten social contract.”
What is the social contract in Putin’s Russia of 2024?
«The government’s implicit message is: ‘You must be patriotic. You can join our army, but this is not your duty if you are not a person who can be conscripted; it is your decision. But we allow you to live a normal daily life.” Violation of this social contract could be very painful for society. No one can predict the consequences. So, the government’s reaction to the terrorist attack was rather mild.”
Hasn’t there been an increase in repressive measures?
«Of course, they are tightening the controls. Police and National Guard are everywhere. They check people entering the subway. They check who comes from Central Asia, who carries a different phenotype, let’s say. They do it all the time. But that’s all. In reality, the government’s goal is to explain that all this concerns Ukraine, that the real threat to the average Russian is Ukraine. They are trying to find any justification to credit this version.”
But was public opinion really convinced that Ukraine was behind the Crocus attack?
“Yes. Public opinion doesn’t want to believe that we are on the side of evil. We can’t be. We are the good. We are on the side of good. And for this reason, the majority does not support the idea that it was a provocation by the FSB (the internal secret service, ed.), for example. So the logical chain continues: Ukraine is behind the terrorist attack, the USA and Great Britain are behind it, according to the conspiracy theorists who are in government, and here they are helped by “foreign agents” who should be prosecuted again harder.”
Do you think the FSB played a role in the Crocus attack?
«Such an idea has cropped up in liberal circles, not entirely unjustified given past experiences. But, I do not think so. There is evidence about ISIS. The point is that public opinion prefers not to believe any version other than the official one against Ukraine, which has been repeated many times by various officials and the official media. They always give vague descriptions, but they have inserted notions into the public consciousness. And the majority prefers to accept the official explanation, because they cannot explain on their own what is happening in Russia.”
Isn’t this a show of strength by the regime?
«Also a demonstration of weakness. After the attack, Putin remained silent for 19 hours. He was as if in a stupor. He didn’t know what to say, how to articulate his position. The same happened during the mutiny of Evghenji Prigozhin (the former head of the Wagner militia, ed.), when Putin simply disappeared. But then he has always proven to be the point of reference for the country. Prigozhin died, then Putin said that Ukraine was to blame for the Crocus and everything seems fine.”
In your opinion, could the regime afford a new mobilization or would it break the difficult balance that exists in society, given that people prefer to support the war while remaining on the sofa?
«A new partial mobilization could be truly painful for public opinion, with potentially unexpected consequences. My personal opinion is that people will accept this too. They will obey. But that doesn’t mean they wouldn’t be resentful of the authorities. During his re-election campaign, Putin focused on a peaceful agenda: social benefits, public projects. And now he announces a tax reform to pay the costs of the war. If a real lever were added, a military mobilization, it would also be unpleasant for the social groups that still support it.”
So, isn’t it better for the government to continue using volunteers and contract soldiers?
«They offer contracts to people who were initially enrolled as conscripts, between the ages of 18 and 30, before they demobilize and return home. So people who were conscripted in the fall of 2022 are unable to return home. Sometimes, even after being seriously injured, they are sent back to the field. For those with a criminal conviction, joining the military means forgiveness and release. And there are many volunteers and men who sign contracts with the army. They are partly victims of aggressive propaganda and false semi-patriotic values, but partly they simply want to make money. Because despite the brilliant official statistics, this country suffers from inequalities and the weak classes are large. This gives the army a supply and is very bad for public morale. This is a society with reversed perceptions: black becomes white.”
3 maggio 2024
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