by Armando Donninelli –
Fethullah Gulen, born in 1941 in Pansier in Turkey, is an important scholar of Islam, for the first part of his life he was an Imam.
His remarkable oratorical skills allowed him to acquire a considerable reputation in western Turkey, where he operated. This determined the birth of an organizational structure headed by him, focused with particular attention on education, financed with donations from his many followers. This was the first nucleus of that complex organization which developed subsequently and which in Turkish was called Hizmet, i.e. service.
Having abandoned the prayer activity in the early eighties, he began to concentrate on activities of a religious, social, media and education nature, using the organizational structure previously established and which expanded to the whole country.
At the beginning of the nineties, there were over 100 schools managed by Hizmet, alongside numerous study centers and preparatory courses for access to universities. In this period Hizmet also began to operate in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, where there is a linguistic and cultural affinity with Turkey.
During that decade Gulen’s organization became truly international, it managed to enter over eighty countries, mainly Muslims, but not only. In fact, it was precisely in those years that Hizmet began to provide assistance to Turkish immigrant communities in Europe, Germany in primis. In 1999, in a climate of heavy tension between the military and Erdogan’s pro-Islamic movement, then in opposition but rising sharply in the polls, Gulen decided to exile himself in the USA.
After the September 2001 attacks, Gulen and his organization began to be looked upon with sympathy by many Western countries, the latter eager to find a reliable interlocutor in moderate Islam, i.e. the one that supports Hizmet with its multiple activities.
In 2002, the pro-Islamic movement of the AKP, led by Erdogan, came to power in Turkey and began an activity of desecularization of Turkey. In this he was able to count on the collaboration of his friend Gulen. All this in the context of a clear separation of duties, in which the AKP had the role of political activism while Hizmet had to act in the social and educational fields.
At the beginning of the new millennium, Hizmet is now by far the most important private organization in Turkey, but its role has also increased enormously abroad, mainly in Muslim countries but also in countries where there are large communities of Islamic faith.
In these contexts, Hizmet begins to gather an ever-increasing number of adherents, ordinary people but also academics, entrepreneurs and personalities from the world of the media. All attracted by the charisma and teachings of Gulen who, in the meantime, has begun to devote himself to interreligious dialogue.
According to Graham E. Fuller, a former high-level CIA official and expert on Turkey, Hizmet has over the years infiltrated many of his adherents into key positions in the Turkish judiciary in order to influence the life of the country. The culmination of this project was reached between 2007 and 2012 when numerous opponents of Erdogan were indicted and arrested on various charges of fraud in various sectors of public life, all this by magistrates mainly attributable to Gulen. These are statements made not only by Fuller but also by other analysts and which, taken together, shed a disturbing light on Hizmet and his projects.
The personal and collaborative relationships between Gulen and Erdogan, solid and long-standing, began to crack at a certain point. Indeed, it seems that Erdogan, by far the most powerful person in Turkey, viewed Gulen’s growing role in the country’s public life negatively.
The turning point came at the end of 2013 when numerous people linked to the AKP, Erdogan’s party, were indicted and arrested, this on the basis of charges mainly of corruption and money laundering. Erdogan himself and his family members were investigated. At this point the government intervened and ordered the removal of 350 police officers involved in the previous operations with a decree. The same prosecutor who coordinated them was fired.
A heavy dispute arose between Gulen, still resident in the USA, who accused the government of wanting to purge uncomfortable public officials, and Erdogan, who spoke of a “judicial coup” managed by Gulen.
In 2014, a Turkish court issued an arrest warrant for Gulen, after 20 journalists associated with his movement were arrested. At the basis of this was the accusation, made for the first time by the Turkish authorities, according to which the movement founded by Gulen was of a terrorist nature.
The climax of the clash was reached in July 2016 when a part of the Turkish army tried to seize power and oust Erdogan. The coup attempt failed, thanks mainly to the resistance put up by loyalist soldiers and public opinion. Erdogan attributed the responsibility to Gulen’s organization, once again highlighting its terrorist and subversive nature.
Retaliation following the failed coup attempt focused mainly on public officials linked to Hizmet. Tens of thousands of judges, teachers, policemen and other state officials were forced out of their jobs.
However, it should be remembered that Gulen has always categorically denied any involvement, his or that of his organization, in the attempted coup.
Turkey requested Gulen’s extradition to the USA which, in turn, rejected Ankara’s request stating that the documentation produced would not demonstrate the subversive and terrorist nature of his action. From that moment on, the question of Gulen’s extradition became one of the points of greatest friction between Turkey and the USA.
The organization headed by Gulen has become a mortal enemy for Ankara, even today whoever is suspected of having links with it is immediately dismissed from the public administration, this with such harshness as to be criticized by the Council of Europe, as much as regards form as regards merit.
Despite Erdogan’s repressive action, Gulen’s footprint in Turkey remains strong, according to a 2017 estimate around 1,200,000 Turkish citizens have attended his schools and are imbued with his teachings.
The hostility of the Turkish government has resulted in the focus of Hizmet’s activities abroad, its presence is reported in around 160 countries worldwide, based on a 2018 research done by German public broadcaster Deutsche Well, and its adherents around the globe there are around 3,500,000, obviously excluding residents of Turkey for whom it is difficult to collect data.
The characteristic of his work does not focus on the construction of mosques or on holding prayer meetings, as institutional Muslims do, but on the opening of schools, where the religious component is secondary, but also on the creation of direct charities to promote interreligious dialogue.
A September 2020 report by the Australian Foreign Office, focused on Hizmet, highlighted the absence of a public hierarchical structure in the movement, but the presence of an internal organization, attributable to Gulen and his advisers, and a organization that has to operate outside, based on activists, often former students of Gulen schools.
The propulsive center of most of the activities carried out by Hizmet consists of periodic meetings held in private homes, in these venues questions concerning faith and society are addressed but, above all, how to concretely implement Gulen’s teachings in the context in which which you live.
Although not very visible, its members are also present in Europe, especially in Germany, Belgium, Holland and France, often Turkish immigrants with a high level of education.
The most important role of Hizmet is certainly played in the countries of Central Asia, also thanks to linguistic affinities with the local population. Here his schools are quite widespread and offer a valid alternative to families who fear the potential radicalism of religious teachings.
Obviously this is not well seen by Ankara, just think that in June 2021 Orhan Inandi, a popular educator with Turkish and Kyrgyz citizenship disappeared from Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, this gave rise to mass protests. Shortly after, Erdogan clarified the matter by stating that Inandi had been kidnapped, as a collaborator of Gulen, by Turkish intelligence agents.
Gulen’s organization was certainly weakened by the harsh repression that followed the attempted coup in 2016, however Erdogan also appears weaker, for a series of reasons including, of fundamental importance, the clash with Gulen who, in some sections of the Turkish electorate remains very popular. If Erdogan is defeated in the upcoming presidential elections, which is not improbable, then, at that point, a bright future would open up for Gulen’s activity in his motherland.