Since the Treaty of Maastricht (1993), the word ‘European constraint’ has long meant in Italy an obligation to keep accounts in order, and therefore a restriction on public spending. A constraint that had indeed considerably intensified with the measures to combat the global financial crisis (EU regulations and then the Fiscal Compact of 2013), both because the ceilings set at European level no longer concerned only the budget deficit but also the public debt , and above all because the whole procedure relative to the national budget decision was intertwined with assessments and controls by Brussels, and with the submission of economic policy, in the event of exceeding the ceilings, to the guidance of a Trojka (composed of representatives of the Commission, of the ECB and the International Monetary Fund) up to the “recovery” of the finances of the “spending” member state.
We all remember what happened to Greece, and that years later official exponents of the Union changed their minds about the validity of the “tears and blood” doctrine imposed on that country. It is certain, however, that the pandemic has forced a rapid (for its usually very long times) change of horizon on the Union. On the one hand, the constraints of the Fiscal Compact were temporarily suspended for all member states, and on the other, a “conditionality” of the opposite sign to that envisaged until then was initiated. With the PNRR, the Union lends or subsidizes resources to the Member States most in difficulty, first and foremost the Italian State, which is the beneficiary of around 250 billion in six years. Of course, apart from loans, the disbursement of these resources is also subject to conditions, concerning the approval and above all the implementation of certain reforms deemed necessary for growth, particularly in public administrations and justice, as well as concerning the control of the and the how of the expenditure of the same European funds.
The PNRR therefore maintains conditionality, but with an inverted sign. The Union is no longer a sharp-eyed accountant who does not intervene in the conditions of growth. He becomes the guardian of the accounts precisely because he has taken part in them. Which should shield the Union itself from any reproach of wanting to choke growth, if the Member State does not reform its administrations or does not spend European funds within the indicated times. Should, not necessarily should. With us, the complaints of interested comedians cannot be ruled out here either. Let’s see why.
In Italy, in times of pandemic, criticism of the Union ceased thanks to the launch of the PNRR, which on the other hand was the result of a strong commitment by the government to direct the bulk of resources towards our country. But this does not mean that the distrust towards the Union of groups and corporations has disappeared, and of parties ready to magnify it for electoral reasons, on the left and even more on the right.
In the current year, the Draghi government has managed to obtain all the funds that it was possible to obtain from the Union, mainly thanks to the approval of the reforms that had been requested. However, the results were less good on the administration front, in terms of reorganization of the same and spending capacity, at the regional and local level even more than at the national level.
We are now at the end of 2022, with a new government legitimized by the election results. At the time of writing, the conclusion of the match on the appointments to the top administrations called upon to implement the PNRR is not yet clear. But this is still only part of the problem. Even if all the leaders were confirmed (which it is legitimate to doubt), administrative inertia remains powerful, and has indeed strengthened with a government that guarantees the continuity of an address attentive to the connection between commitments made and behavior through the Minister of the ‘Economy. Definitely little, especially if the signs of the first month of the Meloni government continue to manifest themselves. The inevitable swerve to the right (not only in terms of rights, but also in terms of the economy) has in fact deliberately overshadowed the more embarrassing issue of compliance with the roadmaps required for European funds.
We want to know where we are on the subject, and what the government intends to do to meet the deadlines: possibly with simple communication that everyone can understand. Instead, media attention is focused on a scam perpetrated against a few hundred migrants recovered at sea by NGO ships: just 10 percent of the total of those landed in Italy in recent months. We went back to the summer of 2018, to allow a party to get full votes again as it did then (which is impossible, however). It’s a drama that could lead to another. When from Brussels, after having certified that the reforms have not been implemented and/or that the funds have not been spent, Italy will be asked to recover not only the funds lent, but also the others. Then the complaints about Europe choking the Italian economy could also start again (again for electoral purposes), as if we had returned to the years of the Fiscal Compact, despite the differences we have seen.
Too much mischief? Let’s just say that too many comedians tread the stage believing they understand and know everything, and thus making all of us run very serious risks.