The recent one approval by the US House of the military aid package to Ukraineworth 61 billion dollars, marks a fundamental turning point that is better understood in light of these 26 months of conflict, and makes Ukrainian defense sustainable as long as Kyiv’s strategy changes and Europe does its part.
The situation on the Eastern and Euro-Atlantic fronts
Two years ago at this time Ukraine repelled Russian invasion forces at the gates of Kyiv. At the end of 2022 the Ukrainians liberated the occupied city of Kherson and the area around Kharkiv, while in 2023 the counteroffensive unfortunately failed in the face of the defenses set up by the Russians in the occupied territories. For more than eight months the front is relatively stable despite furious fighting, with a Russian advance of a few kilometers at Avdiivka costing high casualties to both sides.
Compared to February 23, 2022, theUkraine has saved about 80% of its territory by a large-scale invasion, along three north-east-south lines, aimed at controlling the entire country through direct annexation – then implemented in the area around the Sea of Azov – and/or a puppet government in place of the one democratically elected in a sovereign state. Ukrainian society west of the front continues to function despite enormous sacrifices and continuous aerial bombardments, even managing to export its products across the Black Sea.
Russia prepares a new offensive, leveraging a demographic basin larger than the Ukrainian one and which has no possibility of protesting, and on a war economy that gives priority to war production to the point of punishing failure to achieve production objectives as a crime. Offensive to unfold this summer, or to be played with a possible Trump presidency decidedly inclined to abandon Kyiv to Moscow, perhaps in exchange for possible counter-parties in his clash with China. To face the Russian mass, Ukraine made the painful decision to lower the recruitment age to 25 without giving itself a rigid time limit for demobilization, demonstrating how a democracy can and must try to defend its very existence from a war of invasion by renegotiating the social pact at its basis.
Il aid package now almost approved in Congress provides 23 billion to donate ammunition and means like those already given, 14 billion for new, more advanced systems, 8 billion to pay Ukrainian military and civilian personnele 11 billion to finance military activities related to the war, from training to providing intelligence. Europeans could and, in some cases, would like to donate more to Ukraine, but in many others they have already scraped the bottom of the barrel of their equipment stocks: in more than two years of war there has been no change of pace of the European defense industry, which unfortunately continues to work at peacetime pace and volumes and not for an emergency economy.
Because it is in Europe’s interest to help Ukraine
This is, in brief, the difficult strategic framework in which many in Italy are asking themselves two questions: 1) what interest does Europe have in continuing to support Ukraine; 2) how to do it in current and foreseeable future circumstances, which are partially different compared to both 2022 and 2023.
The answer to the first question is that abandoning Ukraine to Russia will most likely not bring peace because Putin will draw a very simple lesson from his possible victory: that if he invades a neighboring country after a few years the Westerners will throw in the towel, and the time has therefore come to re-submit small and neutral Moldova first – objective within reach reuniting the Russian troops in Transnistria with those occupying Ukraine – and then the Baltics, thus restoring the coveted borders of the Soviet Union. Since the Baltic Republics have been members of NATO and the EU for 20 years, their Russian military occupation, even partial, involves two scenarios: either a war between Russia and all or some NATO allies, or the political destruction of both the Atlantic Alliance and of the European Union, to the benefit of Russian influence on a divided Europe and with enormous negative consequences for the economy, security and stability of all member states – including Italy.
Those who consider these two scenarios unlikely or impossible should remember that in the Italian public debate a Russian invasion of Ukraine was considered unlikely or impossible until February 23, 2022, just 26 months ago. The current leadership in Moscow has proven to be so risk-takingso solid, and so capable of making its nation endure sacrifices unthinkable in Western Europe, from make the scenario of an attack on the Baltics possible once Moscow’s troops arrive at the (former) Ukrainian borders with Poland.
Deter a Russian attack on EU and NATO countries it is, therefore, the main reason to support Ukrainebut obviously not the only one if you attach value to respect for international law and above all to the destabilizing effect of a Russian victory on other quadrants such as the Indo-Pacific, where faced with the surrender of Kyiv, Beijing’s reasoning would be similar to that of Moscow: Taiwan can be invaded because, after a few years of sanctions ‘invader and military aid to the invader, the West will abandon the Taiwanese as it did with the Ukrainians. And so on with a potential domino effect of aggression starting from North Korea.
From a historical perspective, nothing particularly new, rather a return to what was normality in Europe for around 15 centuries from the end of the Roman Empire to the establishment of NATO and the EU – precisely the two institutions targeted by Putin. A return to the past against which it is worth doing everything possible.
How to make Ukrainian defense sustainable over the years
Doing what is the second key question on which there is some confusion in Italy, especially in light of the French declarations in recent months on a possible dispatch of European armed forces to Ukraine. Reflection on how to best help Kyiv must start from the realistic assumption that it is no longer possible to militarily liberate the territories currently occupiedné in Donbas, and Zaporizhzhia o Kherson, né in Crimea.
But it’s possible protect the 80% of Ukrainian territory that the country has saved at great cost by repelling the Russian invasion in the first year of the war. It is therefore necessary to concentrate all the resources of both Ukrainian and international partners in deeply fortify the front line better defensible in operational terms, evacuating population centers if necessary, setting up stratified defenses based on extensive minefields, bunkers, trenches, surveillance systems, and all the measures successfully adopted, unfortunately, by the Russian occupiers in 2023. To defend Ukrainian territory they are also and above all useful anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense systems capable of protecting both critical infrastructures, primarily energy infrastructures, the front line and the civilian population. And long-range artillery and missiles are needed to hit the logistical nodes, the command and control centers, and in general the rear areas that feed the Russian offensive on the front.
Commensurate the level of ambition of the Ukrainian military strategy with the resources actually available, both domestic and international, is the first step to avoid the success of the next Russian offensive. Under current conditions, the most positive scenario for Ukraine in the short term is a situation comparable to the Korean Peninsula, with kilometers of militarized border as has been the case for decades on the 38th parallel. Only if the current Russian leadership no longer has any hope or illusion of being able to break through that fortified front will it seriously consider diplomatic negotiations with Ukraine and its allies. Until this occurs, Putin’s objective will always remain direct or indirect control over all of Ukraine, and therefore a scenario of imminent threat for Moldova and for the Baltic countries that are members of NATO and the EU.
With the 61 billion in military aid on the way, the United States is doing its part, albeit with a six-month delay on what was promised which has cost Ukrainian lives both on the front and in the cities bombed by Russia. In Europe, however, while some countries such as Finland increase and/or accelerate aid, many others hesitate, as in the case of Germany. And now It is essential that European states accelerateincrease and plan them from a multi-year perspective military supplies to Ukrainian defenseespecially if they want to avoid the very scenario envisaged by Macron of sending their troops to Ukraine tomorrow – or to the Baltic countries invaded by Russia the day after tomorrow.
The emergency economy in Europe
Realistically, and honestly, increasing and accelerating transfers to Kyiv entails But thin your stocks close to, or below, the minimum thresholds for deterrence and defense of NATO countries. This is possible without jeopardizing national security only if they are immediately signed multi-year contracts with the European defense industry to fill those very warehouses that are emptying. So no longer just “incentives”, “coordination”, “strategies”, “roadmaps” or complex mechanisms with little funding. To produce more artillery or more ammunition, three elements are needed: contracts; contracts; contracts. That is, legally binding commitments signed by the defense ministries of European states which allocate hundreds of millions of euros every year for 5-10 years, thus binding the industry in the sector to reach certain production levels. Only this can lead large and medium-sized companies to build factories from scratch, purchase new machinery, components and raw materials, hire and train qualified workers.
To enable this leap the European Union should do its part, by increasing appropriations from the community budget to support the transition from a peace economy to an emergency economy as it is the one in which we must get used to living at least in the short to medium term. This means, among other things: continuing to co-finance European research and development cooperation programmes; encourage European cooperation through tax exemption and the use of financing from the European Investment Bank; encourage industrial investments by allowing direct public financing; assume the burden and management of compensation in the event of cancellation or postponement of exports to third countries to meet European needs; reduce the indirect costs caused by the lack of integration of the European defense market; continue to reimburse member states that donate to Ukraine according to simple and stable criteria. But also to help make public opinion understand that the survival of that Union which over the last seventy years has allowed Europeans to achieve unprecedented well-being in history and in the world is being played out on these choices.
Europe’s impossible isolationism from Ukraine
If the transition from a peace economy to an emergency economy had been started two years ago, the fruits would already be seen today. Doing it now means better late than never, because Ukrainian needs in 2024 are much greater than the aid allocated by Washington and because Europeans must prepare to support Ukraine even in the event of a Trump presidency abandoning Kyiv. The United States can perhaps afford a certain isolationism with respect to a war in Europe by placing itself in the shelter of two oceans – even if two world wars prove the opposite – but the European member states of the EU and NATO that directly border Russia and Ukraine certainly cannot and, consequently, neither do the others – including Italy.