During 2023, the government led by Giorgia Meloni he pursued one European politics overall pragmatic towards European partners and EU institutions. Compatibly with the different sensitivities within the government coalition, which belong to three distinct European political families, the government sought a synthesis, putting the claim of the national interest on the main European dossiers relevant to Italy.
The Eurosceptic tones of the period spent in opposition have been replaced by a more cautious and realistic attitude, aimed at finding an agreement from time to time compromise with traditional partners in Europe and with the European Commission. At the same time, this ‘transactional’ approach in relation to European politics it has shown clear limits, especially in the context of the debate on the future of the Union, particularly with regard to key sectors such as migration policy and economic governance.
Less Visegrád, more Germany
Over the course of the year, bilateral relations often followed different directions than what would have been expected looking at the positioning of the majority parties. The ideological affinity with the governments of the Visegrád group has translated into poor results from a policy point of view. This was particularly evident in the attempt to dialogue with Hungary and Poland regarding the redistribution of shares migrants: the governments of Budapest and Warsaw have closed the door to possible mediations, especially on the reforms of the Dublin regulation.
In parallel, Italy strengthened the bilateral cooperation with Germany. At the informal European Council in Granada at the beginning of October, the mediation of Rome and Berlin was central to finding a compromise solution. The collaboration between the two countries was then further structured in the energy and defense policy sectors. As evidence of this synergy, it is worth mentioning in particular the Bilateral Action Plan signed on 22 November 2023, covering a variety of areas, including bilateral technological and scientific cooperation in the European context, joint investments in renewable energy sources and climate diplomacy, the defense sector, human rights and migration, and the protection of cultural heritage, young people and cooperation between think tanks. The bilateral plan ideally represents a complement to the Franco-German Treaty of Aachen of 2019 and the “Quirinale” Treaty of 2021, although it is not, unlike these two, an international treaty.
I relations with France continue on an equally directed track: the agreement between the two countries was confirmed by the meeting between Meloni and Macron at the Elysée on 20 June 2023, from which a shared strategy of repatriations and control of primary migratory movements emerged, then reaffirmed in the bilateral meeting at Palazzo Chigi on 26 September. In this area, therefore, the action of the Meloni government moved in substantial continuity with the Draghi government that preceded it.
Relations with the Commission
A certain continuity is also visible in the agreement reached with the European Commission on some specific dossiers: in this sense too, the time when the President of the European Commission Ursula Von der Leyen feared an intervention by Brussels in the event of the “orbanization” of Italy seems distant.
First of all, the discussion of the Minister for European Affairs on the revision of the was positive National recovery and resilience plan (Pnrr), which led to the disbursement of the fourth installment of the appropriations made available to Italy by the Next Generation EU recovery programme.
The second example of convergence between Rome and Brussels, also in continuity with the Draghi government, concerns the Italy’s support for Kyiv and to the policy of enlargement, revitalized by the Russian invasion of Ukraine after years of stagnation. The effort culminated in the European Council on 14 December, which decided to start accession negotiations with Ukraine and Moldova and, potentially, Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as recognizing Georgia’s candidate country status.
A third area of dialogue between Rome and Brussels concerned the aforementioned migration dossier: the Italian government has in fact contributed to the closure of the new Pact on migration and asylum, the negotiation of which has been ongoing since 2020 and which now only awaits ratification by the European Parliament. For its part, the European Commission has supported the strategy of outsourcing migration management supported by Italy, as evidenced by the joint visit of Meloni and von der Leyen to Tunisia in July, which led to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the European Union and Tunisia, and by the substantial approval of the agreements signed with Albania last November.
Evidence of the EU’s structural reforms
The Italian difficulties, however, were more evident in the context of the processes of reform of the Union, where the ambitions of the Meloni government are greatly reduced by a difficult end to the year. The government has failed to significantly affect the crucial dossier of reform of the Stability and Growth Pact: compared to the Commission’s initial proposal, we have arrived at a final text revised with less flexibility, mainly due to a German initiative, which risks limiting the margins of maneuver for Italian governments in the years to come. The veto, first threatened and then implemented by Italy, was of little use to the ratification of the new treaty on European Stability Mechanism (Mes) – an attitude with which Rome has rather demonstrated unreliability and inconsistency. In fact, Italy’s position has remained the victim of an internal political spiral linked to the competition between the various majority political parties and part of the opposition, little linked to a discussion on the merits of the implications for the country of the adoption of an ESM reformed.
A further structural issue that remains to be resolved is that of migration issues. From this point of view, Italy, like all Mediterranean countries, risks remaining isolated in the attempt to advance its own demands, especially those deriving from the difficult management of relations with the Mediterranean region. The agreement reached on the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, by strengthening the controls and related obligations of the states of first reception, could in fact end up penalizing Italy and the countries of first arrival.
In view of the European elections in June 2024, the Meloni government may have to deal with tensions both related to internal competition within the coalition, and the complex game of alliances at EU level. The results and possible repercussions of the attempt, also made clear by the prime minister in the press conference at the end of the year, to create an alternative coalition to the “Ursula majority” through an alliance with the European People’s Party – remain to be evaluated – even if Meloni has not ruled out the possibility of Italian support for the re-election of Von der Leyen (if she is a candidate) even in the hypothesis that her name is confirmed by a majority similar to the one that elected her in 2019.
This article is based on the chapter “Relations with Europe” prepared by the authors for Report on Italian foreign policy 2023 of the IAI, which will be presented at the Institute on February 6th at 5.30 pm.