Closed on Friday 28th July Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg. A diplomatic kermesse designed by Putin for portray Russia as a great power with many global friends, despite his destabilizing war in Ukraine. Meticulously prepared by Russian diplomacy with numerous trips by the Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on the continent, the St. Petersburg Summit intended to surpass the first Sochi Summit in 2019 in terms of participation and results.
From the point of view of participation, Sochi could boast the presence of 43 heads of state, against 17 present in Putin’s hometown. Russian diplomats have accused Western chancelleries of exerting heavy pressure to dissuade many African leaders from attending. According to the presidential aide Yury Ushakova notable disappointment for the Kremlin despite a flurry of diplomatic efforts in Africa by Foreign Minister Lavrov with numerous missions across the continent.
According to the Washington Post, in fact, the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov he blamed the West for the small numbers, arguing that there had been “absolutely unconcealed blatant meddling by the United States, France and other states” to dissuade them from attending. “This is a fact, this is outrageous,” she said. More likely, it is a consequence of Moscow’s withdrawal from the grain deal and a war that has raised food and fuel prices, hurting vulnerable populations.
This type of pressure demonstrates how much the Western camp, led by the United States, is increasingly concerned by Moscow’s expansionism and intends to act proactively in key of containment. Until recently, European and American decision makers viewed China as their main competitor in Africa. Today, they view the return of Russia with deep uneaseexemplified by the presence of Wagner mercenaries in Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Libya and, briefly, northern Mozambique.
Yet there is no evidence that African leaders share this view. Most countries on the continent, even those that have regularly voted in the United Nations to condemn the attack on Ukraine and its impact, do not want to be dragged into a new “cold war” or become pawns in a struggle for global influence and power games.
Russian goals
The agenda of the summit included an “economic and humanitarian forum” and personalities from the African business world were invited; the Kremlin promises a series of agreements on trade, investment and scientific and technical cooperation.
In the communiqué published at the end of the works, the Russians express satisfaction. “We had a substantial and engaging exchange of views on the whole range of topics of strategic cooperation between Russia and African countries […]. We identified key areas for further joint work and outlined plans to strengthen foreign policy coordination and increase trade and investment flows, as well as industrial cooperation between Russia and the countries of the continent [africano] […]. Or again: “The Forum has led to the signing of 161 agreements that do not constitute trade secrets” (146 agreements with foreign organizations and authorities), even if the value of the agreements has not been disclosed.
Most agreements concerned humanitarian cooperation, with the largest number of agreements concluded in the following areas: International and interregional cooperation – 56; Education and science – 51; Scientific and technical cooperation – 10; exports and foreign economic activity – 10. The details of these agreements can be traced in summary by consulting the “Recap of the Second Summit and Russia–Africa Economic and Humanitarian Forum” and, for the political part, everything is summarized in the “Declaration of the Second Russia–Africa Summit”. Beyond the proclamations observers noted a totally different climate from the first Sochi summit.
The Summit and the results from an African perspective
According to many experts, especially African ones, the prerogatives and urgencies are not correctly aligned between Moscow and the African capitals. The misalignment of priorities was evident at the Russia-Africa forum, where crucial discussions on Africa’s pressing existential challenges were conspicuously absent. At a time when the continent grapples with environmental concerns, social justice and the redistributive effects of growth, the forum agenda failed to address these critical issues.
African nations are actively seeking search for funding to fight climate change and innovative solutions that integrate social, environmental and governance expectations with the harsh reality of poverty and underdevelopment. The event’s lack of focus on these topics made it seem distant from the needs of the continent. Furthermore, the low representation of gender and youth in the panels further highlighted the difficulties in addressing essential concerns.
Oluwadamilola Olanrewaju, expert of the magazine “Business Elites Africa” has identified some expectations disappointed so far. Many other experts, including J. Siegle of the “Africa Center for Strategic Studies” and Sarah Daly of the “Atlantic Council Africa Center” reach the same conclusions about African disillusionment, beyond the grip on African public opinion – especially among urban youth and among the elites – of Russian propaganda, widespread through social networks. “Business Elites Africa identifies the following four points of African “disappointment”:
The trade disparity between Russia and Africa is increasingly alarming, with African exports mainly comprising raw materials such as minerals, metals, rare earths, nuts, fruits and cocoa. In contrast, Russia’s exports to Africa include machinery, refined hydrocarbons, fertilizers and chemicals. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Russia has increased exports of refined hydrocarbons to Africa more than 13-fold, and its exports of machinery and automobiles have exceeded $5 billion. However, the lack of significant imports of manufactured goods from Africa, despite these goods making up nearly 60% of Africa’s total exports, is a cause for concern. Unlike the US and the EU, Russia lacks a program dedicated to facilitating tax-free imports and supporting value-added products from Africa.
There are only a few real business partners. In the tangled web of trade relations between Russia and Africa, it becomes apparent that only a handful of countries play any substantial role. Surprisingly, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa alone contribute over 70% of Russia’s total trade with the continent. This concentration of trading partners may seem surprising, but as long as these countries continue to offer a significant trade surplus, the Kremlin will be satisfied with the current arrangement. In 2020, Russia imported $1.6 billion worth of African imports from Africa, exporting $12.4 billion worth of Africa, a figure that highlights the lopsided nature of the trade. However, relying heavily on a few trading partners limits Russia’s ability to engage in robust economic diplomacy across the African continent (machinery, refined hydrocarbons, fertilizers and chemicals);
Technology transfer between Russia and Africa remains alarmingly deficient. The existing economic relationship lacks the necessary mechanisms to increase crucial flows such as technology transfer, co-investment of private equity and venture capital, cross-border business incubation and creative collaborations for the creation of financial deals. Russian banks are known more for opaque government deals, such as the Mozambique tuna coupon scandal, rather than significant mergers and acquisitions or sophisticated financial transactions. Unlike their Chinese counterparts, Russian tech companies have operations located in Africa. Furthermore, Russia’s foreign direct investment (FDI) is highly concentrated, with a significant portion allocated to a nuclear facility in Egypt, and accounts for only 1% of total FDI inflows into Africa. Debt relief diplomacy is also slow, often tied to new arms deals to make Russia the largest supplier of military equipment to Africa. This bottleneck in technology transfer, finance and investment efforts requires urgent attention and repair;
Wasted soft power. Russia’s soft power efforts in Africa have yielded limited results, leaving much of its potential wasted. During the recent forum, President Vladimir Putin focused a considerable part of his speech on such initiatives as the teaching of Russian in African countries, the introduction of Russian “pedagogy”, the promotion of cultural and sports events in Russia, the encouragement of high-end African tourism and expansion of Russian media exports to the continent. Although there are approximately 35,000 African students studying in Russian institutions and engaging in cultural and educational exchanges, the impact of these efforts is less than expected.
Less than 1% of foreign direct investment in Africa comes from Russia. In essence, Russia contributes a small amount to the continent’s wealth, but has achieved a lot and continues to achieve a lot in terms of political credit as a non-colonial state and inclined to win-win cooperation on the Chinese model.
For now, Russia has achieved the most in security sector and of arms sales: irrelevant economic partner but major arms dealer. Sooner or later, the impoverished African peoples will demand rice, couscous and the bill from their elites, increasingly pro-Russian but with empty public coffers.
Cover photo EPA/SERGEI BOBYLEV / TASS HOST PHOTO AGENCY/