The coup d’état in Sudan, which took place on 25 October at the hands of the army against the transitional government, has increased the fear of a democratic regression in Africa. In just over six months, the continent suffered 7 coups, of which 5 were carried out by the military and were successful. Last March, Niger thwarted a coup d’état just before the investiture of new President Mohamed Bazoum. In April, shortly after the announcement of the death of Chadian President Idris Déby, his son Mahamat said he would take the reins of power for 18 months through a transitional military council. A little over a month later, it was Mali’s turn where Colonel Assimi Goita arrested President Bah N’Daw and Prime Minister Moctar Ouane declaring himself President of the transition and promising that he would lead the country to legislative and presidential elections in February 2022. On September 5, President Alpha Condé, who had been in power for eleven years, was overthrown by the chief of special forces Mamady Doumbouya, after changing the Constitution that would have allowed Condé to stand for a third term. Finally, on 25 October, the Sudanese army, led by General Al-Buhran, dissolved the transitional government and arrested Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and some civilian members of the transitional sovereign council that had led the country for two years.
Coups d’etat are nothing new in Africa. The continent is statistically the one that has suffered the largest number in the world, and Sudan is the African country that has had the most. According to two American researchers, Jonathan Powell and Clayton Thyne, Sudan has had 17 coups since 1952 – including 5 completed. Omar al-Bashir himself, dismissed in 2019 after months of popular protests, came to power in 1989 through a putch. But it is also true that although Africa has been crossed by countless coups (especially in the sixties, eighties and nineties) in the last twenty years the number of putches had dropped drastically, thus being considered “a phenomenon of the past”. The wave of democracy and the reintroduction of multi-partyism in the 1990s and 2000s had provided a glimmer of hope for civilian governments.
Even today it is difficult and too early to draw conclusions on why there is a resurgence of coup in the continent (some analysts in fact speak of “coincidence). In fact, the latest experiences show us that they can come from opportunistic takeovers as in Chad, and from a combination of military ambition and popular discontent as we have seen in Mali, Guinea and Sudan. But at the regional level, what worries most of all is the fact that despite Africa hosting a number of regional organizations, they have not been able to respond to the crisis and, above all, to prevent it. All regional organizations, such as the African Union or the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), have indeed condemned the putsh by suspending the countries in question from the activities of the various organizations, but after having remained silent in the face of changes unconstitutional implemented by governments to preserve power (as for example in Guinea), and helpless in the face of episodes of repression on citizens, corruption or socio-economic defaults that put a strain on citizens’ lives.
The coups d’etat of the last six months have not occurred in the richest countries of Africa but in already fragile countries whose living conditions have worsened with the pandemic. In Mali, as Accord writes, the measures adopted in 2020 to limit the spread of the virus have had a devastating effect on the country’s economy: the curfew imposed from 9 pm to 5 am, has caused many people to lose their jobs who worked at night and the closure of the borders caused the increase in the prices of basic necessities. In fact, if before the pandemic a ton of cement cost 90000 CFA (about 135 euros), today it costs 110000, about 170 euros. The same happened in Chad where, according to a survey by Ground Truth Solutions, containment measures have profoundly deteriorated the ability to meet the basic needs of 60 percent of respondents. In Sudan, according to a report by the World Bank, due to the consequences of the pandemic, 20 percent of families can no longer afford to buy bread, cereals and basic necessities. The protracted economic difficulties and the very inability of governments to provide social goods and economic prospects to the populations, often seasoned by the existence of a high rate of corruption, have pushed the military to justify their actions and to present themselves as saviors of the homeland. In Guinea, the colonel declared in his first official speech that “the duty of a soldier is to save a country” and to have acted to counter rampant corruption and poverty. In Sudan, the junta even declared that it had acted to avoid the “civil war”. [FC1]
All this fits into a context where on the one hand civilians believe less and less in democracy: according to a study by Africa Barometers, only a minority of Africans believe that elections can elect a representative and responsible leadership. In fact, the poll suggests, it is in the provision of democratic goods, rather than the aspirations of citizens, that democracy in Africa is falling short. On the other hand, as the Secretary General of the United Nations Guterres himself declared, immediately after the coup in Guinea, that “the military coups have returned in a climate in which there is a lack of unity in the responses of the international community. Geopolitical divisions are undermining international cooperation and a sense of impunity is gaining ground ”. The case of Mali teaches us: immediately after the coup, France announced a suspension of Barkhane, or the military operation of the hexagon engaged in the fight against jihadist groups. But in September, the Reuters news agency wrote that the Russian private company WAGNER – regarded as the shadow army of the Kremlin – was about to sign a contract with the Malian government to provide it with some 1,000 soldiers charged with protecting personalities and training. the Malian army. In return, according to Reuters, Wagner is expected to have around € 9 million per month and possible access to three mineral deposits. After this news, the French foreign minister Le Drian declared that “this move is incompatible with the French presence in the territory”. Statement and threat that has absolutely not led the Malian government to change its mind about asking for support from the Russians, quite the contrary. In September, during the United Nations assembly, Prime Minister Maiga declared that “the new situation created by the end of Barkhane, which puts Mali before a fait accompli and exposes it to a sort of abandonment in flight, leads us to explore ways and means to better guarantee security independently with other partners ”.