On April 11th United States e Philippines kicked off the largest joint military exercises in their history. It’s about the annual training operations between the two countries called “shoulder” (Tagalog term for “shoulder to shoulder”), now in its thirty-eighth edition. They had never been so impressive. About 17,600 soldiers, including 12,200 Americans: almost double the 9,000 total last year. Also present were around a hundred Australian soldiers and a number of representatives of other states, including Japan, to act as observers.
The training activities will go on until April 28 and will mainly be held in South China Sea, a sea over which China largely claims its sovereignty. According to the People’s Republic, everything that falls within the so-called “nine-dash line” – a demarcation that includes beyond the80% of the waters of the South China Sea – belongs to Beijing on historical grounds. It is a position that clashes with the legitimate claims, sanctioned by international law, of four other countries bordering the area: Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. To them must be added theIndonesiawhich does not officially consider itself a party to the dispute but which sees a portion of its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) overlapping the Chinese nine-section line, and the Republic of China (Taiwan)also for historical reasons.
The change of course of the Philippines
In recent decades, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea has gradually increased. To validate its claims, Beijing has occupied, militarized and in some cases even artificially built a series of islands, particularly within the archipelagos of Spratly and Paracel. In 2016, a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague upheld the Philippines’ request and declared the Chinese claims groundless on the basis of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), but it was of little use. The court’s decision is “null, illegal, and China’s position not to recognize it is clear and firm,” said Wang Wenbin, Chinese foreign ministry spokesman on April 12.
If even today Beijing talks about it with such harshness, it is not only due to the Chinese refusal to implement the sentence: Something is changed. The election in June 2022 of Ferdinand Marcos Jr. to president of Philippines transformed the country’s foreign policy. In an effort to attract more investment from the People’s Republic, its predecessor, Rodrigo Dutertehad dismissed the historic American ally and assumed pro-Chinese positions. A certain softness has arisen regarding the maritime disputes on the South China Sea, which has led Beijing’s ships to increase the frequency of invasions in the Philippine EEZ (more than 200 in 2021 alone). Faced with Duterte’s obvious failures, also on a commercial level, Marcos reversed course.
The “Balikatan” exercises come two months after a Chinese coast guard vessel blinded the Philippine coast guard vessel with a military laser, and just weeks after the extension of theEnhanced defense cooperation agreement (EDCA) between Manila and Washington, signed in 2014 to guarantee the access of American soldiers to five military bases in the country. In March it became nine. Three of the new sites envisaged by EDCA are located in the tip of the Philippines closest to Taiwan, one overlooking the South China Sea.
In the joint statement published on April 11 at the end of the 2+2 summit between the foreign and defense ministers of Manila and Washington (respectively Enrique Manalo and Carlito Galvez Jr. on one side, Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin on the other) reads the “strong objection to illegal maritime claims, militarization of claimed areas, and threatening and provocative activities in the South China Sea”, making explicit mention of the People’s Republic. In addition to announcing new joint maritime maneuvers, officials from the two countries also opened up to operations with other states later this year. The number one suspect is the Japan.
The other actors
In the plans of Japan, the Philippines and the United States there is in fact the establishment of a new trilateral group aimed at military cooperation. It will be called JAPHUS, at least in preliminary ideas. This would mean taking the Japanese prime minister’s commitment to strengthen mutual security ties to the next level Fumio Kishida he had taken with Marcos in February, during the Philippine president’s visit to Tokyo. As analyst Collin Koh told Nikkei Asia, “Japan regards the South China Sea disputes as part of its East China Sea security calculations, as well as a vital maritime communication route for its economic well-being.”
The extra-regional importance of the South China Sea lies in the fact that at least one-fifth of global trade passes through it. But its waters are also a vital center for fishing andenergy supply of Southeast Asian countries. On March 27, a Chinese coast guard vessel was escorted out of the Vietnamese EEZ after approaching a gas site operated by a Russian company, the 40th such incident in a year. Although there are no navigation restrictions of any kind within the EEZs, Vietnam and Indonesia – who signed an agreement to delimit their respective exclusive economic zones in December 2022 – have asked Beijing to avoid letting its ships pass close to the fields. In one case in January, Indonesia responded to the entry of a Chinese vessel by deploying a warship.
Strategic ambiguity and the law of the sea
The People’s Republic uses this type of raid for assert its jurisdictional rights over energy resources which, according to international law, are legitimately exploited by the countries of Southeast Asia. And not everyone can get defensive. In Malaysia Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim was harshly criticized for declaring, during his trip to China in early April (in which he secured $38 billion in investments), that he was “open to negotiations” to resolve any disputes with Beijing over Petronas drilling in the Malaysian EEZ. For the opposition leader Muhyiddin Yassin this means “indirectly recognizing the Chinese claims on the territory of Malaysia”.
It is part of Beijing’s strategic ambiguity on the South China Sea. While on the one hand it shows itself to be intransigent in terms of naval raids, strengthened by an incomparable military capability, on the other the People’s Republic is generally open to bilateral “communication and consultation” knowing that its status as a key trading partner prevents the regional states from address the issue of territorial disputes head-on. The new approach of the Philippines, in this sense, has caught the Chinese leadership off guard.
Talks resumed in March between Chinese e ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) to draft a Code of Conduct (CoC) which should regulate the behavior of states in the South China Sea. It is a document that has been talked about for twenty years, but there are those who doubt that Beijing is really interested in changing the status quo. “China prefers to use bilateral dialogue to undermine multilateral engagement,” analyst Andre Wheeler told Asia Sentinel. And there has already been speculation that the CoC may not be legally binding.
The risks for the region
The perennial postponement of a diplomatic solution intensified the militarization of the South China Sea. On March 23 and April 10, American warships approached the territorial sea of respectively the Paracel and Spratly islands controlled by Beijing, which spoke of “provocations”. These are just the latest episodes of operations that have become increasingly frequent. The tensions over the Taiwan Strait do not help either: the Philippine president Marcos himself said that he “cannot imagine a scenario” in which his country will not be involved in a possible conflict and that the disputes in the South China Sea “keep him awake the night”.
According to a Pentagon report, the South China Sea is also the place where Chinese submarines equipped with nuclear weapons are stationed, which for some time have been increasing in number and intensity of patrols. Not far from the disputed waters, in the gulf of ThailandBeijing has recently concluded joint exercises with Cambodia, with which it is strengthening military ties. Phnom Penh it is accused of having entered into a secret agreement to allow the Chinese People’s Army to use the Ream naval base: it would be the first in Southeast Asia for China.
Two days after the end of the exercises around Taiwan, on April 12, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the southern province of Guangdong. In a speech to the Chinese Navy which operates in the South China Sea, Xi spoke of the need to defend “China’s territorial sovereignty and its maritime interests” and to “strengthen military training oriented towards real combat”. Statements with a high rhetorical content but indicative of the state of tensions in the region. A few hundred kilometers from Guangdong, Philippines e United States they had already planned to test shelling and sinking a dummy enemy ship during “Balikatan 2023”.
Cover photo EPA/PCG/HANDOUT