The Australia-UK-US Security Treaty (VICTIMS) represents a curious ploy to circumvent the obligations under Articles I and III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (TNP). While it could be argued that neither a nuclear weapon nor a nuclear device is transferred, the transfer of fissile material from a nuclear-weapon state (NWS for the acronym in English) to a non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS for acronym in English) without being subject to IAEA safeguards places a risk of proliferation and represents a violation of the spirit of the NPT.
The treaty and nuclear non-proliferation
The problem is not so much the AUKUS itself, but paragraph 14(a)(1) of theComprehensive Safeguard Agreement (CSA for the acronym in English), which was used to justify the legality of the provision of the agreement regarding the delivery of nuclear propulsion technology to Australia from the United States. This section of the CSA states that if a NNWS intends to exercise its discretion in the use of nuclear material that needs to be placed under safeguards in a nuclear activity that does not require the application of safeguards, the NNWS will inform the IAEA of the activity, clarifying that the use of the nuclear material in a non-prohibited military activity will not conflict with a commitment that the NNWS may have made to which IAEA safeguards apply, that the nuclear material will only be used in peaceful nuclear activity.
The development and operation of a nuclear propulsion engine for a submarine falls within the scope of what can be considered a peaceful activity and therefore, according to the CSA, could be exempt from IAEA inspections and monitoring, which puts further pressure on the control of dual-use materials and the system of safeguards of the IAEA.
A dangerous precedent
The three AUKUS members did not dispute that nuclear fuel and technology supplied to Australia had to be safeguarded, but argued that military secrecy should greatly limit the intrusiveness of the IAEA. To ease tensions, Australia pledged not to have a training reactor on its territory and to train its sailors and engineers in the US and UK, as well as not to enrich or reprocess nuclear fuel.
However, this deal creates a previous which may be used by other countries for hide nuclear weapons because, while nobody expects Australia to develop an atomic bomb, the problem is that potential proliferators will use AUKUS as an argument for avoid IAEA safeguards justifying the fact of wanting to develop nuclear-powered submarines, such as theIran which in 2018 announced its interest in developing this type of technology. As a result, AUKUS will reduce the deterrent potential of the IAEA safeguard system and encourage nuclear proliferation in critical cases.
In this sense, one way to mitigate the impact of AUKUS on the nuclear non-proliferation regime is to use low enriched uranium (LEU for the acronym in English) as fuel for these submarines, and that the IAEA establish criteria to justify when the application of paragraph 14 of the CSA for non-prohibited military activities is permissible, as well as develop a general inspection and verification guideline for NNWS who decide to develop this technology.
Cover photo EPA/MARTIN DIVISEK