On June 18, the citizens of Mali voted in a referendum to approve the new constitution. The military junta in power considered this electoral appointment, formally, a fundamental step towards the restoration of a civilian government. In reality, both the referendum vote and the new constitution represent yet another piece of the colonel’s strategy Like Goita aimed at consolidating its power in the Sahelian country.
The fragility of the regime in Mali
The constitutional referendum is considered a crucial step in order to then have the Presidential Electionsformally planned for February 2024. Since the coup d’état of 2020, which deposed President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, Mali has been governed by a military junta, whose main protagonist is precisely Goïta: first as provisional president and head of the National Committee for the Salvation of the People (National Committee for the Salvation of the People – CNSP), then as de facto military strongman in control during the presidency of Bah Ndaw, the latter removed nine months later with a second coupafter which the colonel proclaimed himself president ad interimand leading the reins of government ever since.
Since 2012, Mali has been in a situation of perennial insecurity and fragility, due to the violence unleashed by militant factions affiliated with al-Qaeda and allo Islamic stategroups of Tuareg rebels and various militias and vigilante gangs, often ethnically based, fighting forces considered anti-state. Also, over the past two years, the arrival of the Russian paramilitary group in the country Wagner, a force on which the Malian junta has repeatedly relied to support its anti-terrorism campaign has actually further exacerbated tension and violence, as reported by various accredited observers. Wagner has in substance taken the place of French troopsa withdrawal caused by the escalation of tensions between the junta and the French government, culminating in the end of the 2022 Barkhane operation.
Furthermore, further demonstrating the complexity of the Malian situation, in the days leading up to the referendum, the Malian junta demanded the immediate withdrawal of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (Minusma), which will take place on June 30th.
The new post-referendum Constitution
Voting in the referendum it was prevented in numerous districts, particularly in the central and northern areas of the country, mainly due to concern about jihadist attacks and political tensions. Many polling stations were forced to close including the entire all polling stations which were due to be opened in the northern district of Kidal. In various parts of the country, armed individuals abducted election officials from their assigned posts. Additionally, Tuareg rebels from northern Mali have urged their followers to push back or boycott the referendumstating that they had been excluded from the process of drafting the constitution, an ancestral and never really resolved problem that arises cyclically every time an attempt is made to reform the institutions in Mali.
Despite the challenges posed by prevailing insecurity and a low voter turnout of around 38%, the success of the ‘yes’ vote is widely expected. The proposed new constitution, consisting of 195 itemsaims to replace the current constitution promulgated in 1992. One of the most controversial changes in the proposed revisions is the important strengthening of presidential authoritywhich results in a new constitution that bears a rather marked and distinct presidential stamp.
The new constitution places considerable emphasis on Malian identity as secular societyexplicitly prohibiting discrimination based on religion and ensuring the protection of freedom of religion. However, this particular provision has received criticism from some religious groups, who have denounced secularism as an “anti-Islamic term”, deeming it offensive to the majority of the population, and who would like the definition of “multi-religious state” as a substitute.
Who fights in Mali
Dal 2012 Mali is in a tricky one spiral of violence which has never stopped since. Initially they were the northern territories, the districts of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, to be those immediately affected by the wave of regional destabilization from the war in Libya, by the arrival of Gaddafi’s orphaned Tuareg fighters and by the reorganization that took place in the previous years of the jihadist networks, which had found in northern Mali a sort of sanctuary. Since then, however, the instability has also spread to the central and southern regionswhere attacks by militants of the Sahel Province of the Islamic State (ISGS) and del Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslim (Group for Supporters of Islam and Muslims — JNIM) of al-Qaeda.
However, the two groups tend to have different approaches and also continue to fight each other. ISGS, despite being considered by many to be in crisis, has achieved a number of military successes in recent months, particularly in the Gao and Ménaka regions. In the latter, ISGS occupied the town of Tidermène in April, leaving the district capital, Ménaka, isolated and surrounded.
JNIM instead has been pursuing for some time now an increasingly visible strategy of local jihadist prioritizationalthough it maintains its formal relationship with al-Qaeda Central, trying to present itself as truly Malian actor, away from the idea of global Jihad, and interested in obtaining solutions for local populations. In part, these efforts have achieved their goal: for example, in their latest report, the Coalition of Citizens for Peace, Unity and National Reconciliation (Coalition citoyenne de la société Civil pour la paix, l’unité et la réconciliation nationale CCSC-PURN) has called for dialogue with “the militant leaders of the groups who claim to support the values of unity and integrity of the Malian territory”, such as the JNIM leader Iyad Ag Ghali and Amadou Kouffa, Katiba Macina leader. A few days before the election, JNIM reclaimed three attacksincluding one against the Wagner group, all three incidents appear to have occurred in the central Segou region of Mali.
The referendum vote, although disturbed by violence and low turnout, represents a bias strengthening for the junta and for Goïta, and probably represents the first step towards the organization of the presidential elections for 2024. These elections, however, will hardly bring Mali back to democratic normality, but – above all if Goïta were to run as a candidate, as seems probable also thanks to the article 57 of the new constitution – would represent a further step towards the strengthening of the military power on the Malian political system. A power that must continue to confront jihadist groups which, despite the presence of Wagner and the action of the junta, continue to represent a significant threat, with JNIM increasingly capable of having Malian civil society on its side, which sees the group and some of its leaders as legitimate partners of a potential negotiation and not just as enemies.
Cover photo EPA/HADAMA DIAKITE