What makes Donald Trump’s recent statements on NATO and the role of the United States worrying is the fact that there is no “Trump doctrine”. Only he exists, the candidate who hopes to win November’s presidential elections and return to the White House. And to do so also against the Republican Party, to which in all likelihood its threat to leave the Atlantic Alliance if all European members do not do their part – bringing the level of investment in defense to 2% of GDP – must have provoked some stomach ache.
The “European pillar” of the Atlantic Alliance
Beyond the uncertainty inherent in any election and therefore awaiting the result, those words and those tones deserve reflection and, even more, an awareness on the part of all European governments. In this sense, the political destinies of the two sides of the Atlantic are linked, today more than ever. In June we will vote for the European Parliament and probably, this time, the awareness will mature of having to dedicate different attention to common foreign, security and defense policy than in the past. Perhaps with the appointment of a Defense Commissioner or with a different “rank” to be attributed to the current High Representative for foreign policy.
The political act is always the most important. Operation and details will come at a later time. For example, the prospect of a single European army still remains unlikely. Armies have always recognized themselves in the flags of the States. However, there is enormous space to envisage a common chain of command and control, for the creation of multinational brigades for rapid reaction to threats or for out-of-area missions, for the consolidation of a European cyber command and, above all, for a defense industry which in Europe knows how to express true excellence but which suffers from a historic and now anachronistic fragmentation of projects, programs, platforms and, therefore, investments.
This perspective would therefore strengthen the so-called “European pillar” of NATO. What Trump – but not only him – would like to see more present and useful, beyond his colorful and counterproductive threats.
The United States calls for a strategically autonomous Europe
On the other hand, the theme of the so-called “burden sharing”, of a more equal division of roles and investments between the two sides of the Atlantic, is not new. In the years of the so-called “peace dividend”, after the end of the Cold War, it was already a recurring issue. It was the then Italian Defense Minister, Sergio Mattarella, in an important speech held in Budapest during the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, who clarified how a growing commitment of the European military instrument served to strengthen Atlantic solidarity and, therefore, the role of NATO. The paradoxical fear at the time was in fact that of seeing a Europe that was more militarily and strategically autonomous and therefore less tied to the alliance with the United States. Fears, those of the so-called “decoupling”, about which even Washington did not hide a certain concern.
Today, less than thirty years after that event, the theme remains exactly the same but from a different perspective. The United States has long shifted its geostrategic focus toward the Persian Gulf and, especially, the Asia-Pacific. However, the Atlantic connection remains an essential cornerstone for global security, even more so in the presence of two wars, one in the heart of Europe, the other in the middle of our common sea, the Mediterranean.
But now all US political circles agree in calling for greater European commitment and effort in matters of security and defense. Donald Trump does it “like Trump”, threatening and provoking with tones that do not help the discussion and certainly do not facilitate the building of political consensus. But if German intelligence has delivered a substantial dossier on the consequences of a sudden US exit from NATO to Chancellor Scholz’s desk, it means that we must get used to pondering the unthinkable but, above all, to acting quickly and effectively.
The role of defense in the European integration process
On the other hand, we know well how the construction of a European house is missing a fundamental piece. Currency and defense are the two elements on which sovereignty and the creation of an integrated political space are based. Europe’s successes in terms of financial markets and monetary union are undoubted. The pillar of defense remains perhaps our main weakness. It is certainly a funding issue, which will require a growing commitment to civil and military technologies and platforms. But it is above all a question of spending efficiency and, even more, of political will.
On the first aspect, that of efficiency, just look at the data. Today, European countries have at least three different platforms in development for military aircraft of the future, in addition to multilateral programs such as GCAP, in which Italy also participates, together with the United Kingdom and Japan. The capabilities in the naval sector are undisputed, but again fragmented between national programs or at most collaboration between a few states which do not help economies of scale. Not to mention emerging technologies, linked for example to cyber space. Already in 2008, NATO established its joint cyber command in Tallinn, after the first large-scale attack on critical systems in Estonia. Sixteen years have passed since then, almost a geological era due to the rapidity of change and evolution of cyberspace, in which the countries of the European Union have undoubtedly increased their respective capabilities – defensive and offensive – but, again, in a fragmented manner.
Two elections, the European ones and the American ones, therefore strongly intertwined. And it is better, when looking at what will happen in the United States, to stay away from the temptation to think that threats will never, ever be followed by facts. We simply cannot afford this illusion.