In recent months it has been said several times that the elections on Sunday 14 May in Türkiye they will be a historic watershed for the country. A critical point which, however, must not be of secondary importance is related to leadership mechanisms and the consequences of a possible change at the helm of the country, both for its democratic transition and for the trust that regional allies (EU and NATO in primis) can place in the country. The leadership of the president Recep Tayyip Erdogan seems to be on a razor’s edge, challenged by Kemal Kilicdarogluhead of the Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP), the largest opposition party that leads the National Alliance (Millet İttifakı), and who now also has on his side Muharrem Ince, withdrew from the electoral contest. Domestic and foreign politics in Turkey have always lived in an osmotic relationship: this is why what the new Turkish leadership will be will also influence the country’s status and the willingness (or lack thereof) of other states to establish a relationship of trust.
Historic elections
One hundred years after the birth of the Turkish Republic founded by Ataturk in 1923 and after more than twenty years of uninterrupted government by the Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), Turkey is heading towards the second presidential election in its history, the first since the 2017 constitutional referendum that transformed it into a presidential system. As the first round approaches on May 14, Erdoğan’s leadership will face an unprecedented test due to the combination of internal (i.e. social divisions and economic crisis) and regional/international (above all the Russian aggression on Ukraine).
Around 64 million Turkish citizens will go to the polls, of which 3.4 million are resident abroad and 5 million are first voters, most of whom were born and raised in the AKP era. There economic crisis erupted in 2018 and the consequent dizzying rate of inflation (to 85.5% in October 2022 and again to 50.1% in April 2023), together with the terrible earthquake that hit the southeastern part of the country on February 6, are endogenous factors that recall those that affected the period from 1999 to 2002 (when the AKP finally won a majority in the Grand National Assembly): in 1999, two large earthquakes hit northwestern Turkey, prompting corruption allegations against the then Ecevit government (of the Democratic Left Party) and the public anger, while in 2001 an unprecedented financial crisis exploded. Furthermore, secularism and internal social divisions (secular-religious, Turkish-Kurdish and Sunni-Alevi, in particular) seem to be at play again in these elections.
Competing parties
Elections that promise to be competitive (even if Erdoğan controls, directly or indirectly, 90% of the country’s media and maintains substantial economic power), like a head-to-head between Kılıçdaroğlu and Erdoğan. The incumbent President has already suffered a severe blow to administrative elections of 2019 and now leads a coalition made up of the AKP and the ultranationalist Nationalist Movement (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), together with three small parties, two of which are Islamist in orientation. L’AKP is firmly rooted in the conservative and religious milieu, while the CHP it positions itself on the ultra-secularist side; L’MHP (strongly committed to Turkish nationalism and statism) leverages ethnic issueswhile the Sunni-Alevi division was brought back to the center of public debate after Kılıçdaroğlu’s crucial “Alevi statement”, in which the CHP leader declared “I am an Alevi” in a video, receiving over 360,000 likes.
Two opposing visions of leadership
Il “Gandhi turco” and the “Erdogan ingrigito“: Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu represent not only the opposite extremes of the Turkish political system (the first conservative, the second ultra-secularist), but also two completely divergent visions of leadership: Erdoğan has for years personified the strong man, convinced that he can break with the traditional idea of Kemalism. Kılıçdaroğlu, on the other hand, born to an Alevi family of nine in an isolated mountain village in Tunceli province, has been the leader of the opposition since 2010 and was previously defeated in the general elections of 2011, 2015 and 2018. As his nicknamed “the Gandhi Kemal”, represents a calm leader, who has constantly called for reconciliation between the various political, ethnic and religious groups of Turkey (as evidenced by his support for the right of women to wear the veil in state institutions).
The strategy of CHP for these elections, which wants to counter the divisive and polarizing discourse of the AKP, is based on a publication by Ates Ilyas Bassoy entitled Radical Love Book (the Book of Radical Love). Başsoy is a Turkish writer, publicist and communication expert, already famous for his anti-AKP election ads and his AKP bestseller Neden Kazanır? CHP Neden Kaybeder? (Why Will AKP Win? Why Will CHP Lose?), published in 2011. Kılıçdaroğlu started a quiet revolution within his party, long considered close to the military, trying to make peace with the Islamists and abandoning the old codes militarists of the CHP and apparently able to intercept the real religious, social and economic needs and concerns that cross the Turkish population, from right to left.
Also to be considered is Kılıçdaroğlu’s choice to appoint as vice presidents, in case of victory, Ekrem İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş, respectively mayors of Istanbul and Ankara, both charismatic figures according to various polls.
Foreign policy between trust and risks
In an increasingly unstable international context, in which Turkey continues to claim to be the pivot, a change of leadership could have some important implications in terms of trust also with regard to regional relations. Recently, Erdoğan has been trying to normalize relations with his neighbors in the MENA region; however, considering relations with Damascus for example, as long as Turkish troops remain in northern Syria to prevent the formation of an autonomous Kurdish region on the southeastern border, normalization will remain far from reality.
On your part, Kilicdaroglu declared that he wanted to give space to the “state diplomacy” and al international dialoguesetting aside the “leader’s diplomacy” so much pursued by Erdoğan. Kılıçdaroğlu wants to end Turkish excessive activism, and seems to have more markedly pro-European and Atlanticist features. However, the upcoming elections are unlikely to lead to a drastic and sudden change of course in the short term, at least for commitments undertaken by Ankara with the EU (eg on migration, security and energy issues) and its deep economic ties with Moscow. After the elections, regional and international actors will once again be called upon to choose whether to trust Turkey’s future leadership – whatever it will be – as a crucial Western ally or whether to look to Ankara as a foreign policy country independent of the old patterns and alignments.
Cover photo EPA/ERDEM SAHIN