The South Atlantic conflict had two phases: the first air-naval, between May 1 and 20; and the second with a terrestrial predominance, between May 21 and June 14. In total: 44 days, with around 280 British dead in war actions. Almost the same duration as the Gulf War (US-Iran) in 1991, in which the US air phase lasted 38 days and the ground phase only four. In total: 42 days, with a balance of 144 Americans killed in combat. Briefly, I will refer to some core topics that over time seem to be diluted or almost unknown.
Army anti-aircraft artillery. Since the end of April 1982, a Joint Anti-Aircraft Defense System was able to operate in Puerto Argentino, composed of modern weapons and radars, which directed the incursions of our Air Force and Naval Aviation, provided navigation aid and made search operations possible. and rescue. It was led by Lieutenant Colonel Héctor L. Arias, Lieutenant Commander Héctor Silva and Major Hugo Maiorano. The deployment of the means provided an effective “anti-aircraft umbrella” to the means located in the area.
On May 1, the war began and it was the baptism of fire of the Army’s Anti-Aircraft Artillery. At 04:40 a high altitude bomber (Vulcan The machine was detected by air surveillance radars (200 miles), but did not enter the range of the Army’s weapons systems: Roland missiles (7 km), 35 mm Oerlikon-Contraves anti-aircraft guns (4.5 km) and portable Blow-Pipe missiles. The bombs wreaked havoc on the facilities, but only one of them partially damaged the runway, which remained operable throughout the conflict. At 07:45, I witnessed the first attack – in low flight – of four Sea Harrier bombers over the airport. At 08:45 there was a second attack with five machines. In these actions, our media shot down two planes and a third flew away apparently damaged. The American Thomas Milton stated: “The Argentine anti-aircraft gunners demonstrated such dangerousness that they forced the British to fly at high altitude, out of the range of their missiles and cannons.” Others assured: “… with regard to their anti-aircraft systems, the Argentines were trained, and they used their means efficiently (International Navy, Paris, January/February 1983).” British shootdowns by anti-aircraft means are seen in 14/15 aircraft (Malvinas: exploits and incompetence, page 182); and 30 helicopters in different circumstances. Air Defense was one of the few cases of joint activity that was implemented in the Malvinas.
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Sinking of the cruiser General Belgrano. On April 25, General Oscar Jofre – commander of the Army Group – called me to his command post in my capacity as coordinator of ground fires, and told me: “I have information that we are going to have the Belgrano cruiser in the port roadstead.” For me it was great news, because at that time our artillery only had 105 mm howitzers with a range of 10.2 km, and the cruiser had 23 guns of greater range and caliber; and it also reinforced our anti-aircraft protection by having a sea-air missile system of recognized effectiveness. British sources agree with my opinion: “The most logical employment for General Belgrano would have been as a floating battery in Port Stanley (sic), where its cannons and missiles constituted a useful advantage for the defenders; and she could continue the fight even if she had been sunk in the shallow waters of the harbor” (English, A. and Watts, A., Battle for the Falklands, p. 22).
On May 2 in the afternoon the Belgrano, which was sailing towards the Argentine coast, was hit and sunk by two torpedoes launched by the nuclear submarine Conqueror, 323 of its 1,093 crew members perished. She was in international waters, and outside the 200-mile “exclusion zone” unilaterally declared by the United Kingdom; According to some sources, she lacked detection means and modern underwater weapons and was escorted by two corvettes. An electronic warfare expert, Mario De Arcángelis, said: “…the cruiser had, however, used radio and radar without much discretion, perhaps unaware that its electromagnetic emissions were being regularly intercepted by the American listening network, to which that the United Kingdom has normal access as a country belonging to NATO (History of electronic warfare, page 342).
I disagree with what was expressed, because I do not doubt the professionalism of the ship’s commander, Captain Héctor Bonzo, and his crew. It was an act of war, covered by Chapter 7- Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. I share what Argentine Vice Admiral Juan J. Lombardo expressed in this regard: “In similar circumstances, I would have ordered the sinking of a hypothetical cruiser General Belgrano of the English fleet, simply because it was a war.”
The now emblematic cruise ship had been launched in the United States in 1938 under the name USS Phoenix; She participated in World War II, including the Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor naval air base on December 7, 1941. Upon being incorporated into our Navy in 1951, she was baptized ARA October 17. In September 1955, she renamed it ARA General Belgrano. The old cruise ship lies with part of its crew in the icy waters of our southern sea, and its location has been, rightly, declared a “national historic site and war grave” by National Law 25,554/2001.
Hostilities will stop. After the sinking of the Belgrano, Galtieri assured: “The hostilities will stop and the negotiations will be reconsidered with real possibilities of a solution” (Túrolo, C, thus they fought, page 103). Jofre also told me: “There will be no confrontation.” A clear example of political, diplomatic and military incompetence. Until the landing, and the air-naval encirclement completed, the troops on the ground were subjected to psychophysical exhaustion in the humid and cold trenches, waiting for a landing that the heads of tactical units appreciated would not take place over Puerto Argentino, where our defense It was stronger. This was indicated by military history, and in particular what was expressed by the British general and writer Basil H. Liddell Hart: “Our examination has revealed a large number of campaigns in which the ‘indirectness of the approach’ is as significant as the decisive of the results” (Strategy: the indirect approach, Círculo Militar, page 31). The British landed on May 21 in the unprotected area of San Carlos, 90 km from the town. Even so, the military leadership on the continent, and Jofre and Menéndez in the Malvinas, continued to believe that it was a secondary distraction operation. In June 1944, days after the Allies had consolidated the beachhead in Normandy (France-Operation Overlord), Hitler – and his obedient generals, evidencing pathological incompetence and obedience – also continued to appreciate that “it was an operation of distraction.” Any similarity is not mere coincidence. I share with Patrick Rothfusse: “Power and stupidity together are a danger.”
Electronic warfare. Its purpose is to explore electromagnetic emissions and deceive the adversary, and it is carried out with special equipment that constitutes a relevant component of today’s war. It dates back to 1905, in the naval battle of Tsushima, where the Japanese fleet defeated the Tsarist fleet. In the Malvinas, according to De Arcángelis: “The Americans always followed the Argentine ports and ships with their satellites and had warned the British of the imminent landing on April 2. Using the gigantic National Security Agency and Comsat communications satellites, they broke the secrecy of Argentine codes and passed on invaluable information to their allies” (cited work, page 34). I know how they affected us.
Rattembach Report. It was created in 1983 by a commission made up of Generals Benjamín Rattembach and Tomás Sánchez de Bustamante, Admirals Alberto Vago and Jorge Boffi, and Brigadiers Carlos Rey and Francisco Cabrera, to determine the “Political and strategic-military responsibilities in the conflict of the South Atlantic”. It did not have the capacity to judge since it was not a jurisdictional body, but I appreciate that it was the most serious and profound work on the responsibilities mentioned. In one of the recitals, he stated: “It is important to note that there were units that were led with efficiency, courage and decision. Already in waiting and in combat, performance was always high. Such is the case of the Air Force, the Naval Aviation, the air assets of the three forces stationed on the islands, the Air Transport Command, the Army’s 3rd and 4th Artillery Groups, the effectively integrated Anti-Aircraft Artillery, the Infantry Battalion of the 5th Marine Corps, the 10th Armored Squadron, the 601st and 602nd Commando Companies and the 25th Infantry Regiment.”
Perhaps the greatest experience I gained in the war was an essential restructuring of the Army with priority in the educational system and Voluntary Military Service. Unfortunately, I cannot ignore the sentence of Jorge L. Borges: “The greatest defect of forgetting is that sometimes it includes memory.”
*Former head of the Argentine Army. Veteran of the Falklands War. Former ambassador to Colombia and Costa Rica.