Sudani Net:
While the political process falters in the forbidden annihilation of the armed forces, and may fall completely after colliding with the hurdle of integrating the Rapid Support Forces, talking about overcoming the current crisis and turning the page quickly becomes a winged fantasy. Settlement of the dispute with a consensual solution on the minimum level, as sought by the tripartite mechanism and the Quartet Committee, or the other signatories to the framework agreement tended to support the external forces by pressing the army leadership to accept the issue of signing the final draft political agreement and to postpone the decision on the merger issue and other points in the reform file. security and military.
It was clear from the beginning that the Rapid Support Alliance with (shameless – the Central Council) was seeking to exhume a graveyard for an old idea that was put forward in April 2019, a week after the betrayal of President Al-Bashir and the coup against him, when a political delegation landed in Khartoum and brought with it a proposal that came back hastily. Discussing the proposal within a narrow framework among its stakeholders. Its aim was to form an army parallel to the Sudanese army, along with a long list to refer a number of army, security and police officers to retirement under the pretext of liquidating these institutions from the elements of the former regime, to pave the way for the implementation of the proposal.
The idea of a parallel army coming from abroad was put forward, and it is based on two models that have been carefully studied. And the Iranian, I refer to it as forces parallel to the Saudi and Iranian armies, with its own armament, tasks and role, but it is subject to the authority of the state and under its command despite its semi-independent powers. As for the second model: (Lebanese Hezbollah forces), it is a state within a state that has its own army, financial institutions, banks and His political authority and his political backer, while not subjecting him to any other authority, and his legitimacy is based on his tasks that are determined by the party leaders himself, and the operational operation is also determined according to the paths and variables of the situation in the country.
Through the very limited discussions that took place, the closest formula is the Hezbollah model, and it was said at the time that the experience, if applied, will be more compact and influential on the state and its institutions because it combines the factors referred to in the Hezbollah model in addition to the preference that there is the power of political decision and control of the state’s leadership during Transitional period .
Perhaps Abu Dhabi wanted to follow Iran’s approach by having its army, its loyal state inside the Sudanese state, and making an Afro-Arab version of the Russian Wagner forces in the region. From a specialized team dispatched by the Wagner Company, and the gap that should be bridged was to find and prepare the vital political fuel to launch and implement the idea, since the time was not appropriate at that time to put it publicly and move it forward without generating a political incubator.
The idea and perception were referred to a dimly lit corridor, fading in the event of political tension and attraction during the two governments of Hamdok, and then brightening when its owners approached the magnetic field of the parties and groups of the Istozar, the political trotting, and the petrodollar organizations that eat with their breasts and fawn the dew of the Gulf comfort and its happy livelihood. The process of manufacturing biofuels, and while keeping the idea in a state of revival, many attempts were made, in internal and external directions, to market the process of manufacturing a parallel army and legitimize its existence, and the preparations did not stop at all and were not affected by what happened in the general political weather.
Prior to the announcement of the political settlement, in the weeks preceding Burhan’s speech on July 4, 2022 AD, according to which he determined the army’s exit from political action, the slippery embroidered dress of the alliance between the insolence of the Central Council and the Rapid Support Command was woven, and this alliance pleased the head of the UN mission in Sudan and the Gulf Arab partners. , and some Western parties that had their own reading and assessments to benefit from this alliance in passing the Western agenda and formulating the situation in Sudan anew, and it is not necessary that the Western agenda be fully compatible with the political ambition and other circumstantial data, the Westerners want to use both the allied parties to reach For their declared and hidden goals in Sudan…. Then for every incident a hadeeth.
After the idea of a parallel army was revived again during the coordination and alliance sessions, the requirements were present… these are those, so they were expressed in the draft constitution of the so-called Steering Committee of the Dissolved Bar Association, then in the framework agreement, all of which were preceded by visits and shuttle trips between Khartoum and Abu Dhabi Political figures, party symbols, and activists with cracked beards and loud drums.
The attempt to breathe life into that idea to create a parallel army is a very viscous process that cannot be passed easily. The Al-Qahtu coalition, with its owners and godfathers in the Gulf and the West, has striven to cultivate slogans and glamorous phrases about (the professional army and military reform), contrary to the documents and texts proposed in The constitution implicitly acknowledges the idea of two armies. A distinction has been made between the armed forces and other forces, and a special status has been assigned to them, with the necessary obstacles and raising difficulties and complications when talking about integration.
Accompanying this was the occurrence of political blackmail of the leadership of the army from within and external pressure from Western countries and the Gulf, in order for the army to accept any understandings that signify acceptance of what comes out of the ongoing discussions and the security and military reform workshop. And naive obscurantism, because the results of the workshop and its talk about that resulted in reviving the idea of a parallel army.. So what will happen during the coming days..?.