After four months of Russian occupation, the Ukrainian flag flies again in the center of the city of Lyman. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskii confirmed this on October 2, along with a series of videos showing Ukrainian soldiers proudly posing with their flag as well as some Russian prisoners and much destroyed or recovered material. These are scenes already seen in Izjum and elsewhere, along the route of the counter-offensive that has been advancing for a month in northeastern Ukraine.
The difference this time is that Lyman is part of the territories Vladimir Putin announced on September 30th. This means that even before the ratification of the decision by the Russian parliament, scheduled for October 3, the annexation was denied by the facts. The Kremlin spokesman was unable to define precisely the borders of the annexed area, which would be the new borders of the Russian Federation. This inevitably created disorder.
The front continues to move, both to the north, where the troops who have captured Lyman continue to attack a Russian army in chaotic retreat, and to the south, in the Cherson region, where the advance is slower but still effective.
Reiterated support
Putin certainly had no illusions. Ukraine could never have accepted either the referendums organized last week or the decision of the annexation, especially considering that the Ukrainian army has the initiative in hand.
But from the Russian point of view, the Ukrainian offensive (and through Kiev that of the NATO countries) is now taking place in Russian territory, even if no other country has recognized the annexation. Putin thus aired the hypothesis of declaring that an “existential threat” looms over Russia, paving the way for an even more intense crescendo, even nuclear on paper.
Certainly Putin could have foreseen that his speech and threats would not intimidate the West at this point in the conflict. Quite the opposite has happened: France has just announced the delivery of another six Caesar guns to Ukraine, and Westerners in general have reiterated their support for Kiev.
We are clearly in the scenario of a forward flight, anticipated on 21 September by Putin’s proclamation of a partial mobilization and then by the incendiary speech delivered by the Russian president on 30 September in front of thousands of people sent to the scene with the task of applauding him.
As has been the case since the beginning of this crisis, Putin has achieved the opposite of what he wanted. Nine NATO states, all former Communist countries, supported Ukraine’s request to immediately join the Atlantic Alliance. It matters little if accession is impossible for a country at war: the mobilization of the governments of the “east flank” of Europe, including those of the Baltic states and Poland, triggers a dynamic that makes any step backwards impossible.
Given that he is losing the military battle on the ground, Putin tries to make up for it with the war of nerves, in the hope that fear of nuclear power or uncontrollable energy prices could push Western public opinion to leave Ukraine. What would the Russian president do if this plan also fails? This is the question that no one can answer, neither in the West nor in Russia.
(Translation by Andrea Sparacino)