Vladivostok turned into China’s domestic trade port?The reality and history of Sino-Russian Far East interactions – BBC News 中文

However, experts interpreted that similar arrangements started as early as 2007, and have certain benefits to the economy of China’s three northeastern provinces, but it is far from the point where Russia transfers its rights and interests, and the possibility of “Vladivostok” returning to China is “zero.”

For China’s Jilin Province, which is adjacent to Russia, the original goods to be transported to the economically developed southern provinces need to go through long-distance land transportation, and then enter the sea through the ports of Liaoning Province, and disembark from ports such as Ningbo and Xiamen in the south. If you go north and go to the sea from the closer port of Vladivostok, the transportation distance will be greatly reduced.

“The benefit of this arrangement to China is mainly to reduce the logistics cost of transporting bulk goods from the Northeast to the south, because there is no way for the Northeast to transport directly to the South China Sea, and it needs to be transshipped.” Zhang Xin, deputy director of the Russian Studies Center of East China Normal University, said. The goods are transported to the port of the adjacent country for transit, and then enter the country when they arrive in southern China. The part of the foreign shipment is treated as domestic business, which is the so-called international transit.

Zhang Xin reminded that this is not a breakthrough institutional arrangement. In fact, there was such an arrangement between China and Russia as early as 2007, and it included the port of Vladivostok at that time. Exit through Russia’s Vladivostok Port, Dongfang Port, and Nakhodka Port, and then enter through China’s Shanghai, Ningbo, and Huangpu.

It’s just that the scope of application has been expanded this time, allowing Jilin Province to also transship through the Port of Vladivostok, and the domestic ports of acceptance in China have increased Zhoushan Yongzhou Container Terminal in Zhejiang Province and Jiaxing Zhapu Port.

In fact, as far as the three northeastern provinces are concerned, the main beneficiaries of this arrangement are Heilongjiang Province and the eastern part of Jilin Province. Liaoning Province itself has ports such as Dalian and Yingkou, while Heilongjiang is far away. It used to take thousands of kilometers of land transportation to reach Liaoning ports and go to sea.

Changchun, the capital of Jilin Province, is about the same distance from the ports of Vladivostok and Dalian, so the benefits are limited. However, the part of eastern Jilin bordering Russia can save road transportation distance. Taking Hunchun Port in eastern Jilin as an example, it is 270 kilometers from Vladivostok Port and more than 1,000 kilometers from Dalian Port. In fact, this time, the Hunchun Navigation Bureau, which is the easternmost of Jilin, applied to the central government to add Vladivostok as a transshipment port for cross-border transportation of domestic trade goods. International transit.

“On some media and social media, the whole incident is regarded as if Russia made a major concession against the background of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. There is even a headline saying that Russia is actively opening Vladivostok to China, which has been closed for more than a hundred years. I think this is an understanding. It’s not appropriate.” Zhang Xin said, it can be said that this matter has something to do with Russia’s pressure on the Ukrainian battlefield, but the relationship is not particularly great.

After Russia invaded Ukraine, Western countries imposed severe sanctions on Russia, including prohibiting the import of oil and the export of high-tech products.

Many Western companies have completely cut ties with Russia, and Russia’s trade with the US, UK, and EU countries has fallen sharply during 2022.

However, China’s overall trade volume with Russia will reach a record $190 billion in 2022, a year-on-year increase of 30%. China has largely become Moscow’s most important trading partner.

This year’s surge has continued unabated. According to the latest foreign trade data in April this year, China’s exports to Russia increased by 153% year-on-year.

Furthermore, under the sanctions, Russia cannot even use the international funds clearing system (SWIFT) for settlement, which makes Russia have to increase its trade with China, because trade with China can at least pass through the RMB cross-border payment system created by the People’s Bank of China ( CIPS), settled in RMB.

Zhang Xin said that facing conflicts in the west, Putin will definitely promote what he called an eastward strategy. But not all sides took the initiative to make major concessions.

The Chinese media Caixin reported that since 2022, with the sharp increase in Sino-Russian trade volume, the capacity of container ships from ports in southeast China to Vladivostok port has increased, and the capacity of ships to carry cargo on the return journey has increased. Indirectly stimulates the attractiveness of transit through this port.

Vladivostok was Chinese territory in the Ming and Qing Dynasties, meaning a place rich in sea cucumbers, located in the northeastern region of China. The “Sino-Russian Beijing Treaty” signed in 1860 (a part of the “Beijing Treaty”) ceded the area east of the Ussuri River, including Vladivostok, to Russia, and then Russia named it Vladivostok, meaning “Rule the East”.

The ceding of Vladivostok is regarded as part of China’s century-old history of humiliation since the Opium War in 1840. It is included in history textbooks. The “Beijing Treaty” is repeatedly mentioned as an “unequal treaty” and even required to recite as a key point.

Therefore, many Chinese people have difficulty understanding the meaning of the word “Vladivostok”. Even at the official level, it is also reflected to a certain extent. For example, in March this year, the Ministry of Natural Resources of China issued a notice that on the published map, eight places in Russia that once belonged to China must be marked with Chinese place names at the same time, including Vladivostok, Nerchinsk, Khabarovsk, Temple Street, Hailanpao, Shuangchengzi, Outer Xing’an Mountains, Sakhalin Island. Among them, Vladivostok is the most well-known in China.

Therefore, on Chinese social media, there are often netizens reminding not to forget the land cut off by the great powers, and the biggest piece of it is the area including Vladivostok cut off by Russia.

“Reactions on social media reflect the historical complex of some Chinese people towards the city of Vladivostok, which is understandable.” Zhang Xin, deputy director of the Russian Studies Center of East China Normal University, explained, but in reality, the territorial boundaries between China and Russia Negotiations started in the Soviet era and lasted for decades, with many twists and turns. It was not until the beginning of this century that there was a breakthrough. The Sino-Russian border was fully determined. The two countries no longer have territorial disputes. This is a major progress in bilateral relations. So now to trace the historical ownership of Vladivostok, I am afraid that the space is very limited at the legal and political levels.

“As for Russia’s further transfer of Vladivostok, including the garrison, or even returning to China as some netizens said, I think the possibility is zero in reality.” Zhang Xin said.

A 2016 New York Times report quoted a Russian as saying that China’s recovery of Vladivostok is just as impractical as Russia’s recovery of Alaska.

However, the scene in Vladivostok reflects the prosperity of Far East trade, behind which is Russia’s growing economic dependence on China. After the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian War, Russia’s import share from Europe, America and Japan dropped by about 14%, while its import share from China increased by about 7%.

There are voices in the Western media who believe that in the long run, Russia will become a mere “gas station” for China.

Behind this is the booming energy trade between China and Russia. Russia derives almost half of its export revenue from oil and gas, and sales to EU countries have plummeted as sanctions took effect. A considerable part of the gap is made up through the Asian market. Last year, Russia exported twice as much liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to China than the previous year. It has also increased the transportation of natural gas by 50% and crude oil by 10% through the “Power of Siberia” pipeline.

Not only is China unwilling to comply with Western sanctions against Russia, but it has further developed energy relations with Moscow, and the two countries have agreed to build a new gas pipeline (Power of Siberia 2). The existing pipeline, which began operations in 2019, has a 30-year contract worth more than $400 billion.

Zhang Xin believes that energy is a very important part of Sino-Russian trade, but not all. The two countries maintain a certain diversity even in the field of traditional energy, because both the supply side and the demand side are too high. Any dependency is an additional security risk. Even under the sanctions, India and Turkey are increasing energy imports from Russia, and some of them are being transported back to Europe. Although Russia may not necessarily become China’s “gas station”, if its economic structure does not undergo fundamental changes, it may be difficult to change its dependence on energy exports.