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This article is part of the author’s series of commentary articles in Afghanistan
The rebuilding of the country that cannot be stopped
The U.S. military has been in Afghanistan for 20 years to support the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for democracy, but in the end it failed completely. The reasons and lessons must be reflected.
However, some people say that Afghanistan in the past 20 years is not as good as the five years of the “Emir Nation” version 1.0, and they also compiled a paragraph for the Afghans, saying that “We did not have votes in the Taliban era, but we have everything else. And the U.S. military came to us. With votes, everything else is lost.” This is of course against common sense.
According to statistics, after the fall of the Taliban, the Afghan economy immediately experienced a recovery and high growth, with an increase of 30% in the 2002/2003 fiscal year and another 20% in the 2003/2004 fiscal year. Since then, it has shifted to regular growth: 7.5% (2004), 15.1% (2009), 7.6% (2010). Even in recent years when the Taliban counterattacked, the war has intensified, and the government-controlled area has shrunk, GDP is usually still able to Maintain positive growth: 1.8% (2018), 2.9% (2019), -5.5% (2020), and even before the downfall of the Republican government, relevant parties predict that there will be a 1.0% economic growth this year. (Note 1)
In general, due to the end of international aid and the drought, the economic growth figures of the Republican government throughout its existence are still acceptable: Afghanistan’s GDP in 2020 is nearly five times that of 2002, and the per capita GDP has reached 2.8 in 2002. Times. In large cities and government-controlled areas that have not been affected by the war, “almost all indicators that reflect the level of social and economic development have steadily increased. There are no exceptions in terms of living standards, internationalization and modernization, education levels, infrastructure, and gender equality. “Even a Chinese author who criticized the United States said: “The Algeria government supported by the West has at least gradually got rid of poverty and backwardness in its actual control area, and sometimes even prospered.” (Note 2)
In terms of social progress, the advancement of women’s status is certainly beyond doubt. During the Taliban, the percentage of girls able to go to middle school was 0. Two years after the Taliban collapsed, 6% of girls became middle school students in 2003, and it rose to 39% in 2017. In the later period of the Republic, the rate of female college enrollment reached 5%, the employment rate reached 22%, and female civil servants accounted for 20%. It is inadequate in the world and is unprecedented in Afghanistan. In 2017, 27% of parliament members were women, which is one of the highest in the world. In 2019, there are more than 1,000 female bosses in the Afghan economy. These figures were all zero in the Taliban era. In the Taliban era, there was actually no Internet at all for the Afghan people, but at the end of the Republic, 22% of Afghans were Internet users, 69% had mobile phones, and 4.4 million people used social media. The gap between these data and Pakistan is no longer big. Today, 23% of men in Afghanistan have bank accounts, which is higher than 21% in Pakistan-but only 7% of Afghan women open bank accounts, and the combined rate of bank account opening for men and women is only 15%, which is still lower than that of Pakistan. The 80% that cannot be compared with India is still much lower. (Note 3)
What is more credible than these figures is people’s intuitive experience: Compared with Kabul, which was full of ruins, no new buildings, and a population of only 500,000 during the first Taliban rule, the capital of Afghanistan before 2020 is already a new building. The skyline is full, cars are blocking the streets everywhere, the market is bustling, and the crowd is well-dressed. Muslim headscarves are still popular among women, but they are colorful and black burqas are not banned, but they are hard to see. Pedestrians can be seen walking and talking while holding their mobile phones everywhere. The population has soared from more than 500,000 to more than 4 million. A large development zone called “Kabul New City” is under construction… A local Chinese business friend said: Now Kabul is just a matter of building. Like China in the 1980s and 1990s, looking at cars and mobile phones is what China was ten years ago.
Of course, what is different from Chinese cities in the 1980s and 1990s and even ten years ago is that in addition to the large buildings in the main urban area, Kabul today also has a large area of impoverished shelters on the slopes of the three mountains around the city. This is a common sight in cities in developing countries. Compared with the “slums” of big cities in India and the Philippines, the conditions in the slums of Kabul should be considered good. And considering: After the strict “hukou” control was abolished during the first time when the Taliban came to power, once Kabul was “liberated”, the population quickly swelled to more than 4 million. Under these conditions, these slums have in fact witnessed the progress of human rights in Afghanistan-there will be no expulsion of the “low-end population” here.
The “People’s Sentiment” in the Republican Period
But all this cannot conceal the serious crisis behind it. Afghanistan is still one of the least developed countries. It is self-evident that there is official corruption, rural poverty, high urban unemployment, and the economy’s high dependence on external aid. In particular, the failure of the construction of democracy and the rule of law is a fatal injury that has caused all the above achievements to be destroyed. It is worthy of special analysis, this is something to follow. The first thing to be distinguished here is: Someone specifically pointed out the “economic logic of the failure of the Afghan country: false and prosperous cities, stagnant rural areas”, and this is naturally correct. But to say that this is the main reason why the Republic has “lost popular support” and even led to its collapse, and the Taliban’s success in the restoration, it certainly cannot be justified.
No matter how bad the current situation in Afghanistan is, it is also a horizontal comparison. In terms of vertical comparison with the first Taliban rule, no one would think that it was better then. A friend wrote an article scolding the United States, saying that on the eve of the fall of Kabul, he heard a Hazard (Shiite minority) citizen said that the entry of the Taliban was a catastrophe, and people wanted to resist desperately, but a Pashtun citizen But he said: “The Taliban is actually not as terrible as the legend.” This latter can be regarded as a “praise” for the Taliban. But he didn’t say that the Taliban are cute, right? What’s more, Pashtuns account for only 25% of the residents of Kabul. Most of the residents are Tajiks and Hazars who have ethnic grievances with the Pashtuns. They may even be “not as scary as the legendary” towards the Taliban. Evaluation is hard to come by. Afghans’ disappointment and dissatisfaction with the corruption and incompetence of the authorities should be quite common, but this does not mean that they will support the Taliban.
Afghanistan’s economy is very deformed and highly dependent on foreign aid, especially the United States. No one will be satisfied with this. But shouldn’t it be the U.S. taxpayers who are most dissatisfied with this? And this will cause Afghans to count on the Taliban? Do they expect the Taliban to do more economically, or can they get more U.S. aid?
As for the “stagnation” in rural areas, it is even less a reason for the people to accept the Taliban. Like most developing countries, Afghanistan’s urban-rural differences and unfair “urban priority” have been around for a long time, and it is questionable how it relates to recent changes in popular sentiment. As the “least developed” type of country in Afghanistan, agriculture accounts for an abnormally high proportion of the economy. The economic growth mentioned above cannot rely solely on industry and commerce. In fact, the data also shows that in the past 20 years, due to the improvement of the climate and the end of Soviet-style economy and Taliban control in 2001, commercial agriculture (especially fruits such as pomegranates and opium-the latter is terrible, but it will not be the grower. The reasons for farmers’ dissatisfaction) have developed, which has promoted the country’s economic growth. Therefore, whether the “stagnation” in the countryside has become more serious during this period, I am afraid it needs to be demonstrated.
What’s more, even if it “stagnates,” the rural economy under the Taliban’s rule will not be better than it is now. In recent years, government-controlled areas have gradually shrunk, and rural areas have increasingly become tower-controlled areas again. Will the decay of the rural areas in the tower-controlled area actually increase the Taliban’s popular support?
“Najibullah Phenomenon”
In fact, for Afghanistan, which has been war-torn for a long time, security issues affect the “popularity” far more than economic and even integrity issues. The incompetence of the Republican government in this regard, and the United States‘ intention to let go, these two are truly the people’s most disappointed. However, the data shows that the “popular mind” caused by this disappointment is not turned to the Taliban, but to the pro-Soviet government and its successors. This is especially true in urban areas.
This is easy to understand: Kabul was not affected by war during the Soviet occupation, and urban terrorist attacks such as “suicide bombings” were not yet popular. Therefore, large cities are relatively safe. However, after the fall of the pro-Soviet government, Kabul was caught in the flames of war between various factions of “jihadists” for the capital, leaving a horrible memory. Although there has been no urban war during the five years when the Taliban has been in power, the “state terrorism” of the Taliban itself is too severe, and the bad memories are hard to dispel. Therefore, people began to miss the Soviet occupation before 1992, especially the last generation of pro-Soviet leader Najibullah who was brutally killed by the Taliban, and became the object of people’s sympathy.
Since the fall of the Taliban regime, although the Republican government has prohibited the former pro-Soviet party from re-registering, there is freedom of speech. Najib’s speeches and portraits began to be popular in small areas, especially in the capital Kabul and Najibullah’s hometown. , Paktia Province, southeast of Afghanistan. As the Taliban became active again, the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, and the “Najibullah phenomenon” became more apparent. After 2004, some restaurants began to hang the image of Najibullah alongside the then President Karzai to attract customers. Posters with a portrait of Najibullah often appear on street corners in Kabul, and even on the streets outside Kabul International Airport. And his speeches are sold on DVD at the market. (Note 4) In 2008, a radio station in Kabul conducted a poll: “Past and current systems, which do you think best suits your interests?” It is said that 93.2% of people chose the Najibullah system. (Note 5) On the 12th anniversary of Najibullah’s killing this year, the Afghan Communists first publicly assembled in the capital to commemorate him, and many young people who had never participated in the Red Movement also came. Silula Jabalkh, the organizer of the meeting and the chairman of the Watan Party, claimed that “the enemy of the Afghan people (the Taliban) was under the orders of foreign masters” to kill Najibullah. Participants all know that this refers to Pakistan, and some people clearly pointed out the Pakistani Intelligence Service. (Note 6)
Najibullah started as the head of the secret police during the Soviet occupation and killed people under the command of the KGB. Later, he was favored by the Soviet Union because of his toughness and iron fist and became the last puppet. However, within a year after he was abandoned by the Soviet Union, he expressed dissociation with the Soviet Union, abolished all ideological symbols, changed the name of the country and party, and reorganized the Communist Party of Afghanistan, the “People’s Democratic Party,” into the “Watan Party,” and Vatan was the “mother country.” “, the meaning of “home”. It was only then that he gave up “class struggle” and “dictatorship”, and switched to playing the cards of peace, reconciliation, national identity and Islam, and it was no longer possible to win people’s trust.
However, after all, he resigned on his own initiative, and Kaesong allowed the “jihadists” to enter, saving Kabul from Bingxiu. This is more in line with the sentiments of the people than Hekmatyar, who started fighting factions after entering the city, or even “fighting for the city, killing people over the city”. And he died so miserably at the hands of the Taliban, it is inevitably sympathetic. With the reappearance of the dark clouds of war, people gradually forget the beginning of the Soviet Union’s decades of war, and miss the “years of peace” in Kabul.
In 1997, ex-Arab members exiled abroad re-established the Watan Party in Germany. After the fall of the Taliban, they returned to China for activities. Over the years, they applied to the Republican government for political party registration three times, but they were not approved. But not allowing registration is just not being able to participate in elections, and the Republican government does not prohibit it from acting as a civil society. They established the Dr. Najib Foundation, which has held public commemorations on September 27 (the day when Najibullah was tortured and killed) every year since 2008. (Note 7) In 2017, it is said that “thousands” participated in their activities and announced that they would apply for the legal registration of the Watan Party for the fourth time. (Note 8)
The Watan Party is not the only “survivor” party of the former pro-Soviet government. In the past, there were several small parties dominated by Afghan Communists in the Republican government, the largest of which was the “Afghan National Unity Party” founded in 2003 by former Central Committee member of the People’s Democratic Party, Nur Haq Urumi. Urummi was a former pro-Soviet army lieutenant general. He negotiated peace with the jihadists on the eve of the collapse of the puppet regime. During the Taliban’s “Emir State”, he went into exile in the Netherlands. Contact former pro-Soviet leftists to legally inherit Afghanistan’s leftist traditions. The difference from the Watan party is that because Urummi was at odds with Najibullah at the end of the pro-Soviet regime, he did not play the tragic card that Nass was tortured and killed, but directly defended the Soviet Union and promoted the peace efforts of the pro-Soviet government.
Of course, both the Watan Party and the National Unity Party have now repeatedly stated that they have abandoned the Soviet system’s demands in the past, saying that they are pursuing social democracy, peace, reform, and protection of laborers’ rights under parliamentary democracy. In particular, under the intimidation of the jihadists, Najibullah at the end of the period allowed the Vatan Party to highlight the Islamic color as much as possible. But the religious extremes of the Taliban are now annoying, and the “Najibullah” now highlights the secular color. They have repeatedly emphasized that they are pursuing secular democracy and secular socialism, and they do not oppose any religion.
In the context of the absence of the Soviet Union, Najibullah’s personal sensitivity and popular sentiments and desire for peace, the National Unity Party’s activities have been smoother than that of the Watan Party. Not only did it legally register successfully as soon as the party was founded, but it also passed the party alliance very early. He won a seat in parliament and actively participated in parliamentary politics. Urumi was the Minister of the Interior of the Republican government and held a strong anti-Taliban stance. Before the Watan Party could not legally stand for election, the party became the spokesperson of the former pro-Soviet Leftists including the Watan Party in the parliament.
With the Taliban’s renewed offensive and the renewed war in Afghanistan, the government and the people have given more and more respect to those who died for “peace” in the past and those who were victims of extreme violence regardless of party affiliation. Put aside his grievances. On Eid al-Fitr in 2020, after paying homage to the tomb of Masood, Afghan National Security Adviser Mohib became the first high-ranking official of the Republican government to pay homage to the grave of Najibullah. (Note 9) It is natural to worship Masood, because he is the number one Afghan national hero established since the establishment of the Afghan Republican government. There is the famous Masood Square in the center of Kabul, and Masood’s statues and portraits can be seen everywhere in the country.
And paying homage to Najibullah is extraordinary: he is precisely Masood’s former mortal enemy, and he was notorious as a “traitor” as a Soviet agent in Afghanistan during the Cold War.
But the two figures who were worshipped at the same time by senior government officials have in common that they both died at the hands of the Taliban: in 1996, the Taliban killed Najibullah as soon as they came to power, and in 2001 the Taliban committed suicide bombings before the fall. Assassinated the Tajik hero Masood, the military leader of the “Northern Alliance” who resolutely resisted the Taliban at that time. These two people one after another symbolize the entire history of the Taliban’s bloody ruling power when they came to power through torture and assassination.
These two people are symbolic polarities from all angles: one is a Pashtun, the other is a Tajik; one is a radical Communist Party, and the other is a traditional tribal leader. The two were classmates and acquainted with them when they were students. After the pro-Soviet regime collapsed, Najibullah took refuge in the United Nations agency in Kabul for four years. The Mujahideen government was not embarrassed. It is said that there was Masood’s role. When the Taliban entered the city, Masood asked Najibullah to retreat with him, but Najibullah chose to stay. It is said that he was worried about political and ethnic grievances. He felt that retreating with the Tajiks would make Pashtuns resentful. Had illusions about the Taliban, who were also Pashtuns and had never been enemies before, and ended up being brutally murdered.
Mohib scolded Khalilzad: Ami’s “Prisoner’s Dilemma”
And Mohib, who worshipped the two, was precisely the one in the republican government who strongly advocated uniting all parties against the Taliban and hoped that the former would give up their old grievances, but did not have illusions about the latter. He did this shortly after the US special envoy reached the “Doha Agreement” with the Taliban, which is very meaningful. He stated online:
“During Eid al-Fitr, I visited the tombs of two historical figures in our country. My family had different views on them in the past. However, bringing true peace depends on tolerance, tolerance and overcoming predetermined identity stereotypes,” “Today Afghanistan is made up of different beliefs that were hostile to each other in the past, but today they all operate under one system, one flag, and one Afghanistan.”
Why is it specifically mentioned that “my family” has changed their views on the two? It turned out that unlike the “background people” and tribal and religious leaders in the republican government, Mohib was born in a small mountain village in eastern Afghanistan in 1983. His father was just a court clerk and did not have any strong interest group background. Soon after he was born, his family became refugees when the Soviet army invaded the area. Thanks to the hard work of my family, my own efforts, and the opportunities provided by international refugee agencies, I was able to study in the West. As a civilian, he grew up in a refugee camp and became a young “returnee” of the British Ph.D. He was highly regarded by the president. Before he became a national security adviser, he was the ambassador to the United States. We have no way of judging how much public opinion his ideas have, but he should be a typical Afghan “new patriot” who has a low-level experience of civilians, but can get rid of traditional ignorance, new ideas and admiration of the West, but has an independent personality and loves the motherland. .
In March 2019, Mohib visited the United States with the title of National Security Advisor as the President’s Special Envoy. With his three years of ambassador to the United States and his image of young, cutting-edge, and “Westernized”, he was easy to deal with American politicians. people. And at this time, both sides have understood that negotiations with the Taliban are inevitable, and it is for this reason that Mohib has come to coordinate with the United States.
However, when Mohib learned in Washington that the Trump administration had changed its long-standing refusal to negotiate with the Taliban, not only directly negotiated with the Taliban, but also excluded the Afghan government, he immediately expressed extreme disappointment and anger. He not only criticized the United States fiercely at the meeting, but also personally attacked the U.S. special envoy for Afghanistan and the chief negotiator Khalilzad, accusing the Afghan-American diplomat of wanting to be the “Governor” of Afghanistan and being subject to personal political ambitions. The drive to blend with the Taliban. Mohib’s “rudeness” angered the US, and the next day the US Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs David Hare called the President of Afghanistan to inform the President of Afghanistan that the US government would sever ties with Mohib and would no longer officially accept him. Although the Afghan Republican government changed its people and continued to deal with the United States, the coordination of the Taliban policy between the two parties has been greatly affected. Later, the two parties basically sought a compromise with the Taliban that was most beneficial to them. In this case, the Taliban will naturally ask for prices, waiting for the two opponents to “sell” each other, and it is impossible to compromise.
Although Mohib’s youth and lack of diplomatic experience have seriously affected Afghan-American relations, Khalilzad was also seriously negligent on the issue of Afghanistan – until less than three months before the fall of Kabul, he also asserted that the government forces and the Taliban would be deadlocked. “It is wrong to say that the government forces will collapse and the Taliban will take over in the short term. The real choice that Afghans will face is between a long-term war and a negotiated settlement.”
But in fact, although Mohib is a “hawk” to the Taliban, Khalilzad is actually a typical American “hawk” to the Taliban. As early as three months before the 9/11 incident, he suggested that “the United States must take immediate action to weaken the Taliban and prevent the spread of Talibanism”. The United States sent troops to overthrow the Taliban shortly after 9/11, and Khalilzad was one of the earliest planners.
What made the two anti-Taliban hawks actually turned into “betraying” each other to the Taliban? Of course, both Amerika and the United States have made specific mistakes. But from the perspective of diplomacy, the real fatal flaw in the policies of Afghanistan and the United States towards the Taliban is a typical “prisoner’s dilemma.”
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Economy_of_Afghanistan
2. Liu Yufeng: “The Economic Logic of Afghan National Failure: False Prosperous City, Stagnant Countryside”, Surging Thought Market, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/0LPorcaS5TQb9hbqoz-4nA
3. https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/simp/world-58305992
4. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/political-landscape/the-ghost-of-najibullah-hezb-e-watan-announces-another-relaunch/
5. https://afghanistan.ru/doc/12110.html
6. https://wp-fr.wikideck.com/Mohammad_Najibullah；https://afghanistan.ru/doc/13013.html
7. http://ariananews.af/regional/dr-najib’s-15th-death-anniversary-marked-in-kabul/
8. https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/political-landscape/the-ghost-of-najibullah-hezb-e-watan-announces-another-relaunch/
9. https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/najibullah-grave-death-afghanistan-hamdullah-mohib-6433076/
Note: This article only represents the author’s own views.