When we speak of post-Soviet issues, a historical premise must be made, which takes on an ethical-political value. In 1991 the 15 Soviet republics separated and sealed their divorce according to a guiding principle: the internal borders of the former USSR would be equivalent to those of the new fifteen internationally recognized nations. When, in the post-Soviet space, an armed conflict has arisen it is always because this principle has been violated and the 1991 agreement on territorial integrity was called into question; it happened in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, and, in one case, Armenia did it by wresting from Azerbaijan not only the Karabakh region but seven other “provinces” inhabited by Azerbaijanis and expelling their civilian population in what was technically the largest ethnic cleansing of the 20th century.
We come to the ethical-political question. Many if not all in the West are pro-Ukraine, against Russian aggression and for maintaining the territorial integrity of the Ukrainian state. This is why most EU countries, and others, are willing to send arms to Kiev, harshly sanction Moscow, politically isolate Putin’s government. It is not clear why this position, adamant and widely shared throughout the West, should not apply to the Armenian invasion of Azerbaijani territories.
There is no republic of Artsakh just as there is no republic of Donbass. Indeed, at least Donbass has received Russian recognition, while the self-proclaimed republic of Artsakh has not even received Armenian recognition! If one principle applies – that is, the protection of the territorial integrity of states – it applies to everyone. There are no series A or series B assaults. Otherwise it’s double standard.
Having said this premise, we come to the current crisis. In November 2020, after waiting almost 30 years for a diplomatic solution, Azerbaijan liberated its territories from Armenian occupation by military force, within the framework of UN Security Council resolutions. The 44-day war was so legitimate, based on the right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN charter, that not a single sanction was imposed on Baku. And Azerbaijan’s position as an oil producer has nothing to do with it. If we apply the embargo to Russian oil as is happening these days (see the Priolo case) we could have done it to Azerbaijani oil as well. If we don’t, it is because the international community felt that Azerbaijan was fully entitled to forcibly restore its borders.
But we are not on post-war day one. The peace treaty is near. The Armenian premier and the Azerbaijani president have met several times thanks to the mediation of the European Union and President Charles Michel. An EU mission is underway. As in any political process there are moderates and radicals within the two camps. But if Azerbaijan has every interest in a speedy conclusion of the treaty – because it would emerge as the dominant regional power – the situation in Armenia is more complicated and hostile forces are opposing the supporters of the treaty.
Disturbing events are taking place in the Azerbaijani territories where Russian peacekeepers are temporarily deployed, such as the transfer from Moscow of Russian-Armenian millionaire Ruben Vardanyan – proposed for sanctions by the US Congress – and the illegal grabbing of mineral resources by Armenian forces . It is this process, complicated and full of nuances, that is at the origin of the protests of Azerbaijani environmentalists. During the December 20 UN Security Council discussions on the situation on the Lachin road, the Azerbaijani representative well explained what illegal actions by Armenia have led to the Azerbaijani demonstrations – from unauthorized trafficking of mineral resources, to use of the road for the continuous transport of anti-personnel mines – and also how there is every will on the part of Azerbaijan to keep the passage to civilian use, and how the collaboration with the International Red Cross is constant. But the real root of this crisis is the increase in tension by the forces within the Armenian world and connected more with Moscow than with the West, which oppose the peace treaty. Treaty that instead Baku wants to sign at all costs and which represents the keystone of the future of the region.
* Adjunct professor of history of international relations at Sapienza–University of Rome