Recep Tayyip Erdogan he emerged victorious from the polls on 28 May. With the 52.8 percent of votes in his favour, the outgoing president beat his challenger Kemal Kilicdaroglustopping at 47.9 per cent of preferences. However, the turnout was lower than in the first round, going from 88 percent to 85 percent. An important fact that probably contributed to the defeat of Kilicdarogluexponent of Table of sixa coalition formed by six different parties ranging from the centre-left to the nationalist right. Not having repaid was with much chance also the nationalist turn of Kilicdarogluwho in an attempt to win the votes of the third ultra-nationalist candidate Sinan Ogan it has instead lost support in the Kurdish provinces. Comparing i results of the first and second round, the opposition he won in the same provinces in which he was victorious in the first round, but with lower percentages in some cases. In a challenge to presidency so tight even a few points made the difference. The case of then is interesting Hataythe southeast province hit by the earthquake and in which he won in the second round Erdogan after a result instead in favor of the opposition in the first. The voters of Ogan they have probably decided to support the outgoing president, while a part of the Kurds has chosen not to go to the polls, disillusioned by the result of the first round and by the alliances signed by Kilicdaroglu in recent days. The turnout in the Kurdish regions has in fact increased from 81.7 to 75.7 percent.
After this umpteenth reconfirmation at the helm of the country, Erdogan now has another five years to continue his work of building the “New Türkiye” (Yeni Turkiye) and to start what he himself called the “Turkish century”. Certainly not news positive per the political opposition and even more for the social one, which has already seen its spaces maneuver progressively shrinking over the last ten years and which looked with justified concern at a new victory for the outgoing president. In the next five years it is easy to imagine another one squeeze on the freedoms and rights of Turkish citizensespecially after these last elections in which the oppositionhowever a loser, achieved an important result and posed a threat to the retention of power by Erdogan. What comes out of these elections in fact it is a country split in two, in which just over 50 percent support the new president while another half wants a Türkiye different than that Erdogan is building and will continue to build.
The capacity of the president to get yours approved reforms and in particular the constitutional one to eliminate the two-term limit will also depend on position which will take some parties up to now part of the opposition, including theGood Party. Second most important training within the Table of sixil Good catch could get close to Erdogan and abandon the benches of the opposition.
In exchange for a further limitation of the rightsil president should continue to approve policies Of welfare and support for the less well-off population as already done during his previous mandates and even more so in recent months. However, much will depend on the state of the economycurrently in a severe crisis and with little prospect of recovery in the short term. Erdogan he doesn’t seem willing to abandon his own economic policies nor to stop keeping interest rates low, two elements that together with the control that he himself exercises over Central bank have caused the cost of living to rise Türkiye and the decrease in the purchasing power of citizens. In the short run Erdogan will be able to rely on funding from some states of the Gulfespecially of the Qatarand on the postponement of the payment of gas imported from Russiabut in the medium to long term he will have to go back to raising interest rates or risk condemning the economy to collapse.
A greater economic dependence from abroad will also have effects on the politics foreignespecially regarding its position towards the Russia. However, the choice to act as mediator in the Ukrainian conflict has certainly allowed Erdogan to avoid tensions with Mosca and also granted him greater international recognition, while allowing him to block the entrance of the Sweden in the Nato without any particular repercussions. A dossier which should be resolved shortly, especially if the US finally decides to approve the sale of the fighters F-16 ad Ankara. In the next future Erdogan will still fill the role of mediator and will not break relations with the Russiaalso because it needs the support of Mosca to reach an agreement with the government of Damascus and start the “voluntary” repatriation of at least one million Syrians.
The role Turkey plays in Ukraine will also continue to regulate relations with the European Union and the United States. Both Brussels and Washington will need Erdogan’s mediation on the Ukrainian dossier, but they will have to balance this need with the defense of their interests in the Mediterranean. Ankara has an open dispute with Greece regarding the sovereignty of some islands, the question of Cyprus – an island divided in two since 1974 – and that linked to the exploitation of energy resources in the Mediterranean are still on the table and Turkey will not set aside its own national interests. Not to mention the migration issue, used as a weapon of blackmail against the EU and which will soon be discussed again. A similar discourse also applies to Libya, where Ankara is present in support of the Tripoli government with the ultimate goal of positioning itself in a strategic country in terms of trade and migration routes, as well as a useful starting point for expanding its penetration into Africa. In fact, Turkey is investing more and more in strengthening relations with African countries, first of all exploiting the export of war material and in particular of drones. On the other hand, Erdogan has never made a secret of his fascination for the glory of the Ottoman Empire and aims to make Turkey at least a regional power, attracting even the countries of Central Asia under his wing.
Erdogan will therefore continue to move along the lines of internal authoritarianism and a renewed activism in foreign policy, but his grip on Turkey is less strong than before.