Can the clash between Russian fighters and the American drone over international airspace near Crimea really cause the conflict to widen?
We must not stop and look at the finger, but point to the moon. Since February 24, the day of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the risk of escalation has been constant. From the moment the NATO bloc decided to support Kiev, this risk was accepted. And it has always been there, regardless of the episodes that may trigger it. Undoubtedly, however, this activism and what follows from it adds even more fuel to the fire. The drone incident, if we want to call it that, is very serious, but it is also true that it can be managed diplomatically thanks to the consolidated relations between Russia and the United States. Those like this are episodes with which the two sides have learned to live together since the post-war period, establishing rules of engagement for crisis management.
How?
I give an example. At the end of 2015, Turkey hit and shot down a Russian Su-24M over the skies on the border between the Anatolian country and Syria. That episode could have triggered a conflict between Moscow and NATO, also given the tension between the parties linked to the different sides in the Syrian conflict. but this did not happen because the leaders of NATO and Russia spoke immediately and defused any risk of escalation.
So an episode like that of the downed American drone can only become a casus belli if one of the parties decides that it should be…
Exactly, at the moment there is no will on both sides to make him the spark of the conflict. This is partly told by the decision to define it as an “accident”, when instead it is a matter of a maneuver calculated and wanted by Russia. However, this should not reassure us. If today this will does not exist it does not mean that it cannot emerge in the future. And this tense situation does nothing but keep this possibility at stake.
The episode, despite its seriousness, did not produce harsh reactions on either side. Is this an indication of the seriousness of the episode and should we therefore worry?
The tension and danger are constant. But if the tones are kept low in the face of these episodes, it is in any case a positive sign because it still indicates the will not to escalate. Then we can not know what they said to each other, but I would say that is not important. What matters is the message they give to the outside, it’s the only one they’ll have to account for.
If Russia has been flexing its muscles since before the invasion, do you think the US is increasing the ruthlessness of its actions in the Ukrainian context?
No, I think the US has always held a consistent line since February 24th. We must not forget that on the other side there is a country which has invaded and annexed about 19% of an independent state and which during the Cold War often resorted to provocations of this kind. The United States was clever in proceeding with this provocation. They remained in international airspace, without entering Crimea which, let us remember, is considered Russian territory only by Moscow. However, their position did not prevent Washington from spying on Russian movements, both the US and, indeed, the leaders of the Federation knew this. The US provokes, spies, and has been doing so since well before the invasion began, but it does so within the limits of the legality established by international law. Outside this border, however, Russia exited and proceeded with the killing.
Today, however, we saw Russian fighter jets take off from Belarus and witnessed an exercise with 10 Moscow warplanes over the skies of Kaliningrad. Is it just a provocation?
These are actions that are part of the normality of the war dialectic, actions of deterrence and intimidation. A way to send a signal to the adversary, but also to one’s own citizens, with whom one must always be careful to justify one’s actions and, above all, not to convey an image of weakness.
Isn’t Moscow thinking about deploying aviation, which is still not very active in the Ukrainian scenario?
In recent months, we have undoubtedly seen increased involvement of the Russian Air Force in the Ukrainian conflict. But we are still far from the potential that this can express. A great distance, however, is also recorded between the technological and training capabilities of the Russian aviation compared to the much more advanced western one. There is also a question of war doctrine: Russia, as we have seen, favors the use of war troops, followed by the Navy, especially as regards submarines, and only at the end comes the aeronautics. The latter suffers from a significant gap compared to the western one and is also less used for this reason. The only use in recent years has been recorded in Syria, where it was used to bomb areas occupied by rebels and pro-Assad Islamists. But we are talking about an enemy that had no response capabilities. In Ukraine the situation is different and Kiev’s anti-aircraft systems can really hurt the Russian aviation. Just think of war scenarios like Afghanistan or Chechnya: many Russian helicopters have been shot down by enemy Stingers. Sooner or later, Russia will probably make use of aviation, what we don’t know is what impact this can really have on the conflict.
Speaking of technology, is the United States concerned about the possibility that the Russians recover the downed aircraft to study its technologies?
It certainly is a factor, but there are many variables to consider. We need to understand in what conditions they will find the vehicle, also because these vehicles have self-destruct systems in the event of being shot down precisely so as not to give an advantage to the opponents. Finally, we also have to see what the Russians, far behind technologically in this field, will be able to understand from the analysis of such sophisticated means as American drones.