The war unleashed by Russia against the Ukraine has brought issues related to the deterrence e collective defense from a Russian threat. In 2022, the new Strategic Concept was approved at the Madrid summit, which is the result of both the return of large-scale warfare on the European continentand of a process of renewal and coordination within the alliance for adapt NATO to a context of aggressive multipolarity with a horizon to 2030. The Concept gives priority to Russia among the various challenges facing the Euro-Atlantic space, but also considering the growing Chinese assertiveness, the Russian presence in the Mediterranean and the instability on the southern flank.
The east flank
The core task of deterrence and collective defense against Russia has been the Alliance’s cornerstone activity in 2022 in light of the ongoing border war with four member states and the unscrupulousness of the Russian leadership. With a view to strengthening, a commitment was in fact made to hold approx 300 thousand units of the member states to a high level of readiness as an expression of a “new model of forces” (New Force Model, Nfm).
Italy has also actively contributed by strengthening its presence in Hungary and Bulgaria, assuming the leadership of NATO advanced defense deployment in the latter. Adding up these new quotas and the naval presence in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean, the Italian contribution on the east flank reached 2,193 units, as well as 519 land vehicles and 15 air vehicles. Added to these are the participation of 1,350 units and 77 land vehicles in the Very High Joint Readiness Task Force (VJTF), the spearhead of NATO’s rapid reaction forces, operationally and politically critical for the Alliance to rapidly reinforce the east flank.
However, the renewed commitment on the east flank did not lead to an abandonment of other non-European theaters of operations: Italy remains in command of high-profile peacekeeping and capacity building missions, such as Kfor in Kosovo, Unifil in Lebanon e Nato training mission Iraq. For the Italian Defense Ministry, the challenge will be to maintain commitment to old and new missions, and at the same time preserve resources for military interventions in the enlarged Mediterranean.
Change of government: continuity and credibility
The commitments undertaken by the Draghi executive in the first part of the year were followed by strong rhetorical, political and operational support from the new government of Giorgia Meloni for the Atlantic Alliance. A has also emerged strong continuity in the military and political commitment of Romaa on the priority issue for the Alliance, namely deterrence and defense on the eastern flank. This continuity confirmed Italy’s credibility as a major contributor not only to out-of-area missions, but also in the European theatre.
Another element of continuity between the executives of Draghi and Meloni is the centrality of the enlarged Mediterranean in the Italian agenda in NATO, above all considering the forthcoming expansion of the Alliance in Scandinavia. The Security and Defense Strategy for the Mediterranean published in May 2022 indicates Rome’s intention to “play a role of reference for the main Allies within NATO”.
This is associated with the Italian ambition of adapt the military tool not only to respond to the threat emanating from the Kremlin, but also to “protect national strategic interests, wherever they are located – and in particular in the enlarged Mediterranean”, as illustrated by the latest Multi-year Defense Planning Document (DPP) of the Draghi government. The first parliamentary speech by the new Prime Minister Meloni essentially moved along the same NATO, Mediterranean and European guidelines.
European defence
Both the Draghi government and the Meloni executive have seen the Atlantic Alliance and European defense as complementary, according to a line that enjoys broad and lasting political consensus in Italy. In the context of defense Europe, Rome has supported and participated in the development of common initiatives, also in the light of the Ukrainian conflict. In addition to the continuous contribution to various ongoing EU military missions, the Italian institutions have in fact actively and promptly participated in the finalization of the Strategic Compass (Strategic Compass) in the first quarter of 2022. Italy has gained strong attention for the enlarged Mediterranean, a perspective of synergy and cooperation between NATO and the EU that finds the right balance between Europeanism and Atlanticismand a formulation of priorities for investments in defense Europe in line with Italian military and industrial interests.
The institutions have also worked to define the regulations of the Facility for Strengthening the European Defense Industry through joint purchases (Edirpa) in line with national interests. Also in 2022, through the European Defense Fund (Edf) were allocated approx 1.2 billion euros at EU level for research and development projects of military technologies presented in 2021: Italy is the second country in terms of entities participating in the proposals selected in a competitive manner, thus confirming its pre-eminent position on the key projects launched in Europe.
Budget law and future initiatives
Despite the active Italian commitment, the2 percent target for military spending agreed within NATO in 2014 is still far from the 1.54 percent budgeted for 2022. If the Draghi government had expressed itself in favor of a gradual increase in expenditure, postponing the achievement of the 2 percent quota until 2028, the Meloni executive has not yet defined an alternative roadmap. This is significant if we consider that, in the light of the return of high-intensity warfare in Europe and the consequent significant increase in the defense budgets of almost all European countries, the 2 percent target will probably be revised upwards within NATO .
The new executive should first increase defense budgets in a manner commensurate with ambitions and commitments made, and at the same time remedy the budgetary imbalances due to insufficient spending on training and operations against expenditures for personnel costs above the Alliance average. These imbalances also persist in the first budget law approved by the new majority last December, and therefore represent a challenge for the Meloni government. In conclusion, it can be said that in 2022 there was no substantial change of course in the defense field between the two executives, to the advantage of the continuity and credibility of Italy’s international action in this sector.
Cover photo EPA/Filippo Attili