Both the people and the elites of Ukraine want a lasting peace with Russia more than anyone else in the world. Why Kyiv is not at the forefront of finding a compromise with Moscow? What is the reason for the seemingly uncooperative, indeed decidedly, and perhaps recklessly, behavior stonewaller of Ukraine?
From the Ukrainian point of view, Russia’s current war against Ukraine is too typical and too extraordinary to be concluded simply by negotiation. What is typical of the war in Russia is that it fits into a long one historical and regional model of Russian behavior in its border areas. The extraordinary thing about the war is that it is not just about Ukrainian territory. Oddly enough, from the point of view of Moscow, Ukraine is also concerned the Russian identity. Both its typicality and its exceptionality – that is, its continuation of a broader pathology and of a peculiar significance for Russia itself – mean that an early and stable peace with Moscow is not feasible.
A story that repeats itself
The current Russian war is not Moscow’s first attack on the Ukrainian nation, nor the only one expansionary operation of the Kremlin in the former Russian Empire.
L’imperial impulse in the Russian state tradition it is too strong to allow for a meaningful and lasting ceasefire. The age-old expansionist impulse in Moscow’s strategic culture can also survive a democratic change in Russia’s political regime.
Unlike many outside observers, most Ukrainian and Central and Eastern European politicians, pundits and diplomats do not see only the current Russo-Ukrainian war as Putin’s obsession. Instead, this war is perceived by the elites of Central and Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus, and to some extent Central Asia, as only the latest chapter in a long series of military conquests conventional and hybrid Russians spanning centuries. Ukrainians and other peoples formerly subject to Russian empires – Muscovite, Tsarist, Soviet and post-Soviet – have experienced similar incursions with sometimes similar justifications. In February 2022, many outside observers were baffled by Putin’s assertion that Moscow’s large-scale attack on the Ukrainian state – with its Jewish president – was driven by Russian concern about Kyivan fascism and was aimed at “denazify” Ukraine. Conversely, many Eastern and Central Europeans were already familiar with Russian claims that their governments or even entire elites are fascists. For example, almost exactly thirty years before the escalation in Ukraine, in 1992the Russian 14th Army intervened militarily in a intra-Moldovan conflict.
The commander of the 14th Army at the time, the legendary and now deceased Russian general Aleksandr Lebedjustified his troops’ illegal intervention in a foreign country with a statement that prevented Putin’s 2022 lie. Lebed told a press conference in 1992 that the new government of the young Republic of Moldova in Chișinău he was performing worse than the German SS men 50 years earlier. L’military intervention open of Lebed’s Russian regular troops led to a permanent division in Moldova.
The remnants of the 14th Russian Army, the so-called Operational Group of the Russian Federation are still in the area of Moldova – also recognized by Moscow as such – as uninvited guests. Despite Russia’s promise to withdraw and Moldova’s neutral status ever since, the unwanted troop deployment and state division of Moldova continues to this day.
Pre and post-Putin colonialism
This Moldovan episode from 1992-1994 illustrates a larger issue. It doesn’t matter – at least from the point of view of Central and Eastern Europe – if Putin will he be in power in the future or not. And also irrelevant whether the Russian regime is democratic, totalitarian, monarchical, oligarchic, or whatever: Moscow’s expansionist drive is likely to continue.
Colonialism and expansionism of Russia they were repeatedly demonstrated to the peoples of Eastern Central Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia in dozens of often bloody raids during various historical periods. In the period before 2022, the so-called “special operations” Russians (spetsoperatsii) or “cleanings” (zachistki) suppressed, and sometimes wiped out, local groups seeking independence.
Such historical memories are found not only in Ukraine, but in the whole post-communist world. On their background, look for a cease-fire significant with Moscow appears non-strategic, if not stupid, at the moment. To be sure, Putin & Co. or their successors may, at some point, decide to engage in political dialogue and mock constructive negotiations. The Kremlin could also develop interest in signing a ceasefire agreement and implementing confidence-building measures.
However, such behavior on Russia’s part would only be instrumental. It would be one tactical retreat temporary for military regrouping and rearmament. Later, Moscow would assert its own with renewed vigor cross-border domain, power and hegemony. If necessary, the Kremlin could do it again again with military force and mass terror against civilians.
Russian nationalism and imperialism
Moreover, as far as Ukraine is concerned, Russian aggressiveness is particularly virulent and uncompromising. Most traditional Russian nationalism does not recognize Ukrainian identity and culture as truly and independently national. Consider Ukrainian traditions and the Ukrainian language as local folklore, not equal and subordinate to Russian nationality and high culture. This obvious contempt has its roots not only and not so much in Moscow’s arrogance. Rather, it is an expression of a Russian inferiority complex towards the Ukrainians as the older, more orthodox Christian, more clearly defined, and more distinctly European East Slavic “brother state”.
Ukrainian nationalism and statehood have no right to exist in the view of a large part of the Russian elite and population. Their only tolerance is blasphemy. The Ukrainian territories, with the partial exception of Western Ukraine, are one “Little Russia” or one “New Russia”, in Russian language “Malorossiya” and “Novorossiya”. Moscow’s war in Ukraine cannot be a real war. It’s just a special operation within the confines of the Great Russia.
A ceasefire and a negotiated agreement with Moscow would in principle be desirable for the citizens of Ukraine and for the Ukrainian government. However, strategic considerations and thehistorical experience they do not suggest an early ceasefire to Kyiv based on elementary trust. Since ending the war today would only serve the Kremlin’s purpose prepare the Russian armythe economy and the population for a subsequent new attacka peace deal today would be an own goal for Kyiv.
The current peace deal would be in blatant contradiction with Ukrainian historical memory, comparative observation and strategic culture. Centuries of tragic experience of their own and other post-Soviet nations, as well as peoples such as Poles and Finns, with Moscow imperialism contain bitter lessons. They advise all Ukrainians, be they doves or hawks, to expect a Russian defeat before meaningful negotiations with the Kremlin can begin.
Cover photo EPA/TOMS KALNINS