Really Evgeny Prigozhin was he aiming to conquer Moscow and defenestrate Putin with the 5,000 mercenaries who had come within 200 kilometers of the capital? It is clear that the coup attempt he would have succeeded only if, in the wake of what Wagner’s boss called the “march of justice”, there had been significant defections among the armed forces and an influential part of the establishment had sided with him. Did Prigozhin hope for it? If so, he had miscalculated.
The reckoning
There have been no political pronouncements of any weight in favor of Prigozhin, not even among the most vocal nationalists, most of whom, in reality, do not like him at all. Regional governors quickly and in unison reiterated theirs loyalty to the head of the Kremlin, contrary to what happened with the attempted coup d’état, which also failed, in 1991. Nor has there been any news of other relevant mutinies in the army. Wagner’s sudden about-face and Prigozhin’s acceptance of an agreement which, at first sight, resembles a surrender, albeit a negotiated one, were at that point the obligatory choices.
It was actually the Kremlin that made the first move that triggered the crisis when it ordered all irregular military formations to submit to the Defense Ministry by July 1. Prigozhin with his daily tirades against military leaders, accused of inefficiency, corruption and unpatriotic spirit, had become a constant source of embarrassment, a thorn in his side that needed to be eradicated. Putin could not but know that this would inevitably lead to showdown. With his back against the wall, Prigozhin has chosen to up the ante, launching himself into an improvised enterprise that is beyond his strength.
An agreement in the balance
The agreement that led to Wagner’s backtracking provides for its dissolution and the integration of the mercenaries into the ranks of the regular army – their subordination, therefore, to the Minister of Defense Sergei ShoiguPrigozhin’s bete noire – in exchange for immunity.
Actually, as of this writing, many unanswered questions remain about the details and modalities of implementation of the agreement. Prigozhin said he had ordered his men back to operational bases in eastern Ukraine. But it is very difficult for Wagner’s militiamen to accept inclusion in the regular troops and to be employed by the hated Shoigu. It’s also unlikely that the Wagner boss will agree to retire early: he doesn’t seem like the type of gilded exile. He made no mention of his announced trip to Belarus in his latest – at the moment – speech in Rostov.
But how then to explain the surprising ease with which Wagner’s militiamen took control of the military command in a large and strategically important city like Rostov-on-Don and reached undisturbed as far as Voronezh, another nerve centre?
The surprise effect had an impact, Prigozhin’s men were at home in Rostov and, apparently in the absence of unequivocal provisions from Moscow, it is not so strange that there was only a timid reaction from the army (a few damage credit to the missile attack denounced by Prigozhin against the positions of the Wagner to justify the march towards Moscow). But what is striking, in fact, is the disorientation and confusion that seem to have reigned in the Kremlin for at least 24 hours from the beginning of the rebellion.
Putin certainly wanted to avoid, in a moment of great difficulty for the “special military operation” in Ukraine, one bloody clash with a group like Wagner of which, to quote the president’s spokesman Dimitrij Peskov, the Kremlin has “always respected heroic deeds”. In his televised address to the nation, Putin has evoked the specter of a fratricidal confrontation like the one triggered by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 which the Russian president, in his daring historical reconstructions, has often pointed to as the source of all the ills of contemporary Russia.
Hard blow for Putin
The clash with Wagner is undoubtedly a heavy blow for Putin. His reputation, so laboriously cultivated, as a strong man, capable of keeping everything under control, is seriously compromised. The graves had already come to light shortcomings of the Russian Armed Forces; now the curtain has also risen on the weaknesses of the internal security apparatus. The fortifications and anti-tank trenches hastily erected in Moscow in anticipation of the Wagner’s arrival will not be forgotten so easily. As well as the loss of control of important cities such as Rostov sul Don e Voronezh.
In his speech to the nation, Putin announced an “inevitable punishment” for the “traitors”, but he had to renege on that threat after a few hours. He was forced to come to terms with one of his former subordinates, proving to be blackmailable, the very one who did not hesitate to liquidate his opponents with the most diverse means at home and abroad; a manifestation of weakness that could encourage others, opponents or even men and groups of his circle, to put pressure on him or challenge his power. Even the choice to resort to the good offices of the Belarusian dictator Lukashenkowhich Putin notoriously despises, has certainly not helped, whatever the true meaning of this move, to convey a reassuring image of the Kremlin’s ability to manage crises.
Mephistophelean pact
Putin seems to have lost, several have noted, his monopoly on the use of force. But this had actually already happened when the head of the Kremlin decided to entrust himself to Prigozhin, giving him less freedom to do the dirty work, with Wagner, in the various war scenarios. In the context of the aggression against Ukraine, the decision to give space to Wagner had a very specific reason: Putin strongly fears the potential boomerang effect of a new army recruitment campaign. The impact on popular consensus could be devastating. The Russians are not willing to die in a war they do not understand the reasons for and which has resulted in one military disaster after another. The only alternative was a Mephistophelean pact with the irregular militias. And now Putin is paying the price.
Is this the beginning of the end for Putin’s regime? It is far too early to draw this conclusion. Although, there is no doubt, we are facing the gravest threat to Putin’s power in 23 years of rule. US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken spoke of “real cracks” within the Kremlin and also made it clear that he did not consider the Putin-Wagner dispute concluded, to which, according to what has been learned, the American intelligence services had devoted much attention in the weeks preceding the attempted coup , with frequent White House briefings.
Towards a regime crisis?
There are new visible signs of awave of popular discontent? The applause and ovations with which a crowd of citizens greeted the Wagner militiamen in Rostov certainly cannot be taken as such (many others, certainly more, left the city out of fear). Furthermore, the chaos generated by the attempted coup may have increasingly convinced a good chunk of Russians that Putin remains the only alternative to anarchy. Not surprisingly, the Russian president focused his address to the nation on the risk of civil war. However, many are expecting further repression and new purges. One of the first tests will concern military structures, in particular there could be significant changes at the top.
Beyond the more contingent factors and dramatic events, such as the attempted coup, consensus for the regime will depend heavily on developments in the war in Ukraine. The Ukrainians have seen in the recent crisis, from a military point of view, a “window of opportunity” as expressed by Hanna Malyar, deputy minister of defense, and it is natural that they are now thinking of stepping up attacks before the Russians regroup. The counter-offensive has its times, which are difficult to compress, but the Russian troops at the front are certainly aware of what happened and, in particular, the chaos and indecision in the high commands cannot fail to have had a further depressive effect on their moral.
But, as mentioned, an eventual decision to start one could have an even greater impact new recruitment campaign. Faced with new military setbacks, Putin may be forced to resort to them. In the longer term, a worsening of the living conditions of Russian citizens cannot be ruled out due, in particular, to a further one drop in the price of energy raw materials on which Russia continues to remain heavily dependent. It should not be forgotten that this is one of the factors that historically has had the greatest impact on the fate of the various regimes that have followed one another in Moscow.
Foto di copertina EPA/GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/SPUTNIK/KREMLIN POOL MANDATORY CREDIT