The Russian aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022 had an overwhelming impact on theEuropean Unionwhich at that time was trying to recover from the economic and social consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic.
The EU changed by the war
A year later, the EU looks different. First of all, it is bigger, or at least it is about to be bigger in view of the accession of two new Member States – Ukraine and Moldova – to which it granted the status of candidates in June 2022. The enlargement path promises to be long and not without obstacles, starting with important reforms that will have to be implemented by the Ukrainian government in economic matters and respect for the rule of law. But the way is open to welcome the two countries – and perhaps also there Georgia – in the European house, with important consequences also on the other front of enlargement – that of Western Balkans – and on internal reforms that the Union will have to put in place in order to function even with 35 or more Member States.
The Union has also shown itself capable of mobilizing its resources for more timely and effective foreign policy action. I am 4.8 million Ukrainian refugees who benefit from the EU temporary protection mechanism. In addition, to date the Union has mobilized €3.6 billion for military support to the Armed Forces of Ukraine and overall support to Ukraine of 50 billion euros. The Union has also been united in imposing harsh sanctions on Russia, and a new package of coercive measures, the tenth, will be discussed in Brussels this week.
Borders and internal rebalancing
We also witnessed a internal rebalancing in favor of the Baltic countries and Eastern Europe, at the forefront of the European response to the aggression and who have raised their voices in Brussels to affirm their vision on the future of the Union. At a political level, this translates into an intransigent attitude of containing Russian expansionist aims, far from the cooperative approach of Merkel’s memory, while European defense remains inevitably bound to the role of the United States and the Atlantic Alliance, despite the pretensions of strategic autonomy advanced by French President Macron and Von der Leyen’s ‘geopolitical’ Commission.
The strengthening of the north-eastern front goes hand in hand with a weakening of the Mediterranean one, above all due to the change of government in Italy and the consequent difficulties in coordinating the European dossiers with France and Spain. Finally, you also register a less solidity of the Franco-German engineweakened by internal political difficulties of the two governments and by a lack of synchrony on both European reforms and foreign policy.
If we look at public opinion, the juncture of polycrisis that Europe is experiencing has led to the emergence of fragility and fears, even in a generally favorable climate to continue efforts to support the Ukrainian cause. The Eurobarometer shows that the main fear of European citizens is the increase in the cost of living (93%), followed by poverty and social exclusion (82%) and climate change and the potential extension of the Ukrainian conflict to other countries (both at 81%). Three-quarters of Europeans approve of EU policy in support of Ukraine and specific measures such as sanctionseven if there are notable differences at national level – for example in Italy the percentage drops to 62%.
National responses and European coordination
In this situation of general disorientation, the temptation for governments to resort to national responsessometimes even to the detriment of greater European coordination, in the wake of what has already happened in Germania with support measures for families and businesses to counter the energy crisis (the so-called ‘bazooka’ of 200 billion euros) or in Italy with respect to the management of migrants rescued by NGO ships in the Mediterranean. The consequences of this trend would be harmful for the European project and for its international projection, because the inevitable consequence would be the prevalence of a transactional logic in Brussels which would never lead beyond the lowest common denominator between the various national interests and would not provide the Bring together the vision and political drive needed to navigate these uncertain times.
In the final analysis, only if it is able to strike a difficult balance between the flexibility necessary to accommodate national differences and the consolidation of common policies based on shared rules, will the Union be able to guarantee the stability of the European pact with its citizens – but also with the Ukrainian government and people for the realization of their European democratic aspiration.
Cover photo EPA/UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL PRESS SERVICE