In a few days Vladimir Putin seems to have regained full control of the levers of power in Russia. Indeed, Foreign Minister Sergej Lavrov said he was convinced that the regime will come out strengthened by the clash with the head of Wagner Evgeny Prigozhin. The fact remains that it was precisely the head of the Kremlin who evoked, on several occasions, the specter of civil war. The intent is clear: to convince a population shaken by recent events that he and the establishment around him are theonly alternative to chaos and anarchy. But the frailties of Putin’s power have emerged in full light, as never before. In Russia, propaganda tries to project the image of a return to normality, it is not known how successfully, but in Western chancelleries a crisis of the regime is now considered more likely.
Internal crisis and nuclear risk
The scenario of a Russia in the throes of internal convulsions and at risk of implosion or a traumatic change of leadership raises various concerns in the West, including a possible loss of control over the nuclear arsenal. Is the latter a real threat?
It’s not easy measure popular discontent in a regime where the government has absolute control of the media and demonstrations of dissent are brutally repressed. But there are no signs of an incipient civil war in Russia today.
However, the clash with Wagner could have significant consequences. Putin, but also, and above all, the military leaders come out quite weakened. Various opposition groups – inside and outside the regime – could be encouraged to openly challenge the presidency. Furthermore, as noted in a previous article in this magazine, further military setbacks in Ukraine would jeopardize the stability of the regime and any new recruitment campaign to curb the Ukrainian counter-offensive would most likely have a backlash.
Conflict dynamics that lead to one Putin’s defenestration therefore they cannot be excluded. For any new tenants of the Kremlin, maintaining control over the nuclear arsenal would be an absolute priority, but an even more fiercely nationalist regime, intent on redeeming Russia from Putin’s failures – a very present nightmare in the West – could come to concretely contemplate its ‘use. In the extreme case of a vertical collapse of state structuresthe risk of nuclear weapons ending up in the hands of groups capable of acting autonomously from institutional chains of command would also grow.
The latter scenario appears at the moment rather remote. The breakup of the Soviet Union aroused acute apprehensions about the fate of its nuclear arsenal, part of which was deployed on the territory of some breakaway republics (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukrainelisten) but under Russian military control. At the time the White House – first with George Bush and then Bill Clinton – worked successfully to facilitate the transport and safety in Russia of the nuclear weapons remaining in those republics. Since then we have always relied on Moscow’s ability to guarantee competent and professional management of the nuclear apparatus, also thanks to an experienced command and control system.
The risk that irresponsible leaders or even terrorist groups may take possession of nuclear weapons or the material needed to produce them has actually always been considered not negligible. But they mostly had in mind nuclear countries with inscrutable futures, like North Korea, or perpetually unstable and facing strong radical opposition groups, like Pakistan.
Who decides on nuclear weapons
Of course, the final decision on the use of nuclear weapons of any kind, including tactical ones intended for the battlefield, rests with Russia’s president. It is he who constantly has the so-called with him carrying case which through, it seems, two buttons – “launch” or “delete” – allows him to give orders on the use of nuclear weapons to the highest military commands and through them to the military units that have them together with the relative codes of launch.
It is also thought that the defense minister Sergei Shoigu and the Chief of the Armed Forces Valery Gerasimov have their own nuclear briefcases. How the chain of command, control and communication of nuclear weapons works in more detail obviously remains secret, but, in the event that a nuclear attack against Russia is confirmed, the decision whether and how to respond should be made within minutes, the chain would shorten, and the role of local command structures and computer programs set up for this eventuality could be greater. In the event of false alarms, the evaluation of the lower commands could prove decisive in stopping the retaliation.
In theory, a scenario cannot be ruled out in which the military, at a more or less high level, chooses to oppose a command from the president on the use of nuclear weapons that they deem irrational. However, such a mutiny does not appear very likely. Indeed, it is doubtful that the nuclear chain of command includes officers with sufficient determination and courage to openly challenge the president.
The threat of tactical nuclear weapons
Attention is now focused on tactical nuclear weapons which it is feared Moscow could use in the context of the war in Ukraine, following up on repeated threats of a nuclear escalation. Russia has about 2,000 of them – ten times the American ones – and has begun to deploy some of them, we don’t know how many, in Belarusas proudly confirmed by Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko.
The procedure for their deployment is the same as described above, but the potential launch should be preceded by installations of the warheads, which are now located in depots, on transport vehicles and by the activation of the related military units. All actions that could be detected, without great difficulty, by satellites. Moreover, Moscow itself may be interested in not hiding these preparatory measures if the purpose is to wield the nuclear weapon for intimidation purposes.
Finally, in the event of an effective willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons, the Kremlin should, of necessity, also place its strategic weapons in an advanced state of alarm in view of a possible US nuclear response. However, even this move would not remain hidden.
Since the nuclear risk loomed in the context of the war in Ukraine, Washington has repeatedly expressed confidence in its ability to monitor the activities of the Russian nuclear-armed forces and even recently stated that it has not detected any noteworthy changes in the deployment of Russian nuclear warheads for tactical use. Not least, communication channels between the two countries on nuclear issues continue to be active.
However, the Russian nuclear threat remains, as Biden himself admitted, “real”. The chances of it materializing could increase if Putin suffers further military setbacks in Ukraine and the ongoing counter-offensive is successful. And it certainly cannot be taken for granted that, in the event of his defenestration and a change at the top of the Kremlin, the specter of a nuclear war could be more easily exorcised.
Foto di copertina EPA/GAVRIIL GRIGOROV/ SPUTNIK/ KREMLIN / POOL MANDATORY CREDIT