THE NEW CENTURY: Is it so true that front 53 of the ‘Second Marquetalia’, in the corridor Bogotá, Sumapaz, Cundinamarca and Meta would be revived?
ARIEL AVILA: It is unlikely that there is a front or a heavy structure. There may be three or four bandits, crazy like that, who plant a bomb. But it is quite improbable and, above all, that it is from the so-called “Segunda Marquetalia”, which is that of ‘Iván Márquez’. This for at least three reasons.
The first thing is that a front there needs some support fronts that have to be in the lower part of the Duda river canyon, more precisely on the sides of the municipalities of El Castillo or Mesetas, in Meta. And what there is is a front, but of the dissidents of ‘Iván Mordisco’, who are at war with those of ‘Iván Márquez’. And this was made public about a month or a month and a half ago, when some ex-combatants had to leave there.
The second, because there is no evidence of the presence of a heavy structure. There is evidence of a person who would be putting pressure on peasants in the area. And the third thing is because there is a very high presence of the Public Force.
So, of course, security in Meta has deteriorated, but that ad (the one about the presumed front 53) seems more like a pamphlet than anything else.
ENS: You have just released the book “Criminal Map in Colombia”. On this basis, a question regarding a controversy in recent days: How many members do the illegal armed groups have today?
A.V: Fifty-two criminal organizations and the ELN guerrilla operate in Colombia. That is, a total of 53 large structures. Regarding the ELN, it operated in 99 municipalities in 2018 and today it operates in 163. That is, they doubled, especially in the Duque period when there was a great deterioration. The dissidences went from operating in 56 municipalities to 123, they also doubled.
So yes, there is growth. The question is whether this growth has brought an increase in the number of people who are part of these groups? Yes, there has been growth, but it is not overwhelming. The ELN, in the best of cases, would have some 4,000 people under arms; the ‘Clan del Golfo’ would be around 4,000 or 4,500; the dissidents will be between 2,300 or 3,000… In total, if you negotiate with some seven or eight criminal organizations, bring them to justice and negotiate with the ELN, I think there would be a total of 20,000 people who would come out of the war .
ENS: Within those 20,000 people are counted those who are in prison?
A.V: It is not counted there, but in the case of the ELN it should not exceed 400 people, in the ‘Clan del Golfo’ something similar, but there is not much in prisons.
criminal dimension
ENS: The Ombudsman warned of a critical situation regarding regional security. What is happening?
A.V: Colombia has been facing a security crisis for the last three or four years, which began or deteriorated greatly during the Duque era and which this government has not been able to stop. Today (yesterday) they presented the new security and defense policy, we are going to see what results it gives.
ENS: That being the case, is the government’s thesis logical in the sense of negotiating with all armed groups, whether or not they have a political status?
A.V: Yes. What I have said is that negotiating with the ELN is a very big political leap for the country. A leap that is to end the political justification of violence, is to end 70 years of an armed conflict. But, statistically, that is irrelevant: the ELN today represents more or less 10 or 12% of criminal activity.
So statistically there isn’t much. On the other hand, the so-called “high-impact criminal groups”, of which there are 52, represent 65% of criminal activity. That is to say, politically negotiating with them is not so transcendental, but statistically it is very big.
It is only when one understands this that one realizes the importance of negotiating with the ELN, but also trying to bring criminal organizations to justice.